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THE LONDON QUARTERLY REVIEW

APRIL 1931

GOD AND THE UNFATHOMED UNIVERSE

THE thought of our age is concerned, to a quite noteworthy degree, with scientific exploration and with scientific conceptions. With periodic regularity books appear from the press by distinguished students of science, and many of these are read with avidity by a large and increasing section of the thinking portion of the population. Some of these even become 'best sellers,' though whether this fact is to be regarded as commendation or otherwise of the work of their authors, I would myself hesitate to suggest. In any case, books are written, I take it, to be read; and the fact that such books are in growing demand indicates a very intense general interest in what we may call the phenomena of the universe.

The striking feature of the situation is that such books are written, not for the erudite few, but for the intelligent many. Our age is witnessing the democratization of enlightenment. Wireless broadcasting has brought into the homes of hundreds of thousands of people the views of all types of thinker and of scholar. Knowledge and theories, hidden in weighty tomes which have been accustomed to lie entombed in our libraries, to be disturbed only by the occasional student, are now set forth in ways understandable to all who will make the effort to think. Ideas filter down from the researchers and from the thinkers to the general intelligent consciousness with a rapidity which would have staggered our fathers. To-day there is an open forum for the discussion and promulgation of all new ideas, however revolutionary they be. The truth is, we are living in days of a thought-revolution to which

there is no real parallel in history. Signal eras of the past when the human mind took a big step forward are not overlooked in the making of such a statement. For there has been no era in the past in which it was possible for a whole thinking age to follow so closely in the footsteps of the leaders; and it is this fact which gives uniqueness to our time.

This is the situation to which the Christian Church has to address herself. Her teachers and preachers must not lag behind the thought of the age, if they would have a message for the age. Her thinkers must be on the watch-tower, and, surveying the whole thought-situation which presses upon the Church's so frequently bewildered people, must set forth in coherent terms the eternal truth of God in terms of the intellectual *milieu* of the times.

The quite remarkable fact of the whole situation is that, whenever discussion arises as to scientific discovery and explanation, the question is immediately, and generally, raised: *And now what is the bearing of all this upon the ultimate beliefs of humanity?* Science opens up fascinating, if bewildering, vistas to our thought and to our imagination. But however intoxicating these vistas are, they lead most thinking minds to those more alluring ultimate questions which lie beyond. The scientist himself is aware of these illimitable final prospects. It is hardly any longer true that when he enters his laboratory he can leave his religious, or his anti-religious, convictions at the door, to be taken up just as they were on leaving. Thus, whether he is physicist discussing 'the nature of the physical world,' or astronomer expounding the mysteries of the heavens, he frequently concludes his scientific expositions with an endeavour to show their bearing upon his own ultimate creed. And so Professor Eddington, towards the close of his discussion, sets forth the reasons for his own willingness to enter the 'Church door,' even when 'all the difficulties involved in a scientific ingress' are not resolved. Thus, also, Sir J. H. Jeans, having described 'the mysterious universe' which he and his

confrères have done so much to make more mysterious to the layman—they have not, of course, made it more mysterious than it is; I do not suppose, in fact, that they have even yet indicated how mysterious it in reality is—goes on to set forth his philosophic, or religious, conclusion, or suggestion (the more modest word is more compatible with his general standpoint), of the Great Mathematical Mind behind all.

But, just as the scientist cannot enter his laboratory leaving his religious or his anti-religious creed at the door, to be taken up precisely as it was on leaving, so neither is it possible for the religious thinker to enter his temple or his praying-chamber leaving his scientific beliefs at the door. The situation which confronts us is clearly this: that our thought-world is increasingly seen to be *one*. Religion and science are both manifestations of the reaction of the human spirit to its environment; and the whole endeavour of modern thought is to achieve a unification which will give rightful place to the legitimate scope and function of each.

To achieve such unification is obviously a task of the greatest magnitude and the greatest difficulty. All through the ages the philosophers have been seeking it. That they have not succeeded does not mean that they have wholly failed. Each has stated aspects which he has seen. The last word has not been spoken, and never will be spoken by a finite intelligence. Nevertheless, the quest for unification cannot be wholly a vain thing. The whole has meaning, at least, within the final plan and purpose of God.

In the search for *rapprochement* between religion and science certain gains, which we moderns have inherited, have been achieved; and these, as we may venture to believe, can never be lost again.

The *first* is the recognition by religion of what I may call the 'divine' nature of the scientific quest. All truth is of God, and whoever sincerely seeks truth is doing the will of God. This recognition has involved a purification of religion from mistaken, unscientific claims. No longer is it generally

felt that scientific formulations can be repudiated in the name of any inerrancy, whether of institution or of book. Scientific history has given us a clearer understanding of the true significance and value of religious literature. No cosmogonic theory can be banned in the interests of the mythical and poetic imaginings of unscientific eras. No longer do we erect the notice, 'No Thoroughfare—(Signed) Infallibility'; though I ought, I suppose, to exclude Rome and Tennessee from the disinclination which this statement involves. What I wish to say is that there is to-day the general recognition by religion that the whole sphere of the description and co-ordination of events is the province of science.

The *second* is the recognition by science of her limitations. As this is the crucial issue I must discuss it at some length. What precisely, we have to ask, *are* these limitations? They are, I would suggest, limitations, not of subject-matter, but of method or function. In saying that these limitations are not of subject-matter, I am using the word science, not in its narrower sense of natural science, but in its wider sense as organized knowledge. Every phase of human experience is matter for science in this sense. The remarkable feature of scientific thought during the last generation is the claim she makes to undertake the scrutiny and classification of all facts or events, no matter to what sphere they purport to belong. Science for a long time, as Émile Boutroux put it, 'claimed to accommodate herself solely to the phenomena of the material world. She left to metaphysics or to literature the phenomena of the moral order. But it is quite another matter to-day. Having, since the time of Descartes, more and more tested the efficiency of order and method in scientific work, and the relations between the different departments of knowledge, science is henceforth prepared to begin the study of all kinds of phenomena whatsoever.'

This claim, it is obvious, raises the largest, the most far-reaching, questions. For, let it be noted, science does not

seek simply to *amass* facts ; she seeks to co-ordinate, or to classify, them. As Henri Poincaré very well put it : ' Science is made with facts, as a house with stones, but an accumulation of facts is no more a science than a heap of stones a house.' But immediately the question arises as to what is meant by *classification*. I may put the question this way : do we *make* the classification, or do we *discover* it ? Now, it is obvious that the term suggests a mental creation on our part. Nature, for example, does not classify itself. It is we who classify and co-ordinate its sequences, and these sequences thus co-ordinated are called ' laws.' But, on the other hand, it is no less obvious that we can only classify because there is that in the objective world which is amenable to classification. In other words, we discover what is there. And so while, as Henri Poincaré says, science *makes* the house from stones which are already there, yet there is the truth, not to be overlooked, that *the stones are already in position*. In other words, science discovers the house as well as makes it.

Now, this elucidation seems to me of the highest importance for the consideration of the scientific claim to classify and co-ordinate every fact of human experience. For there are facts *and* facts. It is, for example, a fact that the earth moves round the sun. It is also a fact that I can demonstrate this fact. There is the fact in itself, and the fact of my perception, or demonstration, of that fact in itself. And yet when I am asked to say what the fact in itself is I can only say what it is in terms of the way I perceive or know it. This does not mean we are driven to accept a Berkeleyan idealism ; for I do not see how it is possible to equate existence with perception of existence, or, in other words, how perception can be regarded as determinative of reality. But it *does* mean a *rapport* between our minds and objective reality. And this is the fundamental presupposition of every one who believes in truth. Then there is still another kind of fact, different in essential nature from each of the foregoing facts. There is the type of fact whose *whole* factualness, as

far as the visible, the physical world is concerned, is derived from its being in a personal consciousness. There is, for example, my *feeling of choice* when I plunge into the sea to try to save a drowning man, instead of running a mile away to summon the nearest assistance. Or there is my *sense of moral disapproval* when I hear a jesuitical defence of a lie. Or there is my *aesthetic appreciation* in listening to a symphony of Brahms, or in looking at an iceberg in the cold, grey wastes of the northern Atlantic. Or there is the 'sense of Presence' which may come to a Wordsworth by Tintern Abbey, or to a Brother Lawrence in the kitchen of a monastery. This third type of fact is, *as fact*, wholly in the mind, in the sense, that is, that it does not derive its factuality from any *visible* reality. What I *will*, I know myself immediately to will. What I disapprove or approve, I know myself immediately to disapprove or to approve. What I appreciate, I know myself immediately to appreciate. The 'Presence' I feel, I know myself immediately to feel.

Now, if science is regarded in its broadest sense as concerned with the classification of all facts, of every description, it is obvious that this third class of facts cannot be classified in the same sense as the other classes of facts. There is not a visible, and perceptible, objectivity in reference to which they can be classified. The characteristic that makes them facts is that they belong to a personal consciousness. How, then, can we classify such facts as the sense of moral approval or disapproval, aesthetic appreciation, the sense of the Presence of God? There are only two ways in which we can do this, or try to do this. The first is the *historical* way; the second is the *philosophical* way. The historical way is the way of the behaviourist psychologist: it is the endeavour to trace, whether in the individual or in the race, the physical conditions, the historical development, the phenomenal antecedents, of such facts. The fundamental inadequacy of this method is that it loses the facts in its method of classifying them. We do not lose the sun in classifying our

perceptions of it. If ever, in our abstractive idealistic moments, we think we do, its light and warmth are always there to remind us that there is an objective something still there. But, in tracing the historical growth of my moral sense, the so-called scientific student of sociology may deceive himself into thinking that he has finally settled with it as an imperative fact of my consciousness. And even when he himself, by an inward moral urge, refuses to acquiesce before, shall we say, the buffetings of society for his revolutionary views, he has so blinded himself by his sociological theory that he has lost the very fact of his own moral conviction. This historical method, I repeat, is fundamentally inadequate; and the reason is that it is based, whether knowingly or unknowingly, upon a materialistic philosophical creed. The sun is there to be perceived; but there is nothing there to be perceived to correspond with my, and his, moral sense.

The inadequacy of the historical way of classifying such facts being noted, there remains the other way—the philosophic way. This way is to seek to ascertain whether there is any kind of invisible objective reality to which these facts have reference, from which they are derived, or on which they depend. And, if so, what is the nature of this objective reality. We are here in a realm where, obviously, natural science has nothing to say—inasmuch as she is not concerned with the invisibles and the imponderables. We are driven to ask ourselves *metaphysical* questions—questions, that is, which go beyond physical reality. We note, for example, that our moral sense, and our spiritual sense, is as much a fact of experience as our perception of the sun. It has come later in evolution than the perception of the sun, for animals see the sun which are, we may suppose, devoid of moral sense. But that should be no reason for refusing to acknowledge an objective reality corresponding to the former while we acknowledge an objective reality corresponding to the latter. If we are going to attribute any meaning to the

whole evolutionary process we should find in these later facts of consciousness a surer guide to reality than the former. And, indeed, we cannot attribute any meaning to anything except as we employ those mental, moral, and spiritual perceptions which the materialist, whether he be natural scientist, psychologist, or sociologist, rules out in advance. By such, and kindred, reasoning we may show the philosophical bankruptcy of the materialist or naturalist creed.

Now, if it be granted that this latter class of facts *are* facts, and that they are not to be explained away, *how* can they be classified? Obviously, again, the classification will be by *value*, and not by mere 'happenedness,' if I may use an ugly word consecrated to a specific and required use by the late Baron von Hügel. In regard, for example, to the moral sense of different individuals, I may talk about them as undeveloped and developed, as high or low, as good or better. How can I thus classify them? Only by the highest moral sense known to me. That is, I classify different scales of value by a sense of value, and, in so doing, I must conceive that there is that in the objective world which is the home of an absolute value to which my own sense of value is only itself an approximation. If I did not do so, how could I value values?

This means that the class of facts covered by the terms metaphysical, moral, aesthetic, spiritual, are not amenable to the type of classification to which the facts of the visible universe are amenable. Science, therefore, can only deal with these facts to any profit by going beyond herself—that is, by merging herself in philosophy. And, inasmuch as it is desirable in the interests of exact thinking to preserve the distinctness of these two terms, it would be well quite frankly to say that they are not amenable to the scientific method.

That is the reason why, while we do not wish to limit the scope or the subject-matter of science, that while, to use Tyndall's words, we recognize the scientific claim to 'unrestricted right of search,' we have also to recognize that, by

her very method and function, there is a subject-matter which eludes her competence, facts which by their very nature lead to issues which demand philosophical interpretation.

Thus, in speaking of the limitations of science, I wish to make as clear as I can what I mean. For it is just here that we find the crux of the whole issue between religion and science. And it is just here that multitudinous confusions arise. The phrase 'delimitation of spheres,' for example, is frequently employed, and it often covers a manifold of ambiguities. If it is used to suggest that science should leave severely alone the experiences covered by the term religion, it is obvious that science does not consent to do so. For a generation, psychological science has been engaged on the very task of examining in an objective manner, and seeking to achieve some kind of descriptive co-ordination for, such facts of experience. What, as religious men, we have to do, as I understand the matter, is not to interdict this examination, in the interests of a 'delimitation of spheres' motto, but *to show that these facts of experience necessarily involve finally interpretative issues*. I know, indeed, that the experienced facts with which *natural* science deals lead on necessarily, also, to the demand for ultimate or philosophic explanation. But it is possible to achieve descriptive concatenation in the realm of natural science which does not obscure the necessity of a final interpretation. Granted, for example, any specific scientific 'law'—gravitation, relativity, and the like—it is not to be supposed that these laws explain themselves: they are observed sequences in the inanimate universe, and leave in every thinking mind the question: And now how am I to understand this ordered universe? It is not, however, possible to achieve descriptive concatenation in what we may call the mental, moral, and religious sciences without obscuring, at least to all but the elect, the essential quality of the different type of facts of experience involved. For this type of fact is a fact of *value*. In classifying the facts of consciousness, consciousness itself remains.

In classifying moral judgements, moral consciousness remains. In classifying religious experiences, religious experience remains. And these ultimate remainders are usually overlooked by our materialist psychologists and sociologists.

I do not myself care for the phrase 'delimitation of sphere' as applied to science and religion respectively. If the universe is *one*, such delimitation is, in point of fact, hardly possible, however convenient it may be in theory. The philosophy of a religious man must embrace the facts of the phenomenal universe. And, I should like to add, the philosophy of a scientist must embrace the facts of the spiritual universe. No; it is better, as I think, to speak of the limitation of *method*, or *function*, as involved in the scientific approach to reality. The scientific descriptions, known as laws, which seek to explain the universe leave the universe itself still to be explained in the final philosophic sense. The universal order of nature remains after we have traced and described that order. So, also, consciousness remains after its physical mechanism has been described. Thus all the endeavours made to explain away our mind, our purpose, our moral endeavour, our spiritual insight and awareness, leave these still with us, and still in the deepest sense unexplained.

Science, we are told, has become humble in an unfathomed universe. But the real source and significance of this humility is not always noted. It is not just that the universe is *bigger* than it was once demonstrated to be; bigness has very little to do with an adequate humility. And, in any case, no mid-Victorian scientist, if he were to come back to-day, would be at all surprised at the relatively immense distances in space computed by our modern astronomers. It was not, in other words, his smaller *known* universe which caused his lesser humility. Nor was it that he was less aware than the modern scientist of the fact that our perception of phenomenal reality is determined by the senses we possess.

The significance of Voltaire's philosophical romance about Micromegas and his one thousand senses was as clearly perceived two or three generations ago as it is to-day. No ; the real source of the real humility which characterizes the really scientific thinker arises from the recognition that the ultimate questions are not amenable to the scientific method. In other words, there is the growing recognition of the necessity of some type of metaphysics if we are to seek to answer these questions. The confident prophecies of Comte are being falsified by history. No 'positivist' age will ever swamp metaphysical inquiry—except when men have ceased to think.

If I have been able to carry my readers with me thus far, it will be seen that God is not accessible to the scientific method. Both First Cause and Final Cause are outside the purview of descriptive concatenation. The scientist has no need of that hypothesis, and this, not because it is not a necessary final hypothesis (we hold it is), but because to resort to such a hypothesis is for science to go beyond her descriptive rôle. Nor does he expect, by searching the heavens, to discover God : as, indeed, he does not expect (was it not Mr. Bernard Shaw who suggested this rejoinder to Lalande's famous remark) to discover a *mind* by searching a brain with a microscope. The futility of the telescopic search for God should no more lead to the negation of God than the vanity of the microscopical search for mind should lead to the negation of mind.

We do not expect any scientific 'demonstrations' of God. Nor do we expect logical 'proofs' of God. The *conclusion* always says more than the premisses. The plain man, I may be reminded, likes demonstrations and proofs. I cannot be responsible for the materialistic presuppositions of 'the plain man,' whether inside or outside the Church. If we had our 'demonstration,' our loss would be greater than our gain. Our demonstrated God would be no God. *Le Dieu défini, c'est le Dieu fini.* No ; God is to be found neither at

the end of a telescope nor at the end of a syllogism. He is not 'proved'; it is He who gives coherence and final rationality to the whole. The conception of God, as Lotze so well put it in his *Microcosmus*, is 'the indispensable presupposition of all intelligibility in finite things.' Or, as R. H. Hutton put it more than a generation ago: without the theistic hypothesis the universe presents 'a spectacle of incredible incoherence.'

It is along these lines that our belief in God has to be philosophically defended—that is, to those, and for those, who need such a presentation. Along the line of such a method of statement, it can be shown, on the one hand, that we do not infer the Infinite from the finite, and, on the other hand, that we do not acquiesce in a final agnosticism. I have spoken of the inadequacy of the former inference. Though my remaining space is restricted, I must say a few words on the barrenness and futility of the latter acquiescence.

The following words from a correspondent recently appeared in *The Times* with reference to Sir J. H. Jeans's hypothesis of the Great Mathematician: 'When man was confronted with mysteries too deep for him, he "created God in his own image."' The great mind of Sir James Jeans has travelled very far, but has at last reached the too deep mystery, and he has created God in the image of a mathematician.' I am not here defending a mathematical conception of deity. But I wish to suggest that the basally agnostic attitude suggested by the words quoted is wholly ruinous. It is ruinous, not only to religion, but to every endeavour of man to arrive at truth.

The final implication of the agnostic theory is that our human *experience* gives us no correspondence with reality. This is an assumption which forbids a man saying anything about anything. On such a theory, there is no real reason why a man should trust his scientific experience any more than he should trust his moral and religious experience—unless, indeed, at the outset he adopts a wholly materialist

creed. If, however, he begins with such a creed, it is idle to disguise it under the seemingly more humble term of agnosticism. For he has really made the most stupendous leap of faith, and a faith which can give no reason for itself. He has jumped from mind, which he immediately knows, to the complete negation of mind. This, therefore, is a faith which merits the epithet *irrational*, and in comparison therewith any kind of spiritual faith seems at least rationally based.

The chief bogey that has been bequeathed to us from some past so-called science is this bogey of 'anthropomorphism.' It is usually just materialism in disguise. It reminds me of the 'bogey-man' I used to meet as a boy at the season of Halloween: he always turned out to be a solid, material body, and quite harmless. I would beseech some of our psychologists and sociologists to examine a little carefully this bogey-man, a really very old gentleman, whom they have decked out in some new psychological and sociological garments.

If I were asked to say what is the ultimate *differentia* between a materialistic or naturalistic approach to a world-view and any kind of spiritualistic world-view, I would say that it lies here: the first reads reality in terms of its *roots*, the second in terms of its *fruits*. And what I am now suggesting is that only the latter mode of interpretation can, as it were, stand on its own feet at all; can, alone, in other words, enable us to say anything rational about the universe.

It is, indeed, a mysterious universe that we inhabit. But at once the most mysterious and the most revealing thing about it all is the fact that there is a rational, moral, and spiritual being in it.

I am not here concerned with setting forth the grounds of theistic belief: I have been concerned mainly with presuppositions, or, if you will, with an orientation. And my suggestion is that, building, as we must, upon our human *experience*, and seeking, as we must, some *Ground* for the

whole, we cannot, under the spuriously humble plea of agnosticism, degrade this Ground by refusing to ascribe to It less than the highest known to ourselves. And, that being so, we must say *He* instead of *It*. And can we do other than say that He is Perfect and Purposive Spirit ?

And so I come back to the two so familiar sources of never-failing wonder—the world without and the world within. The former, more wondrously than the Psalmist ever knew, ‘declares the glory of God.’ But we are able to say this only because there burns within the whole circle of our experience, as Browning put it,

The central truth, Power, Wisdom, Goodness—God.

C. J. WRIGHT.

THE FESTIVAL OF HANUKKAH

THIS is a learned history by Oliver S. Rankin (T. & T. Clark, 12s.) of the Feast of the Dedication, which, except for reference in the First and Second Books of Maccabees at the time of its appearance, 164 B.C., receives scant mention in Jewish writings till the rise of rabbinic legend. The subject has never received such thorough examination as is here given it by the minister of the parish of Sorbie, Wigtownshire. He investigates the sources; describes Hanukkah as the Festival of Institution, Replenishing, and Renewal; interprets its light-symbol, and gives many interesting details of the lamp for each person which it was counted a meritorious act to provide. The lamp was to be placed at the door of the house, or in the window of an upper storey which looked into the street, if the resident had only part of a house. If scoffers were attracted by the lamp, it was set at the door inside, or, in times of persecution, on the table. These are some of the interesting things to be found in this exhaustive study of the festival which St. John has made familiar to us in his Gospel.

AMERICA AND CHINA

THE United States in a sense is a reaction against the European system, for her foundation was due to a revolt against the intolerance and narrowness of the early seventeenth century in Europe. The Pilgrim Fathers deserted England because there was no scope for the practice of their religious views, and they also left Holland because they did not wish to be absorbed into the Dutch system and so lose their identity. These sturdy, independent, God-fearing settlers brought those elements of character to the creation of the new American nation which to a large extent determined its growth and its aims.

There were also the Cavaliers who settled in the Southern States, who brought over with them their aristocratic principles, and, like the Pilgrim Fathers, a deep contempt for the system which the success of their enemies imposed upon England.

Thus the situation in America before the Civil War of 1861 was to a certain extent a reproduction of the situation in England in the seventeenth century—the protagonists, the Roundheads and the Cavaliers, had merely transferred their abode, but in the process had greatly intensified their antagonism. In both cases the more democratic and more Puritanic cause won; the aristocratic tradition fell before the more virile, more vigorous, more religious, and less cultured North. The Civil War was a calamity, because it was unnecessary and also because it destroyed to a large extent the influence that was exerted by these two sections of the nation. These two groups were both efficient, both actuated by the loftiest ideals, had a firm grip of their principles, and were people of character. The unnecessary war of mutual destruction meant the loss of the flower of the nation. It was a fratricidal struggle for the triumph of a principle, and was not

fought out by hired deputies, as previous wars were, but bitterly contested by opponents who each believed in the righteousness of his own cause. This was all the more regrettable, for the slavery question would have solved itself by sheer force of public opinion in the course of years. Yet perhaps the war settled more than the question of slavery.

With the great elements then in the United States thus weakened, there poured into the States, unchecked from the odd undisciplined corners of Europe, those who had been squeezed out by economic pressure, and a new principle began to assert itself—wealth for wealth's sake. When people have been poor, and have endured the pangs which grinding poverty causes, there is always the passion, when the opportunity occurs, to put the fear of poverty utterly beyond the limits of possibility. The Jew, who has known want in its various forms, illustrates this point well, and the history of the United States since 1870 proves it. In England there comes a time when a person, having earned a competence, definitely wishes to retire. His aim in life had been the realization of an object for which wealth is merely accessory; but in America the control of a fortune, and its extent, are the aim. The old traditions of the Pilgrim Fathers and of the more easy-going Cavaliers of the South have been submerged in this new economic doctrine. As the pursuit of a private fortune is the avowed aim of the individual, so economic prosperity and predominance in the world is the national ideal. In the pursuit of this object they have been quite unfettered by the relics of the feudal system in Europe, which has always regarded wealth of great proportions as the prerequisite of those in power and authority, and arranged the laws to keep it so.

The American nation, then, consists of those who have no reason to regard the European tradition either with awe or reverence, for the foundations on which it is built are very different from those which form the basis of the European society. The American, in building up his institutions, has

been indebted to Europe, but very often in the negative sense, in that he has deliberately avoided the institutional forms which Europe values, often, of course, to his own detriment. As in the field of industry, commerce, and agriculture, success has been secured by launching out upon new methods and by never being tied down to the conventional, so in the arts and in education generally this pioneering spirit has been of necessity introduced. Emphasis on originality, initiative, and defiance of accepted standards has been the motive which prompted those who have been responsible for educational development. They have looked forward and not backward; they have sought to adjust their aims and methods to needs of the economic world, for it is that which absorbs into it the best of the manhood of the U.S.A., and it is in that world that the dreams of worldly wealth sometimes come true.

The Gothic monuments of France, the art treasures of Italy, the law courts of England, the land of Shakespeare and of Scott, come to be regarded as places of interest—museums which exhibit American origins—curiosities, which have great value because of their rarity and their uniqueness; but America does not yet look back to Europe; she looks forward, and the success achieved in one direction in commerce and industry gives a buoyancy, courage, and hope that the other fields of human activity will, when carefully and fully surveyed, yield the same striking success as the other. Art, literature, music, and such things are merely matters of organization, fields waiting to be conquered, when the other problems are fully solved.

That achievement in these matters does not stand so high is due to the fact that they have not received adequate attention; but there is one of these spheres to which the Americans have already directed their energy in recent years, and which they do highly regard, and that is the world of education. Unhampered again by the feudal notion that education was a dangerous weapon in the hands of the lower

classes, they, individually and nationally, have lavished millions on the development of their system. It has been aptly called the new religion, with its temples placed in every village and its higher institutions in every town. They have taken a view of education which has startled Europe, and certainly done much to stimulate the older countries into activity. Europe acted on the principle in the past that education did not pay, America on the principle that it was the handmaid of industry and therefore paid handsomely. So ardent is the faith of the U.S.A. in this new religion that they are prepared to subsidize missionaries to carry abroad to the East and to the West the new gospel that secular education is a vital necessity of life. It would seem that it is in this direction that the Americans have really found a field they can most legitimately exploit. Already London and Cambridge are heavily indebted to America for educational endowment, but what has been done there is small indeed compared with what they have achieved in China.

Expansion in some form or other is essential to the well-being of a nation as well as of an individual. The spread and acceptance of one's own culture is a testimony to its validity and general excellence. The absence of this expansion indicates its unimportance, spells stagnation, and is a warning of danger, for to depart from, or remain outside of, the general current, without exerting any influence on world affairs, leads to undermining the national confidence, and creates that sense of inferiority which characterizes Russia, and to a lesser extent Italy, in regard to their political systems of to-day.

Nations feel aggrieved and wounded in their vanity if the tribute of flattery by imitation is not paid to them. On the other hand, there is a splendid feeling of exaltation generated within the nation when its institutions are prized and copied. England rejoices in the spread of her political ideals, in the establishment of parliaments on the democratic basis; she sees her games spread and her athletic prowess challenged,

and is not unhappy if defeated by her own pupils. Greece saw her culture spread and felt proud ; Rome realized her excellence in the spread of her military and legal systems. France generously opens the doors of her universities to fifteen thousand foreigners—a quarter of her undergraduate population—who thus flatter her self-esteem by asking to partake in her intellectual feast. Each nation yearns to be recognized and copied in some particular virtue.

Physical force was the only recognized means in the past of bringing about a state of things by which as large a number of other persons as possible would come to think on the same lines as ourselves. The basis of patriotism, of course, is an exaggerated notion of the superiority of one's own culture, and implies the duty of persuading other nations to adopt it. Such acceptance adds to self-esteem. This military method, however, of becoming confirmed in the excellent opinion we hold of ourselves is for the present out of fashion. It is no longer respectable as a weapon for extending national prestige. The Americans realized long before the war that the conquest of a nation may be made by the most beneficent and benevolent processes, and with the consent and co-operation of the nation or people itself. Schools, colleges, and universities are cultural fortresses far more effective and lasting in the influence they wield than the military colonies the Romans established, for example, in Britain, at Chester, York, and such places.

The Rockefeller Institute, the Peking University, the Tsing Hua College, all placed in the ancient capital of China ; the Ginling College in the new capital, Nanking ; the Lingnan University, in the southern capital, Canton ; Yale in China at Changsha ; St. John's University at Shanghai—these are a few of the American institutions which are doing admirable work on the very best lines, in an atmosphere that is primarily American. Then there is the Chinese Press, largely controlled by American returned students, and the numerous Y.M.C.A.s which are on American lines and

diffuse their hygienic and general health principles on which America lays such great stress. The books read in schools are largely the products of an American-controlled firm of publishers. So much is China indebted to America for her educational ideals that one person long resident in China asserted that for practical purposes the educational system of China is controlled and guided from Columbia University. These forms, then, of benevolent activity prompted by religious conviction without the religious side obtruding itself too prominently are an unconscious and sublimated form of imperialism. They have the advantage over the older method in being respectable as well as acceptable.

China herself, unfortunately, long ago reached a condition where she could not expand or radiate her influence. The imperial power came up against dynamic forces which not only denied this cultural expansion, but added insult to injury by convicting it of inferiority, or at least of inefficiency. The West plainly showed that she attached no value to the Chinese system, and had no intention of adopting it in any particular, much less in submitting to it. Pride gradually gave way to disillusionment, and to the realization that the East must conform to Western thought or perish. China, then, a great nation, at present suffers from the fact that her civilization and culture are neglected, and not esteemed in any high degree, except as curiosities. She has become attached to traditions the world now passes over. Her culture at present, like the silver basis of her currency, has no world value. She is bound, therefore, to look to the West for guidance and instruction in order to secure a knowledge of those factors which will bring her into line with Western development. Western nations, always eager to expand their power and always willing to communicate their own ideas of national development, are only too glad to seize the opportunity and privilege thus extended. England has done much through her commerce and her missionaries to teach her ways. The French likewise through the

devotion of their missionaries have done much to extend the religious grip of the Roman Catholic Church—but the Chinese, on the whole are not susceptible to religious influences.

It remained for the Americans to discover the most effective method of approach to the Chinese mind. Other missionaries made Western secular knowledge the peg on which to hang the religious teaching, whereas the American makes the religious teaching the peg on which to hang the secular knowledge, for in America, nationally and individually, there is a firm conviction that the economic salvation of the world lies in raising its educational standards. This is the new intellectual gospel which is being preached with far more vigour and conviction than the old spiritual message. When the American had to decide what he would do with the Boxer Indemnity, his power of going direct to root causes led him at once to expend the money on education for the benefit of China. The Boxer Rising was the last dying combat of the Eastern and Western forms of culture. It prepared the Chinese mind, not for the ready reception of the moral and religious teaching of the West, which it scorns, but for the acquisition of Western scientific thought, which it fears and values. America, on the principle that one should take the hair of the dog that did the biting if a cure was to be effected, offered a portion of her vast resources, in addition to the return of the whole of the Boxer Indemnity, for the re-establishment of Chinese education more or less on Western lines. The cost to the American nation was the indemnity, supplemented by the very generous gifts of various societies and individuals, and the reward was, and is, being reaped in influence exerted and the goodwill of the Chinese earned.

England seems incapable of seeing the change of emphasis. She has always regarded learning as the exclusive privilege of the few, and not the right of the nation as a whole. She has herself been niggardly and sparing in her policy, and only late in the nineteenth century did she feel any national responsibility for the state of education in Great Britain.

This feudalistic attitude has been a severe handicap in her cultural relations with the Chinese, who, as a nation, have a far more profound reverence for the scholar than the English have. We should feel depressed if in China we did not hold the premier position in the field of commerce and in the naval and military sense, and yet we are content to be relegated to an inferior position in a field which is not less important, if we take longer views and wish to maintain our supremacy even in the two spheres mentioned. True, we have established the Hong Kong University, which is not so much a tribute to our generosity and foresight as a monument of British negligence. Instead of being a vigorous and lusty power in China, it is not yet crawling as a healthy infant in its own narrow environment. Had it been adequately endowed, had a stream of students from China proper been encouraged by a generous provision of scholarships, and had further scholarships been provided from it to England, the political situation in China might have taken on a different complexion. But we do not somehow or other realize that the power of a nation to-day depends on the opportunities seized for the extension of her culture. There was a time when, following the example of America, a few idealists persuaded the British Government to allocate the Boxer Indemnity to educational purposes. That time passed; the practical mind of the British reasserted itself, and soon river conservancy and railways were included, though education was still a consideration. Then the British Government, after deciding to hand over the balance unconditionally, got a grip of realities and determined to hand it over on condition that railways were built and that the orders for the materials were placed in England. The Hong Kong University, rumour has it, has to get a wholly inadequate sum to keep it alive.

The English, apparently, are incapable of thinking except in terms of the concrete, and not further ahead than one year. The American nation, that curious combination of

sentiment, idealism, and materialism, seized the opportunity at the critical time and supplied the educational need just at the moment when China as a nation was making her first real conscious contacts with the Western intellectual world. Her great resources were thrown into the work, and, with characteristic vigour and enthusiasm, which made up for many defects, she has been able to give a bias to the Chinese system which is destined to last for many generations, perhaps indefinitely. China welcomed this invasion and this form of conquest, for the Oriental system of thought proved inadequate in face of the changed situation. By a stroke of genius and imagination, America delivered the intellectual goods at the opportune moment, and is bound to reap the material rewards that such foresight merits.

But America enjoys other advantages besides these. The national mood fits in exactly with that of Young China today. This appeal which the U.S.A. makes to the Chinese student might, by some, be lightly dismissed as due to proximity, to cheapness of education in that country, to the influence of the numerous American institutions in China, such as those which have been mentioned, which direct the stream of students towards American shores by securing credit for the school work done in China and by creating a familiarity with the American system in its early stages. A student who has acquired a taste for a certain type or system will naturally wish to follow out that system to its logical conclusion. Once the stream has started in a certain direction, its volume is increased by the mere lapse of time, provided the students are satisfied that the results are what they desire. Such are the factors which are supposed to have created the present numbers of Chinese students, namely, 2,500 in U.S.A. and less than 250 in Great Britain.

This is, however, not the full explanation. Its meaning must be sought by a more critical examination of the mentality of Young China. How far does the American system, the educational and social environment, respond to the hopes

and aspirations of the young student? Is not the solution to be found in the fact that Young China and America are both revolutionary, or, to put it less violently, both seeking to challenge tradition, and to question the age-long conventions? The United States in origin and in growth, it has already been said, is a reaction from, and a protest against, the cramping and restrictive social systems of Europe. Young China seeks for sympathy and co-operation in the fight it is making against the crusted conservatism of the past. America is a country of pioneers, seeking to master and bend the physical environment to its will and its needs. This spirit is also carried into the social, political, and economic world, wherein nothing has existed long enough to be sacred. There is no need, therefore, for reverence. If a convention or a ritual is an obstacle to progress it is scrapped, for everything is on trial or is in the experimental stage. It is precisely this mental attitude towards life that appeals to the young Chinese student, who sees that the advance of China in the economic and political spheres has been barred by the dead hand of the classical culture. It is not enough, however, to feel that, or realize it; it is necessary to have the support of a powerful ally in defying it and in changing it. The American nation supplies that comfort, and provides the necessary example, which has the further advantage of having proved materially successful. Would the Chinese student secure the same satisfaction if he proceeded to Europe? He would not. Of necessity he must proceed to the country where there is no doubt, no hesitation, about the system adopted, where there is a whole-hearted enthusiasm for the cause, and where there is a refusal to be tied down to the past and a determination that every institution, every method, and every organization must submit itself to the test of utility and prove successful or be abandoned. The young Chinese student must have this support, since he must be extreme in his demands for reform, as the forces arrayed against him in China are equally

strong. The national inertia, the adherence to the old rigid tradition, the active opponents of the new ideas, and the stout defenders of the old—these have got to be driven out of their entrenched positions in order to make way for the newer system, which promises material prosperity if nothing else. At any rate, the new movement means activity and replaces stagnation ; it has no respect for, nor patience with, anything that is merely old and does not change. Hustle and bustle are new virtues, and opposition to experiment and to innovation is the new vice and no longer an old virtue.

It is in America, then, that the Chinese student is confirmed in, and not initiated into, this fresh outlook upon his country and its affairs. He finds there just that mental stimulus and encouragement to the mood which is already part of him, and which he has acquired in his first contacts with Western knowledge while in, and because he is in, his own country. In America he finds the Western system growing unhampered by its earlier associations, and taking on an extreme form which this freedom permits. The Returned American Students are far more effective missionaries of the new creed, economic prosperity, than the Americans themselves are of the old in China—Christianity.

The Chinese student, as we have already said, would not find similar conditions in Europe. His conviction that salvation lay in change from the old accepted standards would be undermined rather than confirmed. He would probably find that there was more hesitation in departing from the old tried methods, and less inclination to trifle with, and experiment with, matters affecting spiritual, mental, and moral growth. He would find a more widespread belief that the ancients had found the key to life, than that the moderns had, and the notion rather widespread that the noise and activity of the present generation was merely a method of concealing its inherent intellectual poverty. He would find that progress in Europe could not be marked day by day. He would therefore conclude that, as it produced no tangible

results, Europe was stagnant. In short, he would find Europe insipid. Young China is determined to have some evidence, some outward and visible sign, of progress. The extreme conservatism on the one side has provoked the extreme radicalism on the other, and so the student looks towards that country for inspiration which has furnished the clearest proof that the high road to wealth lies through contempt for convention and tradition, and a refusal to acknowledge the value and validity of methods merely because they are ancient. So long as the change in China is incomplete, Young China will regard the United States as its mentor, because that country is the finest exponent of the view that happiness depends on material prosperity, and that is the goal towards which Young China is moving. China has long suffered from the vices inherent in poverty, while the U.S.A. now exercises all the virtues that spring from affluence. All the intensive moral teaching of Confucius has done little or nothing to eradicate the age-long graft, squeeze, and corruption in public life in China, for poverty, banditry, corruption, and opium are merely different facets of the same problem—the low economic plane of life. Henry Ford points the way to salvation, to mass production, and thereby to the creation of that surplus wealth which will mean leisure and opportunity to pursue the higher human interests unfettered by the need to turn every atom of human strength to the production of the mere necessities of human existence.

China, on the face of it, is potentially as wealthy as America. It occupies a stretch of territory lying largely in the temperate zone, irrigated by the most magnificent rivers, which afford a natural means of access to the rich interior. Its soil is rich and varied, while its 400 million people are unequalled throughout the world for their quiet industry, patience, and peaceful nature. What has been achieved, therefore, in one place can likewise be achieved in another, given similarity of conditions. The world is now embarking

on the road of industrial and commercial progress. Its unity has been achieved by the marvellously improved communications; for the next fifty years the acquisition of wealth by military exploitation and by making other nations poor will be abandoned. The economic interdependence of the world is now recognized, so that, so far from China being hindered from following the example of America and becoming wealthy, she will be encouraged. The world has no longer any profit or pride in slums, whether on the national or the municipal scale. We no longer rejoice in the poverty of our neighbours; every foreigner is of interest to us. His financial standing concerns us, for he is a potential customer, and therefore we are ready to love him if he is rich, and to encourage him to be so if he is not.

Some students on their return from the U.S.A., it is said, break down and weep when they approach their own shores and are brought face to face with the staggering problems that present themselves in concrete form before their eyes. This sudden realization of the chasm that separates the Western world of material plenty and prosperity from the Oriental world of crushing poverty, disease, and filth, is well calculated to stimulate to white heat the passion for reform, if it does not stun it altogether because of the magnitude of the task which lies in front. Some few, indeed, do feel the hopelessness of it all, and despair of making the slightest impression on the solution of the problem by their own puny efforts. They soon revert—forget the four years abroad, or regard them as an airy dream, and merge themselves into the ordinary everyday life, strengthening again that solid phalanx which sees no hope in these innovations. No country in the world has so great a power as China of assimilating alien elements. It is not difficult, therefore, to re-absorb her own sons, who temporarily have been seduced from their loyalty, and who have not got that strength of resistance which comes from a firm conviction that the salvation of China lies in the alteration of her course.

Some, indeed, do draw up very carefully schemes of reform, new methods of taxation largely extracted from the Western text-books, new panaceas for the economic ills drawn from the same sources. These are duly presented to the provincial governors, who politely receive them, acknowledge their excellence, and with equal politeness go on their way ignoring them. The youth is soon fatigued, and consoles himself with the thought he has done his best but that no one will listen to him. Having come in on the higher plane of scholarship, he cannot descend to the lower one of the school-boy and agitate; he simply ceases to be public spirited, and begins to pursue his own interests in private. He is lost to the forward movement.

Still there is a residue that remains stout-hearted, and is proof against all rebuffs and all the obstacles raised against it. It reaches office through family influence or college connexions. It is this group which provides the buoyancy and enthusiasm, and proclaims its splendid faith in the future prosperity and greatness of China. They are untroubled by doubts; they have one model and one only—the United States—and they march forward unhesitatingly to their goal. They do not believe in this poetic nonsense about the narrowing lust of gold. On the contrary, it is the passion for gold, and what it connotes, which will open avenues at present inaccessible, and will make life sweeter, nobler, and richer in quality. Henry Ford, gold, wealth—in fact, everything that the United States stands for in the economic world—is the lodestar of Young China to-day. As an aim for China it is desirable, perhaps, but as an ideal it is inadequate because it is incomplete.

From the English point of view, the American system of education is not altogether suitable because it makes the Chinese student feel that there is some special virtue in the scrapping of the old and in the establishing of the new, and that the mere activity suggests progress. Change, experiment, and stunting without any very definite end in view

seem to be the inheritance of those who imbibe the tradition of the U.S.A. The excessive devotion to organization, to the card-index type of life, the worship of the form rather than the content, the collection of data without the power of making the deductions or discovering the relationships and formulating the laws, all this reaching out in an ambitious way to something which is indefinite and certainly not clearly envisaged, leads to a haziness, and finally to disappointment and disillusionment. The material prosperity of the U.S.A. is not only likely to obscure the grave defects of their educational system, but to attach to it an importance, and create a faith in it, to which it is not by any means entitled.

Just as the wealthy person is forgiven much, so in the same way the astounding success of the American commercial system carries with it the conviction that everything in the social organization must be a factor in that commercial success and efficiency. If, however, the latter is due to factors other than an inherent goodness in the social structure, if, for example, it is largely due to the access of wealth brought to the U.S.A. through the world war, then it may be that the educational system gains by reflected glory, and is not worthy of imitation because of its own intrinsic value. It only gains prominence and publicity because it is linked to something that is striking, because of its outstanding prosperity. The admiration for one thing tends to spread over all, and in this way the real truth is obscured. Another important reason why the United States is not the ideal country for the education of Chinese students at present is because the failure to enforce prohibition has produced a disregard for law such as has no parallel in modern times. The criminal records of a city like Chicago surpass anything to be found in the history books, and are a poor object-lesson to a Chinese who goes abroad to learn the art of government in accordance with Western civilization. What the Chinese want is contact with a stable, well-organized, and efficiently managed city, where there is reverence for tradition, a profound

respect for law and order the violation of which is visited promptly and inevitably with adequate punishment.

But the American scheme of education for China is especially incomplete because of all countries China is the most historically minded. True, she has reached the present impasse by being excessively attached to the old traditions. Her civilization became rigid and unyielding, and unequal to the strain of adjusting itself to the new situation created by the European political and commercial expansion of the nineteenth century. The new problems could not be solved by the old Confucian methods. The nation, so long as it lived in splendid isolation, could be indifferent to the outside world, and develop a national satisfaction with things as they were, provided there was no menace or challenge. A nation in such circumstances loses its plasticity and develops a kind of social sclerosis which follows from the absence of, or the suppression of, that criticism which would break up the conservatism, which looks exclusively backward and which ignores the new conditions brought about by alien and external forces. The prophets of a nation are as necessary to its salvation as the priests. It is the duty of the former to look forward and prepare the nation for the necessary adjustments. It is the business of the latter to preserve and hold fast to the old traditions. China suffered from an excess of the latter type, but there is now an equal danger of her suffering from the excess influence exerted by the former type. There is bound to be reaction towards the old system, for the national pride in its own civilization cannot be destroyed, however ardent the new reformers may be. It may be submerged for the time being, and Confucius may be burnt in straw, as at Changsha in 1926, because he represents the old classicism, while Sun Yat Sen is enshrined as the new God because he stands for the modern scientific spirit, but there must be a reconciliation, or otherwise China must be content to start her history from 1911 and jettison her old art and literature, which will then occupy the museums and libraries

of Europe, and perhaps America too, where their value as curiosities of civilization will be beyond price.

China will learn from the U.S.A. better than from any other country the method of emancipation from the tyranny of hard work. Horse-power must be substituted for man-power, the motor-car for the rickshaw, and mass production for the domestic industries, but if, in the process of this liberation from the shackles of physical labour, mechanization imposes a new tyranny, then China will be in danger of becoming soulless in her pursuit of freedom, leisure, and wealth. Let us hope, however, that in the colossal transformations which are imminent something of the beauty of the old spirit will be retained, and that the best elements in the old structure will be used in building up the new skyscraper.

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Robert Louis Stevenson: The Frail Warrior. By Jean Marie Carré. Translated from the French by Eleanor Hard. (Noel Douglas. 7s. 6d.) This is a biography of special interest to all lovers of R. L. S. His warts are not ignored. His foolish youth in Edinburgh is clearly painted, and the long apprenticeship to the art in which he became a master stands out clearly. He was fortunate in his marriage, though his wife's yoke was sometimes heavy, and her prejudices lost him a chosen friend, but she had the strong common sense and the driving-power which he lacked, and she never failed to use them. The Life is beautifully written; there are no wasted words; it sparkles and fascinates, and it loses nothing in the fine translation. It is a relief to find that Thomas Stevenson, after years of disappointment, lived to be proud of the son who had added new charm to English literature by his verse, his essays, his fiction, his letters, and his Vailima prayers.

THE FIRST AND THE FOURTH GOSPELS COMPARED

IT has often been pointed out that what look like traces of Johannine tradition can be discovered here and there in the text of Luke's Gospel. Those who, like myself, do not believe that the Fourth Gospel was written by John the son of Zebedee are not likely to attach much importance to the order, found in Luke's Gospel, 'Peter, John, and James,' instead of 'Peter, James, and John,' as in Matthew-Mark, for the association of Peter and John in the Acts would sufficiently account for so slight a change as this. But, in regard to 'this is your hour and the power of darkness,' any one of us would, I imagine, have guessed that the Fourth Gospel was being quoted, if we did not know better. But links like these between the Third and Fourth Gospels are few, striking as they are when we come across them. Scholars seem to be agreed that the Fourth Evangelist knew Mark's Gospel, and sometimes corrected its narrative in regard to matters of fact. No one has, so far as I know, suggested that there exists any kind of relation between the First and Fourth Gospels other than that of complete contrast. I shall not try to establish any such connexion, but merely plead that they should be studied together, as being complementary though divergent embodiments of one great idea. Behind each of them lies a long tradition, centring round the name by which the Gospel is known; they are the two consummate Gospels, binding together all the Christology of the New Testament; between them they provide the clue to apostolic and sub-apostolic doctrine.

It has always been difficult to understand why the Logos doctrine so prominent in the prologue of the Fourth Gospel is never referred to again in its pages. The difficulty is not really met by the theory that it was written last, or that the

editor, as distinct from the witness who 'wrote these things,' was responsible for it. I would rather accept Dr. Andrews's suggestion to the effect that iii. 13-21 and 31-8 belong to the prologue, and should be extracted from their present context and appended to i. 18. By this procedure we get a complete *résumé* of the ideas underlying the Gospel; we pass naturally from the Logos to the 'only begotten Son,' from the Only-begotten to 'the Son of Man' who came down from heaven, from the exalted Son of Man to the Spirit. The whole process comes under review: the pre-existence of the Heavenly Man as the Logos; His incarnation; the purpose for which He came, with preparations for His coming; His lifting-up upon the cross; His ascension; the gift of the Spirit; and eternal judgement. We begin with the life scattered through the universe, the vital principle in nature and the light of men, and pass on to the same light viewed as concentrated in the incarnate Son of Man, and so to men's reactions to it. The whole conception is theocentric; the Son comes out from God and goes back to Him. The Logos is the Son, eternally present with His Father, before His incarnation; the Spirit of truth, that 'other representative,' is the *alter ego* of Jesus, eternally present with believers after the Ascension. An idea something like Ruysbroek's great saying, 'Life is nothing else than the outward journey of the soul to meet its brother souls; death nothing else than the return journey of the soul to meet its God; and these two are one,' seems to underlie the Fourth Gospel. All that comes from God, 'only begotten Son, Spirit, he that is born of the Spirit,' comes out from God and goes home to Him, for to 'go home' is surely the translation of the Johannine *ἐλθέω*. 'The Spirit breathes where *He* willeth'—the thought is not that of capricious, but of ordered though unseen, movement—'you hear the sound it makes, but do not know whence it comes or whither it goes home.' So, too, of Jesus; He came out from God, and is on His way back to God; neither friends nor foes know where He is going,

though His friends are ready to believe that He came out from God, and some of the Pharisees are bound to admit that He was sent by God—a very different thing! As the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus are successive stages of His journey forth and back, so it is with those who believe in Him. Faith is not a single act, but a process, by which the power of the Father working through the Son draws them into the track along which Son and Spirit move from the unseen into the seen, and back again. 'No one has ascended into heaven but He that came down from heaven, the son of Man,' but henceforth the angels of God are continually to ascend and descend by the ladder, the Son of Man. Just as the Cross is the lifting-up, the glorification, of Jesus, so the hour of the believer's death will be *his* consummation—'I will raise him up at *his* last day.' The Incarnation is the Son's coming down; the Cross, the Resurrection, the Ascension, the three stages of His going home. For Him the process is from the unseen into the seen; for the believer, from the seen into the unseen—his goal the achievement of faith without sight. But, for the present, the Word must become flesh, if we are to behold His glory—the Cross—we must 'eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Son of Man'; otherwise we have no life in ourselves. 'Signs' are necessary, a kind of concession to men who cannot yet escape from the world of sense—'If I have told you earthly things, and you do not believe, how could you believe if I told you of the heavenly realities which they embody?' So the business of the Son of Man is to reproduce in the world of time and space, and in little, what the Father is always doing on a vaster scale. As the Father created man from clay, so the Son makes new eyes for the man born blind out of clay; as the Father turns water into wine, so Jesus; as the Father multiplies loaves and fishes to feed the hungry, so will Jesus. As the Father raises the dead, so the culminating sign of His identity with the Father in purpose and achievement comes when He raises Lazarus, who had been four days in the grave. He sees the Father

everywhere at work, and finds in His human experience that He too can do the same things. Whatever we may think of the historicity of illustrations such as these, it is clear that the evangelist has here given us a valuable clue to the reason for the restraints as well as for the activities of Jesus. It will be found that Jesus everywhere does the kind of thing that we can see God doing, and refrains from doing what, as a matter of common experience, God does not do. He does nothing for man without man's aid; He does not, for instance, turn stones into bread, though He does multiply loaves and fishes when men are willing to throw what they possess into the common stock, and so make the most of them. When they have provided all they can for each other and for themselves, He does the rest. The God whom Jesus sees at work is for ever fighting against pain as against sin, except pain borne for others, but He does not heal men's ills by magic; they must contribute their faith, and He comes in with all the rest. Jesus takes as homely a thing as the yearly miracle of seedtime and harvest, for He sees in it a parable of the government of the universe. The sower sows the seed lavishly on the rocky, the shallow, the weed-infested soil; so God is ever pouring fresh life into the world with an extravagance of creative energy which appals us; His waste of love is staggering to the imagination. In the same way Jesus, the One indispensable, will throw His life away for the many whose continued existence does not seem to serve an obvious purpose. He will make a last desperate appeal to Jerusalem, though He knows, or more than half knows, that His appeal will be in vain. Their obduracy has already been proved in a thousand encounters; but, precisely because God had ever been sending prophets and wise men and scribes all uselessly, all the day long stretching out His hands to a disbelieving and perverse people, so Jesus will throw Himself upon them, though the arms He spreads out will be arms nailed to a cross.

Even in the good soil the seed must die, if it is to bring

forth much fruit ; the law of larger life through death is written everywhere in the world of nature and Old Testament Scripture alike ; the Cross, which stands for the waste of love, means also that it is not all waste. ' Even in the good soil,' we say, for the Fourth Evangelist labours to make it clear that only after the Resurrection did the disciples understand either the Scripture or the words of Jesus. Comparatively little is said, on the other hand, of the fate of unbelievers ; even ' God so loved the world ' is followed by ' whosoever believeth.' One gleam of universal hope appears in ' I, if I be lifted up,' but it is not developed. The horizon narrows down again to Jesus and His ' own ' whom His Father has given Him ' out of the world.' The characteristic note of the whole Gospel from this angle is ' that which the Father hath given Me shall come to Me ' ; as for the others, they are not threatened even with the fire of hell, but are simply left with an explicit statement of their origin—' their father the Devil.' Their destination is left undefined ; like Judas, they go out into ' the night,' and there they are left ; this has always seemed to me somewhat inhuman. Yet even the occasional infelicities of the Gospel—to use no stronger word—the suggestion, for instance, that Lazarus has fallen ill, and been allowed to die, in order that it may be proved once for all that the Son can raise the dead as the Father does, are due to the evangelist's absorption in His idea. It is, perhaps, a shallow impertinence to criticize a work of such extraordinary power and depth as this Gospel, but one is left with an uneasy feeling that the miracles of Jesus here are, as has been said, ' miracles of state ' rather than deeds of compassion ; when, in the same chapter, Jesus is shown as praying, not for His own sake, but for the sake of bystanders, His self-consciousness as here depicted to us comes perilously near to being a pose for effect. That may be a superficial view, but it persists in my mind. I have discovered that it is a good rule to write one's question-marks on the Gospel margins in faint pencil, and then think again ;

it is well to put them down, but it is also advisable to keep the india-rubber handy. All I need say on this matter is that other question-marks have appeared on the margin of my testament, and disappeared again; this one abides; I should only be too glad to remove it, if I could do so without intellectual dishonesty.

Another great idea suggested to the mind, of the Jesus of the Fourth Gospel, by the intricate process whereby the Father feeds His children, fills up to some extent the gap which we discover in the reproduction of His thought-world, but again the idea is not developed; it would seem that the evangelist's main interest did not lie here. It peeps out in the words of Jesus to His disciples after the talk with the woman of Samaria, and is carried further in the eucharistic discourse which is appended to the feeding of the five thousand. The disciples have been forced to go and buy food from despised Samaritans; Jews have no dealings with these people, but, if need be, they will not be too proud to eat the bread for which the people they detest and avoid have toiled. In the sacrament of the bread we eat, God is drawing us together by bonds which are no less real and binding because we do not recognize them. We eat food which men whose faces we shall never see, and, if we did see them, should never desire to see again, have laboured to prepare. By our dependence upon one another God is always drawing reluctant men together; the food they eat is in itself a symbol of the reality from which we are ever trying to escape, the literal brotherhood of man. Here, again, what the Father does, Jesus will do; the living Bread from heaven, which heaven and earth, the light of revelation, the rain of grace, the soil of man's life, have combined to prepare for His coming, is to be drawn together into one consummate Loaf, only to be broken again and thus dispersed to draw all men first to Himself, and then to one another. The same thought, viewed from another angle, is expressed in that loveliest of all eucharistic prayers, which appears in the 'Teaching of the

Twelve': 'As this broken bread was once scattered over the mountains, but has been brought together and become one, so let Thy Church be gathered from the ends of the earth into Thy Kingdom.' I can never understand why this prayer is not used in our liturgy. We are left with the impression that, after all, the idea of the Logos underlies the whole Gospel, though the word in that sense never occurs again in its pages.

In the First Gospel we have the same idea in the concrete, and worked out from a different point of view. I shall assume that the main source of the Logos Christology in the prologue of the Fourth Gospel is to be found in the Wisdom books of the Old Testament and the Apocrypha, though I should not deny the possibility of influence from Philo, and would admit that the conception of the Wisdom of God was not native to Palestinian soil, but is borrowed from Greek Stoical philosophy. Its influence is quite as marked in the First as in the Fourth Gospel, the difference being that the idea is expressed implicitly in words attributed to Jesus in the former, explicitly by the evangelist or his editor in the latter. The evidence for its presence in the First Gospel can be quickly marshalled. In the Wisdom books the Wisdom of God is described as pre-existent with Him before the foundation of the world, as 'initiated into the knowledge of God,' as His agent in creation, ever calling the sons of men to come unto her, and offering to those who submit to her yoke and learn of her rest of soul, calling both bad and good to her banquet, herself being like hid treasure filling the treasuries of her disciples with things new and old, so that they can start housekeeping for themselves, like a great tree under whose branches the birds of heaven make their nests. It is often urged that it is not enough to point out a number of literary connexions between words attributed to Jesus in the First Gospel and the Wisdom books; further proof is needed before we can assume that we have not simply to do with an identification for which the evangelist himself is

responsible. I suppose that critical analysis can never finally settle this problem for us ; in the last resort we must fall back upon private judgement. At present, I cannot bring myself to believe that ' Come unto Me,' for instance, or the parables of the hid treasure and the pearl of great price, do not come from Jesus Himself. If ever there was an inspired word, it is ' Come unto Me ' ; we remember what so exquisite a judge of literature as Walter Pater thought of it, and how by itself it for the moment overmastered his scepticism. Why should we ascribe great ideas to the disciples rather than to their Master ? Surely the probabilities are that great effects come rather from the greater than the lesser source ; denying them to Jesus Himself, we are only making the miracle of their appearance in the Gospels less intelligible. When, especially, we find a conception like this common to Paul and the authors of the First and Fourth Gospels, is it not at least arguable that its inspiration is due to One greater than all three ? All I should ask is that the possibility of His adoption of the doctrine of the heavenly Wisdom should be considered, and that we should not be waved away from the schools, simply because we often find it easier to accept traditional assumptions than the explanations of the critics in cases in which demonstration is, in the nature of the case, impossible. However it came to be there, it will at least be allowed that the Wisdom doctrine is as strongly represented in the First Gospel as in the Fourth. But here it is developed differently. Underlying the Fourth Gospel is the idea that in every man there is, or has been, something divine, the light that ' lightens every man.' That is why the Word can become flesh, why men can rise in the response of faith, through the drawing power of the Son of Man, out of the seen into the unseen. The thought embodied in the First Gospel is rather that in God there is something human, that the deepest truth about God is that He is all that we call humane. It might be said that the Fourth Gospel dwells on the first part of the verse in the Book of Proverbs as set to music by

Cowper, 'Myself the Father's pleasure,' and the First on the second, 'And Mine the sons of men.' In the Fourth Gospel we are told to look at Jesus, and we shall see God in man; in the First, to look at Jesus, and we shall see man in God. 'Is there a man among you?' we hear again and again when He is talking of God. The Sermon on the Mount develops the idea in a score of ways; we are to be perfect men, as our Father is perfect God, and He is perfect God because He lavishes His bounty upon the loveless, as a real man will do. If unspeakably evil things, like the libel that Jesus casts out demons by the aid of the Prince of Darkness, confront Him, 'An enemy has done this'—the fact is not slurred over, nor are the guilty parties absolved; all the same, such things can only happen because men are ruled by an alien power; ultimately nothing that is native to human nature can be responsible. 'Is there a *man* among you who does not think more about the sheep that is for ever straying, the "black sheep" of the family, than for the ninety-nine that can be trusted not to go wrong? Even so your Father's face,' He goes on, 'is set against one of these little people being lost.' Every time we are told of the power of Jesus, we are also told of His pity; indeed, He was so strong, precisely because He was so sorry; He could heal the sick, just because He bore their sicknesses; He could feed the crowd, because He saw them like 'dumb driven cattle, like sheep without a shepherd.' He can equip His disciples with power like His, because He can infect them with His own compassion. His miracles are not wonders which He alone can perform, not miracles of lonely state; as He heals the sick, cleanses lepers, raises the dead, so shall they; as He wins the love of the humble, and persecution from the powerful, so shall they, for their love for Him is to make them what His love for us made Him, at the same time transparently simple and uncannily wise, as 'wise as serpents, as unsophisticated as doves.' All this is possible because the power of loving, and answering to love, links God and man together. 'Greater

works shall ye do,' says Jesus in the Fourth Gospel, 'because I am going away': the First Evangelist might have made Him say the same thing, but it would have been, 'Because I am with you all the days.' It is no accident that, in this Gospel, when they say, 'No one but God can forgive sins,' He does not deny it, but asserts that what God can do in heaven, the Son of *Man* can do on earth, but the crowd 'glorify God, who had given such authority to *men*.' It is in keeping with this emphasis upon the obvious rightness of the things that Jesus does that the argument in the First Gospel is rather to the effect that He must be the divine Wisdom incarnate, because He gives rest to the souls of men, than that He gives rest to the souls of men because He is Wisdom incarnate.

It is true that the human emotions of Jesus are less strongly emphasized in the First Gospel than in the Fourth; we do not hear of His weariness or tears—though perhaps we ought to translate the second infinitive in Matt. xxvi. 37, 'to be unlike Himself'—and His self-determination is almost absolute. What He does He does not do because He sees the Father doing it, for, if His authority is delegated to Him (Matt. xi. 27, xxviii. 20), He is now in complete possession of it; His 'I say unto you' is enough. He is the Wisdom of God, the last secret of the universe and of all history (xiii. 35) yearning over the souls of men, His 'very little brothers,' 'these little ones.' In the Fourth Gospel, Jesus is shown as healing on the Sabbath day, because the Father never ceases, even on the Sabbath, from His activities; in the First the reason for similar action is simply that 'it is right to do good on the Sabbath'; the sacred day is instituted, not only for the worship of God, but also for the more undistracted service of man. There is a sterner side to this Gospel, for the demand for human sincerity and humane compassion is insistent, even threatening, all the more because, to any real man, inhumanity is an intolerable outrage. 'I want true human feeling, not sacrifice.' The Temple is purged and

made wholesome, not merely by the driving out of the cattle-dealers, who represented the unsavoury shambles that it had become, but also by the healing of the blind and lame in its precincts, and the simple praises of the children. Jesus is Power supreme, because He is incarnate Compassion, and the coming of the Son of Man is to set compassion on the throne of the universe, making it a test by which judgement is passed upon 'all the nations.'

There is one curious link between the two Gospels, in the Passion story; each of them tells us that, when He expired, He 'set the Spirit free.' According to our two oldest Greek MSS., their coincidence at this point is still more striking; in these codices both Gospels record the piercing of the side of the Crucified and the coming out of the 'blood and water' ('water and blood' in Matthew). But here is the important difference; in the First Gospel the incident takes place just before His death—and is, indeed, its occasion—in the Fourth just after. In the latter the meaning is clear; by His death Jesus releases the Spirit, the blood, and the water, and these three (cf. 1 John v. 8) symbolize three aspects of the same inspiring power. 'The Spirit was not,' the evangelist says in another place, 'until Jesus had been glorified'—that is, 'crucified'—for, if He does not go away, His 'Representative' cannot come. He said, 'Receive ye the Holy Spirit,' when He showed them His hands and His side; that is the Fourth Evangelist's version of Pentecost. In the First Gospel, on the other hand, the Spirit is set free as a world-redeeming, rather than a Church-inspiring, power. The infinite compassion of the Divine Man has spent itself out in a waste of inhumanity, for the men whom He has come to save have risen in rebellion against this relentless Lover who will not let them go, or leave them alone in their comfortable insincerities, their soft and self-indulgent hardness. Heaven itself seems closed to Him, for His identification with us has now gone so far that He must be, for a moment which was an eternity, lost with a lost world. Compassion

incarnate in Jesus is helpless, desperate, alone, and can only suffer. No longer can relief be found either in anger or deeds of healing; the power which had been going out of Him throughout His ministry has left Him altogether now, and He is suffering that worst agony of extreme physical pain, that it must turn in upon itself. All the same, sheer desperate suffering in the dark can do what all His words and deeds, even His, have never availed to do. The last touch of inhuman indignity, of fallen man's perversity, sets free the water and the blood, the cleansing, life-giving Spirit of compassion to haunt the world for ever with its all-permeating redemptive power; the Wisdom of God, which is the compassion incarnate in Jesus, 'hath power to do all things; and, remaining in herself, reneweth all things; and from generation to generation, passing into dedicated souls'—as they gather round the Cross—'maketh men friends of God and prophets.' Through all the ages men have crucified the Spirit of compassion; that is why the nations have 'gone into age-long punishment,' but through all the ages, and ever more pervasively, the blood crying for vengeance—the voice of their brothers' blood calling from the ground—is now the blood crying for mercy, and the Spirit of compassion which makes men divine, at once the secret of the heart of God and of all His dealings with men, rises again after each crucifixion to ever greater power and victory.

Each of our two Gospels carries us from the descent of the Spirit upon Jesus at His baptism to its transference to the believer at and after the Cross. But, in the First Gospel, Jesus never really goes away, for His Spirit is to be incarnate in His disciples; according to the Fourth Gospel, He does go away, and His Representative takes His place; believers are either to follow Him in a glorious martyr's death, and so to be with Him where He is, or else to stay where they are, till He comes back to take them to Himself. Obviously, the two Gospels are supplementary, and comparative valuations of the ideas they suggest are unnecessary. Together

they give us the consummation both of Gospels and Epistles alike; all the streams of apostolic thinking run into one or the other, and in the end they cry in different tones of the same voice, 'Jesus is Lord.'

J. A. FINDLAY.

CLASSICAL STUDIES AND SKETCHES

'VERONA AND CATULLUS' is the first of these studies by Joseph B. Pike (University of Minnesota Press, \$2). It sets the famous poet in his local environment, describes his passion for the profligate Clodia, and shows by quotations in the Latin and clever translations that had he lived he would probably 'have produced something that in scope and finish would have equalled, or even surpassed, the work of his own rival, Horace.' Giacomo Boni's excavations in Rome are described in a paper of special interest to archaeologists. Ruskin was a potent influence on his art life, and Carducci, the greatest poet of modern Italy, instilled him with a passionate love of his fatherland. The papers on Pliny and Seneca make the Roman society of the first century stand out vividly. Seneca's words have almost a Christian note: 'He is a friend never far off'; 'He is our father'; 'Prayer is a witness of His care for us.' 'Roman Epistolography' shows how world power developed the literary epistle; and another pleasing essay is devoted to 'Classical Predecessors of the Short Story.' The writer's wide knowledge and graceful style make this a book of special charm and value.

Messrs. Skeffington send us three volumes. *The Ladder of Lent*, edited by John H. Burn, B.D. (3s. 6d.), is a course of seventeen addresses for the season. They are impressive and heart-searching. *The Bitter Cost of Redemption*, by Canon Clark-Hunt (2s. 6d.), dwells on the Triumphal Entry and the scenes of Passion Week; and *Agents of the Passion*, by Harold G. Emtage (2s.), shows how Judas, the populace, the priests, Herod, and Pilate brought about the death of Jesus. The character-sketches are powerful and the lessons drawn from them are practical.

The New Knowledge and the Old Gospel, by F. C. Bryan, M.A. (Kingsgate Press), is a series of addresses which bring out the fact that science really makes faith in the existence of God, the original creation, providence, revelation, and the cosmic significance of Christ easier for a thoughtful mind than it was a generation ago. The task is not an easy one, but Mr. Bryan makes his points clearly and impressively. He makes it clear that we can confront the world to-day with Jesus Christ in renewed confidence. Jesus made a stand against our foes by His Cross, and, where men fight with that weapon, victory is sure. We do not wonder that such teaching made a deep impression on Mr. Bryan's hearers.

A SAINT IN THE DARK AGES

THE period between the fall of Rome and the close of the tenth century is often called the Dark Ages, and rightly so. It was a rough, wild time. Feudalism, which had developed on the ruins of the Roman world system though standing in theory for a principle of personal loyalty, perhaps the only alternative to social chaos, was associated with infinite cruelty, and represented actually the doctrine that 'might is right.' The Carolingian Empire of Charlemagne had broken up into certain kingdoms which were, in their turn, divided into innumerable duchies and counties. In the western part of Europe, Louis IV and Lothaire, both men of character and ability, the descendants of the great Emperor, still ruled. In the eastern or German portions the Saxon kings now ruled, and claimed also the Imperial Crown at Rome, contesting their claim with various princes of Carolingian descent resident in Italy. Many of these princes, like Hugh of Provence, were utterly unprincipled, cruel, immoral. Italy was descending into political chaos.

The Church in the deepening anarchy was the only stable institution, but it too had compromised with the paganism it had nominally overthrown, and was influenced by the rampant feudalism.

Popes followed each other in rapid succession, owing their election frequently to the appointment of some local baron. Fighting prelates and adulterers were not uncommon, for the favour of some king or prince counted for more than character or spiritual efficiency in the episcopal elections. Bishoprics were openly bought and sold, for the lands attached to these bishoprics made them attractive to the lover of power and wealth. Life in the monasteries was often demoralized. At Lobbes an abbot was attacked and blinded by his monks ; at St. Rule in Gascony an abbot was killed

in a riot. We read of laymen holding the position of abbots in some monasteries. There was constant friction and discord. The situation must not be overdrawn, but this background must be remembered when we come to consider Rathier, the saint-reformer, whose writings, collected for us by Migne (P. L. 136), give us such a clear contemporary account of the doctrine, ritual, and custom of the Church of the tenth century, and it must never be forgotten that the appearance of such a man, and others like him, is a corrective to a too pessimistic view of the period.

Rathier was born in 890, in Belgium, and as a boy was dedicated to the monastery of Lobbes. His life was very varied and restless. He passed into Italy in 926, and was three times elected to the see of Verona, three times expelled. He quarrelled with his clergy because of their unwillingness to accept Canon Law in its reference to celibacy and equal distribution of Church funds. His zeal for reform also involved him in trouble with the local counts. He spent some years in the south of France and in Germany. For one year, 953-4, he held the bishopric of Liège, but was expelled by some intrigue on the part of a neighbouring count, who wished to install a relative in the wealthy bishopric. Eventually he returned as an old man to his native country and to the monastery of Lobbes. After further trouble and disappointment he became abbot of some neighbouring monastery, and died at Namur in 978. Such wanderings show that life in the Middle Ages was not so monotonous, isolated, and local as it is sometimes portrayed. Here you see the international ideal still governing the Church theory and practice. The same Canon Law, the same episcopal and sacramental system is as valid in Liège as in Verona and transcends local and national boundaries. The Church maintained something of the old Roman Imperial system, and represented not altogether inadequately the principle of World Order and Unity, for it is the One Mother Church throughout the world.

Rathier's character can be traced in his writings. There is a certain lack of tact, and not a little temper at times. His irony can be very bitter. His attack on his enemies does not lack fury and passion. He lashes the vices of the Church with uncompromising directness. He stands firmly by the privileges and prerogatives of his office, and administers Canon Law with a fierce rigidity of purpose. We must, however, never forget he is walking the way of a reformer in an age needing drastic reform, he is surrounded by evils which wound his conscience, and call for his censure. We get bewildered trying to find a way through the mists of dark conspiracies. Rathier seems caught up into the swirl of things, dragged here and there by his own unresting spirit, but also by the changing whims and fancies of princes who knew not the meaning of loyalty; but through it all he remains a man with a message, uncompromising, fearless, and impulsive, but passionately attached to Church order. In his *Confessions* we can discern his sense of sin, his longing for God, his profound humiliation, his purity, his love of Jesus, his infinite hope in God's mercy. From the weakness of man and from the factions of Church and State he appeals to God and the great name of Jesus. 'Pity me, O Thou son of David,' 'I, Rathier the sinner.'

Rathier certainly accepted the Church doctrine and polity of his age without questioning the authority and divine origin of the Church, which he believed to be a visible and universal institution in which alone there was salvation. He accepted the ancient creeds issuing from the Great Councils. Man had fallen in Adam, and needed divine grace. That grace is seen in the death of Christ, who died to release from the Devil and hell, and because of that sacrifice is now available for all men through the sacraments, administered by the properly ordained clergy.

In baptism the guilt of original sin is washed away, whilst for post-baptismal sins there is available the régime of Confession, Penance, Satisfaction by good works. The

Mass is the repetition and memory of Calvary, and there by the word of the priest the bread is changed into the body of Jesus which died on the cross. Rathier held, in fact, the doctrine of Transubstantiation. He did not underestimate the position of the bishop. He held a doctrine of apostolic succession—the bishop was of the ‘*esse*’ of the Church, and his powers—financial, disciplinary, administrative, priestly—were tremendous. He taught the grace of God as initiating salvation, anticipating man’s response and co-operating with it. Yet he took his stand on the freedom of the will of man. Faith to him was both the acceptance of the doctrine and obedience to the divine commands.

He believed in the Supremacy of the Scriptures, which he knew very thoroughly, but at times he exalted the authority of the Fathers as necessary for the actual interpretation of the Scriptures. In all these matters it is quite clear that Rathier belonged to his age. To him the Pope was the Archbishop of archbishops, the see of Rome was the highest see; he gave Rome a special and unique position. He was no Protestant, for he accepted the authority of the Church, a visible institution with its sacerdotal caste, its historic episcopate, its apostolic succession, its divinely appointed sacraments.

Nevertheless, this is not the whole story. Rathier was always a reformer and willing, if occasion demanded, to appeal to the profoundest realities of the moral and religious life, and beyond and above all to God. Let us notice some of these phases of his thought and life.

I. *He was a scholar*, acquainted with the Latin classics; and, if he acquired this information at Lobbes monastic school, this would seem to suggest that these schools were more open to classical influence than is sometimes thought. He knew the history of the Church, and was acquainted with the Fathers, but his knowledge was mainly scriptural. No Protestant or fundamentalist could make greater use of the Bible. There is no science of interpretation, no

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Higher Criticism, but there is a very great use of New Testament texts—the words of Jesus seem to have for him special value. He protested against certain superstitions and the magical use of charms; he knew something of the medicine of his age, and his classical studies gave him a literary style above the average for his times. He strove courageously for a more cultured intellectual life for the clergy.

II. It is certain that a *deep ethical note is struck* here. Puritanism is often associated with Protestantism, but it must never be forgotten (as Mr. Coulton has reminded us) that there was always a definite Puritan aspect to the Church of the Middle Ages. Rathier was essentially a Puritan, teaching the necessity of restraint, discipline, and duty. He emphasized the truth that no outward regulations are of value unless there is right living. His reverence for the Lord's Day and demand for rest from servile toil is a Puritan characteristic. He knows the difference between outward morality and a deep inward morality. Thus sin destroys the effects of Confession and Penance, and turns the blessing of the sacraments into a frightful curse. Humility, charity are the roots of all virtue; hypocrisy, luxury, pride are three of the sins, and sin is a matter of will and heart and inner disposition. Those who fulfil the high office of bishop must be morally worthy; the clergy must live lives separate from secular pursuits. Hawking, hunting, theatres are forbidden; the bishop must be like Christ. Rathier is concerned lest the Christian ethic be forgotten in a multitude of regulations, therefore he pleads for an ethical inwardness. The love of God and man is the only true basis for character.

III. There is also a deep *religious* interest manifested throughout. He is insistent that it is God's grace which saves and not the priestly act. In the last issue it is on God's mercy he rests for his salvation. Rathier certainly believed in the judgements of God and the penalties for the impenitent, but it is the gracious side of God's character which attracts him. He constantly asserts 'no one need ever

despair of the divine mercy.' He writes about the mercy and pity of God who does so much for us, and offers so much. There is a constant appeal to the New Testament Jesus. His mind is saturated with the parables and words and example of Jesus. 'O Christ mine.' 'Absolve me, O Lord, for I have no confidence save in Thy mercy.' To follow and imitate Jesus is the Christian calling. The Judge is a Pious Redeemer. One feels in reading these heartfelt appeals that God at times is very near to this man and that the prolonged study of the New Testament and the Gospels had led him, in spite of the whole mediaeval system of material form and legal almost mechanical ideas of salvation, to the enjoyment of the love of Jesus. Jesus is 'the good and pitiful and celestial doctor' for diseased souls.

IV. Rathier's *political* views have an interest for these days. He claimed that all legitimate authority must be just and righteous. He told Hugh, the king of Italy, that he was as much under law as any of his subjects, and as a moral being and a baptized Christian he was under the authority of the Church and the law of Christ. He boldly advanced the theses that if a man obtained the whole sovereignty of the world wrongly by unworthy methods, he could not be called a king, for by governing badly he loses the highest title to government. An unjust king is a tyrant and can be deposed. Divine Right of Kings must never be separated from the Divine Duty of Kings.

V. Rathier had very definite views on society. He seems to hold a theory of the Fall, which lost for man an original paradise of equality and freedom, where all possessions were held in common, and thus the State, slavery, private property, and war are the results of the Fall. Such a theory seems to put forth an ideal of a regained paradise, when man by the power of divine grace recovers this lost inheritance of freedom and equality. A world of love, brotherhood, fellowship, comes slowly to view. Rathier is not, however, content with the bare ideal, and strives to realize something

of this ideal in actual life. Thus he emphasizes the truth that all come from the same origin, are redeemed by Christ with one price, and reborn by the same baptism. Man may be separated from man, but it is not by nature, only by will, for all belong to the same dust and are children of one Father. He reaches the conclusion that freedom is not in outward condition, but in mind, for there are many serving Jesus who though under emperors and subject in body are above their lords in mind. His teaching is revolutionary, for equality in mind and ideal suggests a condition of equality and status in the actual relations of the world and life. If all these servile distinctions are the result of the Fall, should not Christianity abolish these distinctions by raising Fallen Man? Rathier, therefore, foreshadows much of the Socialism and Christian Communism of later days. He teaches the importance of almsgiving, not just because it is the acquiring of merit or the generous thing to do, but because what we have is not ours to keep. God gives, in order that it be distributed. Almsgiving, therefore, turns out to be some sort of endeavour to rectify the inequalities caused by the Fall, therefore a Christian duty and privilege, part of the redemptive scheme which regains Paradise. Much has been said recently about a gospel which should cover life's relationships, and in his greatest work Rathier takes one class after another, and shows the immediate application of the Christian ethic to each class in turn. In this effort to moralize all life's relationships, to bring all life under law of Church as representing the law of Christ, we see something of the high idealism of the mediaeval Church. Merchants, judges, doctors, nobles, the rich and poor, parents and children, all have their work and their Christian duty. Economics, politics, buying, selling, governing, judging must also be unified in Christian ethics. In these latter days we have too often divided life into departments, self-contained, independent. Rathier's fearless exposure of social sin is a noble contribution to human progress.

It must be remembered in estimating Rathier's character and career that he was *a monk called to be a bishop*; there was always a conflict in his mind between the active life of a bishop and the contemplative life of the monk. From his monastic vows there came his intense opposition to the married life of clergy, his appreciation of the common life, but he never forgot his episcopal duties and his duties as preacher and pastor. We have eleven of his sermons, and we there see Rathier the true pastor and prophet proclaiming the mercy and the judgements of God. He belonged to the prophetic order, and in this sense was not an unworthy member of the true succession of apostles who are sent to preach the gospel of grace.

He was a teacher who instructed his people in truth about God and life. There is a gospel to declare, a gospel of mercy of God for sinners, there are words of warning as well as of promise, words of comfort as well as of censure, and this he will proclaim with the living voice, and of this he writes.

Rathier might face up to this life's problem, but he lived under the shadow of Eternity. Paradise and Purgatory, Heaven and Hell, the everlasting rewards and penalties, were tremendous realities to this man. There is no abiding place here, for life is but a pilgrimage, and that which lies beyond is the real thing which matters. The modern world does not concern itself much with the life beyond; we have ceased to believe in much of the eschatology of the mediaeval Church. Yet there is life beyond; the Christian revelation is very definite about that, and if there is an Eternity transcending Time, some thought of that 'beyond' may be a very necessary corrective to a too great absorption in this life's affairs. Perhaps Rathier in witnessing to the eternal background to life may yet have a word for this present age, which in the surpassing interest of this life has almost forgotten the life to come. Politics, economics, citizenship will not lose their significance if they are seen in the eternal setting related to eternal duty and resting in the Eternal Love. At any rate, this is how Rathier saw this life's interests.

D. W. LOWIS.

IDEALISM AND CHRISTIANITY

IN the history of philosophy the term Idealism has several meanings associated with certain great names such as Plato, Bishop Berkeley, and Hegel. The ultimate principle of all idealism, however, is that Mind dominates the universe, and that things apart from their relation to the mind have no independent existence. That is only a rough definition, because we shall see that Hegel especially cannot be quite fitted into such a brief description. Idealism as a philosophical creed has had a deep and abiding effect upon the developments of Christian theology. Especially is it true that Plato's and Hegel's influence have been significant in this respect. In a sense, Platonism, ever since the first century, has been an integral part of Christianity. It is quite certain that Paul felt the inspiration of the bracing moral idealism of Plato, and he was probably brought into direct contact with the Platonic philosophy while at the University of Tarsus. In any consideration of the varying strands of influence which were brought to bear upon the development of the Apostle's mental and moral outlook, Platonism must receive due recognition. But Paul was not helped much in regard to the personality of God by Platonism. The wonderful thing is that the Jews, on the whole a non-metaphysical people, should have made the greatest contribution to the idea of God—namely, that of God as the Supreme Personality. A study of the idealism of Plato makes certain of the Apostle's beliefs more explicit.

In the first place, Paul recognized that it was perfectly foolish of man to allow his life to be dominated and propelled by instinct, appetite, and passion, and he recognizes—despite the Pragmatists of his day—that it is an absurdity to make utility the test of value. The absolute values of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, Plato affirms, are eternal ideas or

forms which are unaffected by the shifting scenes and evanescent appearances happening in the world of space and time. Only in so far as man's soul rises on the wings of thought into that blessed region of the Eternal Ideas, which are the only realities, has his life any true value and meaning. Human life attains real significance when it 'participates' in the life of those Eternal Principles which alone exist, and which are the directive forces behind and within this spatio-temporal world. Paul's mysticism was probably influenced by this Platonic idea of *participation* in the Divine Life. His conception of union with God has affinity with Plato's mysticism. In the *Phaedo* there are cogent arguments given to prove the immortality of the soul, the main one being that man as a participant in the Eternal is himself an eternal being. 'Time is the moving image of eternity' for Plato, the unreality of time has been the contention of most idealists from his time onwards. The Pauline view of the things that are seen being temporal, the things that are not seen being eternal, approximates to the Platonic conception of the relation of time to eternity.

The necessity of maintaining the life of thought at its best, by contemplation of the good, is a conception of Plato which we cannot despise. We ultimately become what we think. We must not forget that Plato's idealism is quite consistent with Paul on this matter. Whatsoever things are lovely, true, good, &c., *think* on these things. Plato's idealism consists of a plurality of eternal forms summed up in the terms Goodness, Beauty, and Truth. The alpine character of his bracing moral idealism is remarkable for its purity and splendour. Unfortunately Plato never makes quite clear the relation between God and the Ideas or forms themselves. Whether God is the ultimate and sole metaphysical ground of the universe, or whether the forms are, is never made quite explicit (*Laws*, chap. x). Although he is a Theist, he is not so pronounced a Theist as the Apostle, nor is his Theism so free from difficulty. Plato allows that there may be evil spirits

in the universe which are the cause of evil in the world, and in consequence of this he is in a better position both theoretically and practically than those idealists who repudiate the reality of evil, or regard it as being a passing phenomenon, thus minimizing its devastating power. Evil is a reality, for Paul, and in this Paul is more explicit than Plato on account of his profound religious nature. It is clear, then, that the idealism of Plato influenced the mind of the Apostle.

Also those who have read St. Augustine's *City of God*, as well as his *Confessions* and other writings, know quite well the influence of Plato upon Augustine. And when we remember that Luther finally denounced Aristotelian metaphysics in impolite phraseology, and took his stand upon St. Augustine and Paul rather than St. Thomas Aquinas, we are able to see that it is quite possible that the conflict with Rome and Protestantism is a philosophic as well as a religious one.¹ Rome stands for Aristotle and Aquinas. Protestantism stands for Plato, Paul, and St. Augustine. That is only in brief, of course, and an approximation. Plato's idea of the body being the σῆμα, the prison of the soul, has affinities with St. Augustine's Manichean tendencies, and Augustine's view of the utter depravity of human nature was influenced by Plato's view of the terribleness of moral evil, as well as being exaggerated by Augustine's personal experiences.

My contention, then, is that besides the combative Catholic and Protestant elements in the Church there has always been another feature, a subtle penetrating influence which was almost ignored by Thomas Aquinas and many other mediaeval theologians, but which came into more powerful activity at the Renaissance. This influence begins with Plato. It runs through St. Paul, St. John, Plotinus, St. Augustine, Luther, and the Cambridge Platonists. The last

¹ I am glad to see this point confirmed by Mackinnon, *Luther and the Reformation*, Vol. II., p. 47.

were never afraid of making clear their intention of recognizing that the Church must be brought back to 'her old loving nurse the Platonic philosophy.' These people have all believed, and present-day Christian mystics agree with them, that a truly spiritual religion must be based upon a firm belief in the absolute and eternal values as the most real things in the universe. A merely historic religion, we claim as idealists, is not enough. A religion whose roots go no deeper than the shallow soil of time has no ultimate nor abiding value. Religion in the Christian sense is rooted in the Eternal, and the temporal is only one of the vehicles of its manifestation. It is clear, then, that the Idealism signified by the name of Plato is a good friend of the faith, and in many ways quite in harmony with the basic principles of Theism and Christianity.

There is another type of Idealism, named *Subjective Idealism*, or, as Professor S. Pringle-Pattison calls it, *Mentalism*. This was taught by the famous Bishop Berkeley, who wrote all his important philosophical works by the time he was twenty-seven years of age. This philosopher urged that there is no such thing as material substance. All that you perceive is a group of qualities, shape, colour, size, &c., and if you take these qualities away nothing is left. To put it plainly, it comes to this, a thing without its qualities does not exist. But Berkeley forgot that the qualities without that which they qualify cannot exist either. Only by a process of artificial abstraction can you isolate substance from attributes to the mutilation of both. There is for Berkeley no substance in which the qualities inhere, and there is nothing supporting the attributes.

This all looked very well until the 'terrible' David Hume, who was an awfully nice fellow, applied similar arguments to spiritual substance or the soul, coming to the conclusion that soul substance does not exist and that you simply have a group of unrelated experiences. The thinly disguised ghost of spiritual substance also disappears when all its

qualities are abstracted. Both Berkeley and Hume forgot that attributes cannot exist of themselves, they are necessarily qualities of some substance material or spiritual.

The mind for Berkeley is an active centre and the only true causation is that of will. But he never shows how the 'ideas' are connected with the active mind, but asserts that they are placed in the mind by God. On this account Berkeley does not do justice to the finite personality. He does not show how ideas are related to the self or to God. Although he overthrows the abstract ideas of Locke and his *tabula rasa* view of the mind, he does not really show us how the self is active. He is a staunch Theist, but by conviction rather than by philosophical demonstration.

Mentalism or subjective idealism, then denies the independent existence of the object, and affirms that things only exist, and are related to each other, in so far as they exist for mind and in the thought relation. This position is becoming increasingly unpopular amongst philosophers. The whole of the modern realist movement is against it. Alexander, Russell, Perry, and others affirm that things do exist apart from being perceived by ourselves or God, and they affirm that relations exist between things apart from minds at all. Things and their relations are presented to the mind and are not constituted or created by mind. Personally I am of the opinion that all Idealism need not be regarded as of Berkeley's type, which, to say the least of it, is not proven, and I do not think he has rendered much help to Christian theology, although he has set the philosophers enough problems for several generations.

The third type of Idealism I want to mention is that of Hegel. His massive objective idealism has had an enormous influence both in Germany and in this country. To classify Hegel's idealism with that of Berkeley, as do Perry and Bertrand Russell, is a mistake. Hegel did not deny the existence of either material or spiritual substance. He never denies the independent existence of the object as standing

over against the mind about which the mind may reflect. Things, for Hegel, are presented to the mind, thought being the operation taking place when that contact of mind and object occurs.¹

I want here to state briefly the main tenets of Hegel's idealism, and to show how it has helped and how it conflicts with the Christian outlook.

Hegel's idealism is based upon the dialectical processes of his logic. Everything tends to generate its opposite. Truth is discovered by way of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and so the process logically understood governs the universe; only by plunging into the different spheres can Truth be discovered. History is a means to the triumph of Thought which culminates in the Absolute, or God. History, names, dates, nations are all so much scaffolding to be thrown away when the logical structure of Absolute Thought and Spirit is completed. The strong social stress of Hegel's idealism has contributed much to the democratic movements of our day. Curiously, although Hegel himself was a Tory and an autocrat, his influence upon Karl Marx was very great. The Anglo-Catholic movement also has been definitely influenced by Hegel's social emphasis, and perhaps Nonconformity would do well to hearken to his voice more seriously in this matter. Personality is social as well as individual.

The universe for Hegel's idealism is a systematic whole revealing itself in the timeless process through its individual parts. The Absolute, which is God, for Hegel, comes to itself in the finite centres or 'moments' that compose it. Mind is dominant in the universe, the mind of the Absolute. Finite minds have only an instrumental value for the Absolute, whose nature is ruled by a strict logical necessity. The concept of purpose is definitely utilized by Hegel, in this respect following Aristotle's lead, for everything must be understood in the light of that to which it tends.

¹ See *Direct Realism*, J. E. Turner.

From these points in Hegel's idealistic system certain things emerge which are of real interest to Christian theologians. His teaching was entirely antagonistic to the materialism and naturalism which prevailed in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and it was largely due to the infiltration of British philosophy by Hegel's Absolute idealism that the materialism and naturalism received its knock-out blow. The repudiation of materialism was largely due to the British idealists T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and others, who absorbed a good deal of Hegel's teaching. But strange to say, the conclusions which were maintained in regard to the personality of God and of man by naturalism are the conclusions that are maintained by Hegel, for he himself, although believing that reality is Spirit, does not attribute personality to God, and he reduces finite minds to possessing transient rather than eternal significance. Hegel's idealism is dangerous also to the Christian position because it is deterministic. He does not indicate how there can be freedom in a Whole which is a complete systematic structure, of which we are parts.

Reaction from this determinism, which is equally reaction from the determinism of the new psychologists, finds strong expression in the writings of theologians and biologists as well as physicists to-day. The first repudiate determinism on grounds of moral experience, the second on a basis of impartial analysis of bodily processes, which Dreisch, Vries, Sir Arthur Thompson, and H. B. S. Haldane tell us cannot be explained on purely mechanistic lines. Purpose is involved both in biology and physics. Eddington and Böhr suggest that contingency and determinism are in the heart of the atom, and the quantum theory approves.

So, in brief, we may conclude that, although Hegel's idealism rendered hopeless the position of the naturalists of the nineteenth century and in that negative sense helped Christian teaching, it has not aided Christian faith on the positive side on account of its Pantheism (no less dangerous

because spiritual) in identifying God with the universe, and also on account of its reducing the finite personality to a mere instrument of the Absolute.

Let me close this paper by saying I heartily recommend Hegel to be read at first hand. It will be a good mental discipline, and will deliver us from the miserable pragmatism and the ineffective pluralism which characterizes, to my mind dangerously, much of our theological outlook. Back to Plato and Hegel is my cry. Let us give the psychologists a little rest, for they have not attained the quietness of soul that one finds in the depths of idealistic philosophy. The ground of things and the ultimate truths and principles of the universe are the subject matter for metaphysics to discuss, and these ultimate facts and principles by which we live, and which determine the destiny of the universe and of ourselves, we must make a serious effort to comprehend.

E. G. BRAHAM.

CITIZENS OF THE KINGDOM

THIS study of current problems by Patrick Cowley, B.A., L.Th. (Skeffington & Son, 6s.), is intended to make its readers reconsider their positions and duties in the Kingdom of Christ. Nietzsche held that the superman alone could save the world; Christ pointed upward to the Cross, and those who follow Him 'will find the immortality of God and the present reality of the life that is life indeed.' The chapter on sex states that 'there is little holy love to-day.' We have not yet grasped 'the bringing together of two equals in a life-long partnership.' This is a wise and helpful study of a vital problem. We all feel that the Church is called to stand forth as the 'power-house' for the world, though the description of 'a wafer and a sip of wine, which have become endued with God's Life,' makes us pause. There is real beauty in the passage on the reception of Christ as Saviour and as God. 'A new music comes into life, and all is illuminated with the rays of love, and one labours in the creating of the Kingdom and the conquest of sin, to infect others with the goodness of the Man upon the Cross.'

THE IDEAS OF WALTHER RATHENAU

I

WALTHER RATHENAU was a notable man. His quality is only now beginning to be appreciated in this country. He was the prime author of the present foreign policy of Germany, and the creator of the post-war rationalization of her industry. His was a dual personality, for he turned now to realism and now to idealism. As a realist he was a successful captain of industry, becoming a millionaire. One of Germany's big industrialists, he was also a passionate social idealist. Millionaires are common in the modern world, but idealists from this stock are scarce. It should be worth while to ponder upon Rathenau's ideas and ideals.

The story of his life has been attractively told by Count Harry Kessler in his *Walther Rathenau: His Life and Work*. There we are informed that he was born in 1867, and died when but fifty-five. He came of a Jewish stock which had been naturalized in Germany for two hundred years. His family had long been prominent in Berlin Society, and in its banking and business-life. His father was a famous industrialist, and his forbears had all been in some way distinguished. Emil Rathenau, his father, beginning as a small ironmaster, became one of the pioneers and master builders of big-scale German industry. It is admitted that all its fundamental methods are more due to him than to any one else. He it was who began mass production in the electrical industries. He it was, too, who inaugurated a new intimacy between business and banking by which abundant new capital was forthcoming for German industries. It was Emil Rathenau who bought up Edison's Incandescent patents for Europe, and who founded the German General Electrical Company—the famous A.E.G.

Walther Rathenau, after his university career, began business under his father, but, differing in disposition and outlook, became critical and grew apart from him. It seemed to Walther that his father's enterprises absorbed the whole of him, and that he became, 'not a master, but a slave' of them. He left him and went to Munich for technological study. There he mastered electro-chemistry. Soon he became the manager of Electro-Chemical Works at Bitterfeld, in 1893. By 1900 he was a director of the A.E.G. and had written his *Physiology of Business*. He next turned to finance, and joined the management of a large Berlin bank. There was no difficulty in this for one with his family banking-connexions, but it was a sign of his appreciation of the new rôle of finance in modern industry and business. He thus mastered modern 'big business' on both its sides—technological and financial.

Walther Rathenau not only had great intelligence; he had also much charm, wit, and social tact, and possessed brilliant conversational powers. He found, about this time, ready admission into select social circles, the aristocratic, and even the exclusive Court circle. He became a *persona grata* to the Emperor William, and more than once had to expound to him privately his ideas on life and labour. He was importuned to disavow his race and accept high State office. But Rathenau, although Christian by conviction, was too faithful to his family, and too proud of his race, to renounce them. He continued to be a Jew.

During these years his literary activity was considerable. He wrote upon most of the questions of the age. He was, during 1906-7, a frequent contributor to Maximilian Harden's famous *Zukunft*. Many of his books, too, were most successful. He even wrote plays and poetry. Society life soon palled upon him. He felt the vapidité of the fashionable round. Business life too, clever as he was in it, failed to satisfy deep needs in his nature. He became increasingly critical of himself, of the fashionable world, and of modern

industry. He longed for a higher life and tone both for himself and his generation. He grew miserable.

In 1906, to gain time for reflection, he went on tour to Greece. Then occurred the great crisis of his life. It was on a day when he stood on Mount Parnassus, the place indeed for vision, that he suddenly saw all life in a new light. He underwent at that hour a spiritual transformation—he found his soul. In his *Breviarium Mysticum*, published that same year, he explained what he understood by the ‘soul.’ ‘The soul is the image of God. The powers of the soul are threefold: imagination, love, and awe. With the imagination the soul comprehends the world; with imagination and love, God’s creatures; with all three powers, God.’ None of these with the mere intellect. The soul is disinterested and intuitive. The intellect defeats its own ends by its own essential limitations, by its selfishness and blindness, and by its arrogance. In *In Days to Come*, published in 1916, he explains this distinction still further. He says: ‘The intellect is immensely old, dating from the days of the pre-human. Mankind has grown grey in this school, but the soul is young.’

From the moment of his ‘conversion,’ his great transforming spiritual experience, Rathenau felt himself to be a man with a mission and a message. He renewed with fresh zeal his study of religion and philosophy. His authorities and inspirers became the New Testament (he once wrote to a friend, ‘You know I take my stand upon the Gospels’); that Jewish mysticism of the eighteenth century, Hassidism, as expounded by Dr. M. Buber; and both Spinoza and Fichte. Not every one’s combination, but one essentially upon the side of the spiritual in life. Rathenau set forth his new views in his book, *The Mechanism of the Mind*. In this he affirmed ‘the divinity of every human soul, its uniqueness and paramount importance.’ This was vouched for to him by ‘a ring of indisputable facts’ and by that transforming, satisfying experience which ‘lifted him from the depths of

misery' and gave direction and clarity to his conception of the meaning of life. Suddenly, however, he was forcibly brought back to the old familiar 'real' world of industry and commerce. His only brother Eric died. The young man was the idol of his father's heart, and under the strain of sorrow the old man, Emil Rathenau, the head of the A.E.G., utterly collapsed. We are told that, immediately, Walther 'leaped into his place' and carried on the great affair. This also was in 1906.

How successful he became in modern electrical industries may be realized from the fact that by 1909 he was a responsible member of *eighty-four* large concerns, either as one of the Supervising Board, or as a managing director. He was also appointed the managing director of the A.E.G., and in the course of ten years played a leading part in eighty-six German and twenty-one foreign businesses. As has been stated, he became a rich man—a millionaire, and the originator of the modern rationalization of German industry.

In 1914 came the Great War. He had foreseen the coming catastrophe, and had written against the luxury, arrogance, materialism, and imperialism of his country. But with the war in existence he placed his services at the disposal of his country. He was made a member of the Prussian Ministry of War in 1916, and given the vital task of organizing raw materials.

In 1918, when the end for Germany drew near, he incurred much unpopularity by urging, instead of surrender to the Allies, a levy *en masse*. The German people then hated him for 'trying to prolong the war.' The result was that afterwards, when a Republican Government was set up, he was passed over. His intellectual and practical abilities and his great economic experience, however, were too useful long to be neglected; moreover, his pre-war pacific writings were remembered, and his social teaching—and in 1921 he was called to power as Foreign Minister.

His first step was to begin negotiations with the Allies upon

new lines. He had seen that the way out for Germany lay, not in political conflict, in which she was little skilled, but in peaceable negotiations and economic reconstruction. This policy he formulated and furthered amidst much opposition. It was triumphantly carried through by his successor, Herr Stresemann. Neither statesman, however, was forgiven by German Nationalists. Both men paid for it with their lives. Rathenau was assassinated in 1922. In 1929, Dr. Stresemann died from overwork, worry, and exhaustion. Both men perished prematurely.

It is said that 'not since the assassination of Abraham Lincoln had the death of a statesman so shaken a whole nation' as the assassination of Walther Rathenau shook Germany. Mourning processions, unprecedented in numbers, marched through the cities of Germany under the Republican flag. Over a million so marched in Berlin alone. Never before had a German citizen been so honoured in his death. In the Reichstag, solemn speeches of indignation were made by responsible statesmen, and by others over his grave.

II

In considering the ideas of Walther Rathenau it must be remembered that he was not a Socialist, but a Social Idealist. Social judgements and economic suggestions from such a man deserve respectful consideration. They are those of one eminently and peculiarly qualified to speak, and to speak with authority. They are not the utterances of a marketplace tub-thumper, or of one without expert knowledge, or with nothing to lose. They are the considered judgements of one of the leading business men and statesmen of Europe. Space permits only the exposition of those ideas and judgements, and that but superficially. Results, not processes, can only here be given, and no discussion of them can be begun.

Rathenau's social and economic views were put forth in Germany in a series of books which have had, and still have,

a wide circulation. *The Criticism of the Age* was issued in 1912, and reprinted at the end of the first month of publication. *In Days to Come* came out in 1916, and sixty-five editions were called for in the first year of publication, during which it eclipsed in attention even popular novels. *The New Economy* appeared in 1918, of which 30,000 copies were sold the first month. *Autonomous Industry* was published in 1919, and *The New Society* in 1920. They all set forth ideas both critical and constructive in relation to modern civilization. 'My duty compels me to deliver the message entrusted to me,' he wrote in his 1916 volume, and he reiterates this often in his most confidential correspondence with friends. Something he saw on Mount Parnassus burned in his mind, and must be expressed. He was not sanguine of a patient audience, but he hoped for one fit though few.

To begin with Socialism. Of this, he says 'it is stamped with the curse handed down to it by its father'; that is, to a German, by Karl Marx. He has no hope from it, because of its atheistic materialism. 'Its strength lies, not in love, but in discipline; its revelation is not the ideal, but utility.' To him, therefore, it lacks the scientific method of which it boasts. He exposes Marx's economic errors, and ends by saying that 'socialism can control masses and interests, but it has no spiritual philosophy.' This is undoubtedly true of German and Russian socialism, but it is not true of all socialism.

Rathenau's indictment of modern civilization is similar to that of the Socialists. But it is very significant coming from a modern captain of industry and an immensely rich man. His charge is that all life is now mechanized. In *The Criticism of the Age* he writes, 'We encounter mechanization over whatever department of human life we cast our eyes.' This has produced a complete revolution of modern outlook, spiritual, social, economic, and political. 'We have turned the world upside down: its economic interests

are on top, political interests subservient, and the soul is crushed and suffocated between both.'

The workers are enslaved both body and soul. *In Days To Come* declares that 'mechanization has known how to impose a relation of servitude, without legal coercion, without manifest lordship. Through the mere course of ostensibly free institutions there has been established a system of dependence of stratum upon stratum, which, though anonymous and speciously reversible, is in reality inviolable and hereditary.' With regard to the soul of the worker, he says that 'whether the employer appropriates part of the value due to labour may be doubtful, *but what is not doubtful is* that the institution for which he is responsible crushes and destroys the workman's soul.' Mechanization destroys every one else's soul also, and the 'struggle of the proletariat is but part of a much more extended and complex struggle for the emancipation of man.' He thinks that deliverance of the worker will come, not by violence, but by the way of the Cross. 'Those very masses who to-day set the pace of mechanization, who are enslaved by and succumb to it, are hastening its end. It will not come by sacrificing the upper classes, nor by revolution, but through the re-birth of the people themselves, redeemed by the sacredness of suffering.'

The modern social order seems to him 'incompatible with spiritual freedom and spiritual progress. When all are equipped by God with similar bodily form and with similar talents it is wholly wrong that one half of mankind should keep the other half in perpetual subjection.' He surveys with horror the spectacle 'that, in every civilized country, two nations have been created, kindred by blood, yet forever sundered. All over the civilized world, we live to-day under the economic and social dominion of a mighty plutocracy, which in some States has gained the control of the totality of political forces, has acquired the mastery of law and constitution, and of peace and war.' Surely he here speaks from knowledge, for he was one of these plutocrats

himself and a statesman. Count Kessler says that, by 1909, Rathenau had 'become one of three hundred men, all acquainted with each other, who controlled the economic destiny of the Continent.'

Rathenau maintains that 'mankind was not born to be subjugated in accordance with a predetermined fate, to have the neck bowed beneath the yoke of chance forces which result from the unfettered working of economic influences.' His hope of deliverance lies partly in what has happened during and since the Great War. 'Capital, labour, and materials have not, indeed, become the property of the community in accordance with the Socialist recipe, but they have been placed under the guardianship of the community,' and things can never be wholly the same again. It is realized that 'economics is not a private matter, but a communal matter; it is not an end in itself, but a means; it is not a right, but a duty.'

Rathenau declares that the purpose of his books is to show 'that the spiritual guidance of life, and the permeation of the mechanistic order with spirit will transform the blind play of forces into a fully conscious and free cosmos, a cosmos worthy of mankind.' 'Nothing,' he holds, 'but the liquidation and disvaluation of wealth, the bridging over of hereditary cleavages, the ending of the subdivision of society into permanently burdened and permanently burdening sections, nothing but the amalgamation of society to constitute a living, labile, self-renovating organism, nothing but this quietly effected and yet tremendous transformation surging up from the depths of the moral consciousness, will be competent to stay the fratricidal struggle of men and nations.'

III

What, then, are Rathenau's suggestions for the domination of material things and economics in the interests of the

soul in man? Fundamentally, the task is a moral, a spiritual, a cultural one. Economically, his suggestions may be summed up as fourfold. There is, first, the control of consumption; for that is not primarily a private matter, but a communal one. Luxury must not be tolerated. Next, there must be the equalization of property and income; this, he holds, is prescribed both by ethics and economics. Thirdly, there must be no place for the monopolist, the speculator, or the inheritor of great wealth, for these are the sources of personal riches. Finally, there must be a drastic restriction of the right of inheritance.

These economic and legislative changes will enable society to abolish poverty, for, as he remarks, 'we can do without slaves,' and at the same time place material goods at the service of the spirit of man. Accompanying these four changes there should also be educational and cultural ones. Economic changes should precede educational ones, for 'education can only bear fruit upon the soil of equality in the circumstances of life, equality in domestic life, and equality in civic origin.' Education, too, should be industrial as well as literary and scientific. Rathenau would enact a 'year of labour' for all the youth of the nation without distinction, insisting upon an interchange of physical and mental labour for all alike. Character is the chief thing, and religion—ethical and mystical Christianity—the best instrument.

If it be asked, these things being desirable, whence comes the power to secure them, Rathenau answers, from the will of man and the love-energy of the soul. 'The essential thing is the will, and nothing but the will. But it must be a will surging up from the depths of the folk-soul, a will sustained by the power of the nation and guided by a knowledge of the bonds to be broken and the obstacles to be overcome.' And, again, 'Adequate spiritual power may come for the new sphere of knowledge in the love-energy of the soul.'

Rathenau held that a new world would never come into

being primarily by political means, but rather by a new world-economic organization. He thought that very little change, given the social will, would be necessary in order to communize key industries, and that because of the company-constitution of modern business. Nor had he any fear for the provision of new capital for them, for the State would receive the major part of the net profits of the countries' industries. But he also thought that 'decades must pass before an international economic system could be built up.'

'The goal of the world-revolution upon which we have now entered,' he declares, 'means in its material aspect the melting of all strata of society into one. In its transcendental aspect it means redemption: redemption of the lower strata to freedom and the Spirit. No one can redeem himself, but every one can redeem another: man for man, class for class, thus is a people redeemed. Yet in each case there must be readiness, and in each there must be goodwill.'

The foregoing is a bare outline of the ideas and proposals of Walther Rathenau. All his writings are enveloped in a halo of spirituality, and each suggestion is solely conceived in the interests of the soul in man. His only anxiety is to see men of all classes and nations freed from the tyranny of materialism and mechanization.

A month or two before the German Revolution he wrote an article, which appeared in *After the Flood*, entitled 'The State and the Fatherland.' In this article he expresses himself in language which may be taken as a summary of his teaching: 'The world is in need of a Kingdom of Man which shall be the image of the Kingdom of God—the Kingdom of the Soul. The Kingdom of Man is the Kingdom of Freedom and Justice.' The least that can be said of his brave effort to bring that Kingdom on is that he laid down his life for it.

S. E. KEEBLE.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL REVIVAL

THE supreme fact in the intellectual life of men during these latter generations has been the dominance of the physical sciences. The world has been greatly preoccupied for a considerable time past with the study of the properties of matter, and a vast mass of assured and priceless knowledge has resulted. But it is important to remember that the final problems of thought, as to the origin and destiny and significance of the whole of existence, are pretty much what they have been ever since men began to think about these things at all. Where the results of science are important in the wider world of thought is mainly that they predispose the minds of men to accept the philosophical speculations of scientists. The man in the street would be as contemptuous of Einstein and relativity as he generally is of philosophy and theology except for this : he sees all round him the marvels of applied science, and therefore he is ready to take the word of scientists for abstract theories that would otherwise seem ridiculous. Apart from this, it is not the actual and assured results of science that matter most in our thought about ultimate things. It is rather what is often called the scientific view of the universe—the way of thought that stresses the uniformity of nature and the universality of law, and that often—venturing into more debatable regions—proceeds to teach a doctrine of mechanism or materialism, and then, in consequence, of determinism. Really, that kind of thing is not science at all ; it is a philosophical view of existence often held by scientists and supposedly based on science. But there is nothing scientific about it except that it has often been the only philosophy of scientific men. For, of course, it is philosophy and not science. To speak paradoxically, it is the metaphysics of the physicist who does not believe in metaphysics. It is a philosophical interpretation of the universe which operates from the physical angle alone.

It therefore naturally deals with the physical side of things—with development rather than origins or ends, with the process rather than the purpose or the value of the process, with the detailed way in which things happen rather than the why and wherefore of their happening. This is characteristic of scientific method, and therefore science, properly so called, never gives an ultimate explanation of anything, nor, if it knows its own business, does it profess to do so. The whole concern of science is with descriptive classification; the only sense in which it explains is that, as things are sorted out into connected series, we see them falling accurately into place, and have the deepening conviction that there is a real scheme of the universe, and that finally all things must fall into one regular and universal system. But that, while it shows that there is a rational order in the universe, in no way explains either the origin or the meaning of the universe.

The reason why science can give no ultimate explanation is plain, when you think it out. Science is the method of description by experiment, and experiment depends upon measurement of some sort. In fact, as Sir Oliver Lodge once put it, 'Science is the metrical knowledge of phenomena.' Now that kind of method can only give you a quantitative view of things. If it deals with qualities it can only deal with the quantities of qualities, so to speak. It cannot measure, and therefore cannot render any account of, the real essence of any qualitative existence, nor of the real cause of anything at all. It can describe their physical antecedents and accompaniments, and nothing more, because there is nothing more in the way of material, and therefore measurable, facts. It is perfectly obvious, one would think, that, while you can measure a physical fact or a physical process, you cannot do that with ultimate causes, or ultimate results, or the validity that really depends upon these. Apply the tests of physical science, for example, to literature or to music. You can give a more or less scientific account of the growth of language, because that is a process with physical

accompaniments that can be more or less measured. You can give a more adequate account of the facts of mere sound because these make a physical series that can be more accurately measured. But you cannot give any merely scientific account of what is really essential in Shakespeare or in Bach. As Professor Eddington has shrewdly put it, 'Beauty and melody have not the arithmetical password, and so are barred out. This teaches us that what exact science looks out for is not entities of some particular category, but entities with a metrical aspect.'¹

Now the measurable necessarily means the repeatable and the repeated. If there were only one material object in the whole universe it would be quite meaningless to say that it was an inch long or a mile long. It is only because there are many things in the universe, and because they are things which happen in recurrent series, and are therefore more or less alike, that we can compare them with each other, measure them by each other, and so allocate them their position and proportion in space and time. Science could give no account whatever of an absolutely unique thing, and, as things approach the unique, science increasingly fails to give any adequate account of them.

Moreover, the measurable necessarily means the analysable. If you can give a metrical account of anything, that thing must be discrete, divisible into parts, capable of analysis. Now, since science can only reckon with things as analysable, it can never account for the whole of things as a whole. It assumes the existence of the whole of things, and does not attempt to deal with the why and wherefore of the whole. It cannot take account of causation in any absolute sense, because that involves the interconnected relations of the whole universe. It can only give some statement of what things are within the existing scheme of the universe, which is taken for granted. Now, any analysis of a whole

¹ *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 105.

into parts, or any synthesis of parts into a whole, fails to reckon with precisely that—the causal organization of the whole, without which there would be no whole and therefore no parts of the whole. It is as if you were to analyse a poem into words, or to analyse a living body into chemical constituents, and then forget that without mind the words would never have been ordered into a poem, that without life the chemical constituents would never have been organized into a body. There is something in the whole which is not a mere adding together of the parts, something which makes the whole into a whole, and therefore makes the parts, which exist as parts of the whole. As Professor McDougall has recently written, ‘Relations are constitutional or constitutive of things; and organization is universal and primordial, not something superadded, suddenly or gradually, to a world of things that might have existed without it.’¹

Hence science cannot give any adequate account of the whole of existence, nor any really adequate account of anything. For to deal with phenomena as merely recurrent and measurable, partial and analysable, is not really to give any complete account of them. It is as if a statistician insisted that there was nothing more to be said or explained about the English population when once he had tabulated the number, sex, and age of the inhabitants of the island. That is a true account as far as it goes, but it does not cover all the ground. There is much more that remains to be said, and it is much more essential and explanatory.

This inevitable inadequacy of scientific method is being realized more and more by the thinkers of this generation. The result is interesting and important. I want to suggest that we are witnessing a reaction from the merely scientific habit of mind, and that it may be clearly discerned in at least three directions: on the part of those who may be called scientific philosophers, on the part of those who may be called

¹ McDougall, *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution*, pp. 72-8.

philosophical scientists, and on the part of some modern theologians. Obviously it is impossible to survey these tendencies in any detail. I can only briefly indicate how they all appear to illustrate what is essentially the same general movement of thought.

1. Some eminent philosophers who have been largely dominated by the scientific view have been forced to make allowance for what mere science does not explain, and what supposedly scientific theories of the mechanist and materialist type do not really admit at all.

Hence, very largely, one of the most interesting movements in modern philosophical thought—the philosophy of emergent evolution, mainly associated with the names of Professor Lloyd Morgan and Professor Alexander. It is important to remember that it is intended to be definitely and decisively a philosophy of naturalism. There is not meant to be any place for God, nor indeed for anything that does not fall definitely and wholly within a system of naturalism at the beginning, whatever may emerge from it before the end. But the philosophy of emergent evolution does at least see that the old mechanistic naturalism is not enough, and it recognizes that there are not only ‘resultants,’ but ‘emergents.’ The emergent is a resultant, so to speak, but it is more. It is not merely the sum of the preceding conditions, for in addition to this there is something which is new, unforeseen and unforeseeable until it happens; something which has not appeared before, and which is not explained by what has appeared before. This is a genuine attempt to make room for the facts in the life of the universe which are novel, and which are unpredictable because they are hitherto unparalleled and unrepeatable. Obviously there are such facts. Oxygen combines with hydrogen, and there is the emergence of water, with its peculiar properties, which are not discoverable in oxygen and hydrogen in their pure state. At a particular stage in the history of the universe a new complexity arose in a system of atoms, and there was the

emergence of life, with all its peculiar attributes of growth and assimilation and reproduction—qualities, again, which are not discoverable in the inorganic elements which go to make the material basis of life. At a still later stage in the development of the universe, still further complexity arose in living organisms, and there was the emergence of consciousness, which, once again, is a new attribute, not to be discovered in the mere elements of the living organism.¹

Now, here in each case, is something novel and original, which could not have been predicted merely from what has gone before; something *more*, which is not a mere totalized result of the antecedents.

It is this unforeseeable and unaccountable appearance of the new which is meant by emergence. But does the mere phrase 'emergence' really explain anything? It admits the novelty of the fact, but that is all. Where does the new thing emerge *from*? The inevitable logic of the situation, one would think, leads either to theism or at least to deism—either there is a creative spirit within the world of nature now, or there was a creative spirit beyond the world of nature at the beginning. Indeed, Professor Lloyd Morgan has gone very near to something like this, although he carefully avoids any language that would sound theistic. He admits that there is needed 'something in the nature of a relating and directive Activity of which the *de facto* relatedness and the observed changes of direction (with which science is concerned) are the manifestation.' 'I use the word "Activity" in this sense,' he adds, 'as the most non-committal name I can select. I write it with a capital letter to differentiate the concept as other than naturalistic. . . . I frankly accept Activity under my third acknowledgement—one that supplements, but is nowise contradictory to the concepts of naturalism in its accredited domain.'²

¹ Cf. McDougall, *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution*, p. 114.

² *Contemporary British Philosophy*, i., p. 304.

But an acknowledgement of this kind stands rather apart. One cannot help feeling that this is not what the philosophy of emergent evolution is really after. The general impression left upon the mind is that philosophers of this school want to say 'emergence,' and then leave it at that. Their philosophy is a system of naturalism which has been driven to admit that mere naturalism is not enough, and that there is an *x* expressed by the term 'emergence.' But you do not account for a thing's emergence by merely saying that it emerges.

2. Then some eminent scientists who have the philosophical mind have themselves begun to proclaim the bankruptcy of the merely scientific view. It really began with the new view of matter. The older science regarded mass as not only the main characteristic of matter as known to the senses, but as an original and final and ineradicable property of matter. Now that conception has gone. As Professor Whitehead has said, 'We have got rid of matter with its appearance of undifferentiated endurance.'¹ Matter is no longer regarded as a kind of gross solidity that can never be got rid of: a stuff made of atoms which are themselves solid, which might indeed be arranged in patterns of different density, as solids, liquids, and gases, but which always and everywhere remain as minute particles of solidity. To-day, matter is regarded by scientists as a kind of pattern of energy. There has been, in fact, a *bouleversement* of the general conceptions with which science operates. They are valid enough for all practical purposes, of course, but they can no longer be regarded as really ultimate and therefore really explanatory. The assumptions which science quietly took over from common sense—for that is what it amounts to—are now proved by the progress of science itself to be only working assumptions, approximations to some reality the absolute character of which escapes the scientific method. All the

¹ *Science and the Modern World*, p. 55.

final conceptions of physical science are turning out to be paradoxes and antinomies. The scientist may be said, for example, to have reduced everything to motion, only to find that there is nothing left to move. But, even if we disregard the element of paradox in the theories of advanced physics, it remains true that the physicist's ultimate conceptions of matter and motion now appear to be at least unknown entities. Professor Eddington has summed up our scientific knowledge in the epigram: 'Something unknown is doing we don't know what.' The ultimates of science, in fact, are all passing out into a region of abstraction where only philosophers and theologians have any right of entry, or any means of exploration. The scientist has discovered, and discovered by his own researches, especially in the region of mathematical physics, that *omnia exeunt in mysterium*.

Let it be clearly understood that nothing whatever has been said here against science and scientific method properly understood. The argument is simply that science has its limits in the very nature of what it is, and that, while it is always right to begin with the empirical facts and to operate with the experimental method, you cannot stop there. By all means measure all that is measureable, and analyse all that is analysable, but when that is done you must go on from the facts to the significance and purpose and value of the facts; from the mechanical to the teleological; from the natural to the transcendental; from all that is measureable by our standards and expressible in our terms to the immeasurable and the inexpressible—in short, from the merely scientific view (right as it is in its own way) to the more universal view of philosophy and theology.

3. There is a remarkable sign of the tendency of which we are speaking in Germany, in the widespread influence of Karl Barth. It would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that the whole of his teaching is a development of the emphasis

¹ *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 29.

in the Apostle's words in Gal. iv. 9, *μᾶλλον δὲ γνωσθέντες ὑπὸ θεοῦ* — 'But now that ye have come to know God, or rather to be known of God.' Everything in religion is to be seen from the side of God. 'In the Bible there is a new world! God! The sovereignty of God! The glory of God! The incomprehensible love of God! Not human history, but divine history. Not human virtues, but the virtues of Him who called us out of darkness into His marvellous light! Not human standpoints, but the standpoint of God!'¹ This point of view is constant in Barth, and is constitutive of his whole religious thought. It recurs perpetually, and is never more clearly expressed, perhaps, than in a passage in his *Dogmatik*, which we may render: 'The Word of God is not grounded and contained in the Christian faith, but the Christian faith in the Word of God. There is always this difference, and however strongly the so-called objectivity of faith may be emphasized from the other point of view, falsity upon falsity necessarily follows, along the whole line and at every point of it, if the relation is reversed.'² Barth's real contribution to modern theology—and I regard it as an important and opportune one—is simply this, in my judgement: a tremendous emphasis upon the transcendental reality of religion, and upon the necessity, in all our religious thought, of beginning and ending there. Barth's teaching is not, as he has said himself, a system, but an emphasis, a corrective, a marginal note.³

Thus he is usually placed—and, indeed, places himself—in the most fundamental opposition to Schleiermacher.⁴ I do not believe that there is really any opposition more radical than a considerable correction of emphasis. Barth does not, and cannot, rule out the human side, the fact of experience; but he stresses the truth that it is the act of

¹ Cf. *Dogmatik*, i., p. 103; *Das Wort Gottes und die Theologie*, p. 98.

² *Das Wort Gottes und die Theologie*, p. 29.

³ *Dogmatik*, i., p. 87.

⁴ *Das Wort Gottes und die Theologie*, pp. 100, 103, 123.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 28, 164.

God, and not the apprehension of man, that is primary. Schleiermacher does not, and cannot, rule out the divine side, the fact of revelation and redemption; but he stresses the truth that the scientific approach to revelation and redemption must be made from the side of human experience. Personally I believe that both are right, but that at the moment it is the Barthian emphasis that is needed. For we have been so much occupied with religious studies of an historical and critical kind that we are almost unable to see the wood for the trees. It is when we have frankly accepted the evolutionary origin of morality, the critical position with regard to the date and authorship of the Scriptures, the results of historical research into the life of Christ, and so on, that the facts with which religion is most deeply concerned really begin, and they stand out to the believer as essentially novel, inexplicable, and transcendent. The facts of the spiritual life, of the religious consciousness of Israel, of Christ as God manifest in the flesh and the Redeemer of men, are not explained away, nor explained at all, by merely scientific research into origins and developments. There is here something *more*, and it is that which matters—something which in its essence stands clear of history and humanity, and belongs to another world. In fact, the real concern of religion only begins when scientific investigation has spoken its last word. As Barth has said of the Bible, ‘only on the farther side of every judgement of it, in its human, historical, and psychological character, does the intelligent and fruitful discussion of the Bible begin,’¹ as far as religion is concerned; and that must be true of every other religious fact whatever.

It would be quite a mistake to regard Barth’s attitude as obscurantist. If I understand him aright he does not repudiate the results of scientific criticism in any department, but quite unconcernedly takes them for granted, and then passes on to what he believes to be the real religious issues. These

¹ *Das Wort Gottes und die Theologie*, p. 76.

are always rooted in what is beyond science and beyond history, because it is beyond humanity. When human knowledge has said its say, there is a *more*, or, rather, before human knowledge at all, there is an *other*, and the reality of religion lies there.¹ This is surely true if there be any truth in religion at all. A human experience of God is obviously necessary if there is to be any knowledge of God, but God, and His will to reveal Himself to men, and His will to redeem men, must be prior to our apprehension and independent of our experience. It all begins and ends, not here, but *there*; not in a world of nature, but beyond.

So I suggest that we may now discern, alike in science and in philosophy and in theology, a new effort to reach out beyond what is merely natural, merely empirical; in fact, a revival of the transcendental.

HENRY BETT.

¹ *Das Wort Gottes und die Theologie*, pp. 65, 99.

Passion Personalities, by Alfred Thomas, M.A. (3s. 6d.); *The After-Life in the Unseen World*, by Euston Nurse, M.A. (3s. 6d.), come from Skeffington & Son. The characters of the men and women who figure in Christ's trial and death are drawn with insight and literary skill. The mother of Jesus and Mary Magdalene, St. Peter, Judas, and Pilate, all are here, and many more, to guide and to warn. It is choice work with a fine practical note. Mr. Nurse's studies of the after-life cover all sides of a subject which always arrests the attention of a congregation. His sermons are lucid, his explanations reasonable, and his conclusions are helpful. Other subjects, such as hospitals, harvest, Armistice Day, are treated in a wise and suggestive way. *A Little Road-Book for Mystics*, by Alfrida Tillyard (Student Christian Movement, 3s. 6d.), is intended for those to whom the spiritual world is more real than the material world. It has rules for every day, quotations from St. John of the Cross and Ruysbroeck, meditations, a portrait of a mystic, and all manner of suggestive little essays which refresh and stimulate and guide a devout reader. It is a really bright companion.

THE JEWS IN ENGLAND IN MEDIAEVAL TIMES

THERE is nothing to show that the Jews had any footing in England in Saxon times, and the probabilities are that they first appeared here at the date of the Conquest. They were expelled from this country in 1290. They were precluded from following any occupations save those of brokerage, banking, and money-lending. As a decree of the Fourth Lateran Council declared that 'manifest usurers should not be admitted to the sacrament of the altar,' nor have Christian burial, rivalry in the trade of money-lending became restricted. At the same time a certain amount of competition existed, for we find that the Justices Itinerant at Lichfield in 1254 were instructed to inquire what property had been left by Christian usurers. We also hear of the employment of Caorsine and Lombard money-lenders, and Roman financiers were often applied to for loans by bishops, abbots, and clergy, when business took them to Rome and, as was often the case, they were short of money.

The original Jewish colony in England was no doubt small, but it gradually increased, and Jews chased out of other countries added constantly to its numbers. 'Sufferance was the badge of all their tribe.' Everywhere they led hunted lives. In France they were alternately encouraged and burnt and plundered. There were wholesale massacres of Jews in Spain and Russia. In Germany they were frequently the objects of popular vengeance. Here in England their fate was as tragic as elsewhere. Insulted, robbed, savagely treated, regarded as the enemies of the Most High and as under His malison, the Jews had little love of their hosts and masters. Need we be surprised to find that they sometimes 'fed fat their grudges' when they 'caught their enemies on the hip?'

Nowhere were the Jews allowed to live the ordinary life

of citizens. They were always quartered in royal cities or boroughs in which certain districts called Jewries were assigned for their exclusive use. Among the towns in England possessing Jewries we find such places as London, Canterbury, Dunstable, Norwich, Oxford, Winchester, and Worcester. In these Jewries the Jews were allowed to maintain their own synagogues, schools, and cemeteries. Their High Priest resided in the London Jewry. They were permitted to purchase the necessities of life from Christian tradesmen, but, apart from this dealing, the relations between them and the civil population of the country were mainly those of creditor and debtor. There were, however, occasions when the beauty of a young Jewess was so seductive as to lure a lover to throw prudence to the winds. We possess a sad example of such a case in the fate of a deacon who turned Jew 'for the love of a Jewish woman' and married her. He was arraigned before the Council held at Oxford in 1222 under the presidency of Stephen Langton, the Archbishop. The unfortunate deacon was degraded from his orders. He was then handed over to the secular power in the person of the notorious Fawkes de Breauté, Sheriff of Oxford, and burnt outside the walls of the city.

The Jews had no civil rights. They were the 'chattels' of the King and he could do what he liked with them. But they were preserved as of extreme utility to the Crown; for they produced a large revenue by heavy death-duties, forfeitures, and fines. Indeed, Maitland tells us that they financed the kingdom for many years. From 1192 there was a registration-office in all the towns in which the Jews lived. It contained an 'ark' or 'chest' in which were stored their deeds and the records of their transactions. The Government searched these chests at pleasure, and was thus able to check all their proceedings. Indeed, it sometimes confiscated the documents and itself realized the debts. The establishment of registration-offices was soon followed by the appointment of Justices of the Jews, who transacted the

business of the Crown and its relation to this people in a department of the Exchequer known as the Exchequer of the Jews. Thus in 1256 we find the Barons of the Exchequer and these justices sitting in the Tower to arrange for the disposition of the property of a wealthy Jew of Oxford called David. His wife Licoricia and the Constable of the Tower were present at the session of the court. The judges nominated four Jews who were to select six of the richest of their brethren in the country to administer the estate. These six apparently were to realize the property and hand over the proceeds to Licoricia after the deduction of extortionate death-duties payable to the Crown to the amount of five thousand marks. One hundred thousand pounds is perhaps the modern equivalent of this large sum. One wonders whether, after the payment of this windfall to the Exchequer, the court and the six executors had much to hand over to Licoricia.

The Justices of the Jews not only transacted purely Crown business, but also settled disputes between Christians and Jews. Quarrels among the latter were decided by themselves according to their own law. Waste, misgovernment, and their own prodigality made the nobles and landowners poor and unable to meet their liabilities. They hurried for relief to the Jews, only to fall from one evil into another. Accordingly the volume of business transacted by the latter was immense. Indeed, it has been stated that almost every landowner in the country at one time or another owed them money and had to pay their heavy rate of interest. No doubt they were sometimes of the greatest service in advancing money for building. Their gains were so considerable that, fleeced though they were by the Crown and often robbed by the public, their Jewries contained very wealthy men who lived in fine houses and possessed goodly stores of jewels and precious stones. If, then, the Jews often succeeded in earning large incomes, they well knew that the Crown would be a more unsparing exactor than the daughters

of the horse-leech. A few examples may serve to show that the oppressions of Solomon and Rehoboam were trivial compared with those of several of the English kings.

During the absence of Richard I in the Holy Land, his Chancellor, William de Longchamp, so plundered the Jews that they are said to have been despoiled of most of their treasure. King John was a pitiless extortioner. In 1210, by his orders, all the Jews in the country were imprisoned, their goods and documents confiscated, and many were cruelly tortured. We have it on the authority of Matthew Paris, who lived in the next reign, that the King's satellites obtained ten thousand marks from a single individual at Bristol by the extraction of one of his teeth every day. At the end of the seventh day the Jew cried a halt and paid the money. Many of the Jews died as a result of the persecutions which they suffered under John. His successor, Henry III, was a striking contrast to his father in the purity of his private life. In public affairs, however, he was imprudent and unfortunate, and always staggered under a load of debt. The Jews were consequently victimized.

It has already been seen in the case of Licoricia how enormous a toll might be obtained by the Crown on the demise of a wealthy Jew. But as already stated, tallages might be levied, and often were levied, on the whole fraternity of the Jews or on those who lived in certain cities. We find Henry III writing in 1231 to the Sheriff of Kent instructing him to send him six of the richest Jews of Canterbury and six similarly qualified from Rochester. They were to give into the King's hands tallages of eight thousand and six thousand marks from the Jews of these two cities. They were also to contribute their proportion of a thousand marks due from the whole body of the Jews. That sum was due to the King for enforcing their claims on debtors. Five years later, when Henry was undertaking an expedition into Brittany, the Jews were called upon to pay a third of the value of their movable goods.

In 1250 the Jews were despoiled of most of their money, and, to add to their miseries, were compelled to observe the feasts of the Church by abstinence from meat. When, in 1254, Richard, Earl of Cornwall, the King's brother, demanded the help of the Jews to meet the necessities of the Crown, the unfortunate people felt that the limit of endurance had been reached. Elias of London, the High Priest of the Jews, spoke in behalf of his countrymen. 'My lord,' he said, 'we see that the King means to wipe us out from the face of heaven. We implore him to let us go. We are prepared to leave the country and never shall we return.' The High Priest wept bitterly as he spoke. The Earl of Cornwall and his advisers were touched by his distress. They realized at last that the Jews were of one blood with themselves. Yet, though they pitied the sufferers, they would not let them go. The Jews made their loans either on pledge or at a certain rate of interest. If the pledge were not redeemed within a year and a day, it became the property of the lender. Many valuable jewels must thus have passed into Hebrew possession. There was no limit to the rate of interest except in the case of Oxford scholars, when twopence in the pound per week was the maximum amount. That seems to have been the usual charge in other cases, though it was often greatly exceeded.

The Crusades involved borrowing on a large scale. The Crusaders required a considerable sum of money for their equipment. They had the further heavy expense of their own support and that of their followers in the field for a period of two or three years. The Jews took advantage of such opportunities to exact heavy interest. The Council of Lyons, however, decided in 1245 that no interest should be paid on the debts of Crusaders during their absence on Crusade, and that the profits falling in from securities during the same period were to be reckoned to their credit. It is worthy of note that the Council of Lyons also forbade, under serious penalties, the shameless profiteering of certain

Christians who were guilty of selling ships, arms, helmets, and harness to the Saracens. Much of the money borrowed during the Crusades was lent on mortgage, which was quite a usual method of raising money. Maitland tells us that at one time some of the Jews were actually in possession of lands, and were even offering 'clerks' to bishops for livings. A story told us by the chronicler of the Cistercian Abbey of Meaux gives us a picture of transactions in land in the reign of Henry II in which a leading Jew of the time, Aaron of Lincoln, played a conspicuous part. A landowner, called Fossard, was a great benefactor of Meaux Abbey, and his body and that of his wife reposed within the abbey church. Their son, William, was a ward of the Earl of Albemarle, who founded the abbey, and unhappily repaid the Earl's kindness by seducing his daughter. Thus he incurred the displeasure of King Henry II, who was not a man to be trifled with. Fossard therefore found it expedient to leave the country. After a sojourn of some duration abroad, he returned to England, and found his affairs greatly embarrassed. He was compelled to seek Hebrew aid by borrowing about eighteen hundred marks on mortgage. Anxious to get out of such hands, he asked the Abbot of Meaux to pay his debt and promised to give him land in Wharrom in return for the money. The Abbot was very reluctant to have dealings with the Jews: but wished to oblige the son of the founder of his convent. Having no ready money, he decided to ask the assistance of Aaron of Lincoln, 'the first and greatest of the Jews.' Aaron took on his shoulders the entire debt, cancelled five hundred marks of it, and bought out the other Jews. He was thus left with twelve hundred and sixty marks due from the Abbot to himself. The Abbot was to pay sixty pounds per annum until the whole debt was cleared, and to make the land given him by Fossard his security for payment. In the meantime the Jew would appropriate the rents of the mortgaged estate. When twenty-one payments of the annuity

had been made, the Wharrom land would become the property of the abbey. Unfortunately Aaron died soon after the transaction had been arranged. The Crown claimed and obtained the immediate payment of the unpaid balance of twelve hundred and sixty pounds, and even demanded the remitted five hundred pounds. Happily Aaron's acquittance for this sum was found among his documents in the 'ark' or 'chest' at Lincoln.

The Meaux chronicler tells us that the abbey acquired other lands by releasing the owners from debts due to Jews. The case of John of Skerne, who mortgaged estates to the Jews for two hundred and fifty-one marks, is interesting. He redeemed the mortgage by an annuity of ten pounds to Gamaliel of Oxford, who made it over to Prince Edward, afterwards Edward I. These cases go to prove that impoverished landowners were unwilling to permit their mortgaged estates to remain in the hands of the Jews. They solved their difficulties as far as they could by the transfer of these lands to the religious houses which gradually cleared off the debt. In the year 1269, the holding of landed security by the Jews was definitely abolished.

The Jews not only had to contend with the enormous taxation imposed by the Crown, but were also too often the victims of popular fury. Their denial of the Christian faith, a denial which was not merely negative, but sometimes took the form of insults to Christian processions, was itself a potent cause of hatred. Then they were odious to many borrowers who had been reduced from affluence to poverty by their dealings with them and sometimes even compelled to beg their bread. Moreover, there grew up a universal belief that on certain occasions the Jews tortured and crucified Christian children. Circumstantial accounts, differing in detail, but with the same main features, are given by various writers of such an outrage at Lincoln. It is asserted that many Jews, there assembled from all parts of the country, tormented and crucified a child called Hugh,

'the son of Beatrice.' The body, when at last it was discovered, bore the tokens of the victim's sufferings. It was accompanied to the cathedral by the Dean and Canons of Lincoln in long procession with officials bearing crosses, candles, and censers, and amidst chanting and weeping. It found its resting-place in a grave next to that of Grosstête, the famous bishop, who had been buried there two years before. Henry III is said to have visited Lincoln and to have ordered the arrest of the incriminated Jews. Joppin, the High Priest, on the promise of his life, revealed the whole truth. The pledge was broken and he was executed. The other accused Jews were taken to London and tried on the charge of Hugh's murder by a jury impanelled by the Sheriff of Kent. The order to impanel the jury was given by the King in a royal letter which still exists. Eighteen Jews were found guilty of the crime, and, after being tied to horses' tails and dragged along the streets, were hanged. Other Jews under the like sentence were saved either by the efforts of the Dominicans or of the Earl of Cornwall. Similar outrages are said to have occurred at Norwich, Gloucester, and other towns. Hebrew writers have denied invariably the truth of these stories and have explained them as inventions of seceders from the Jewish fold. It is, in any case, certain that Jews were charged with such offences and tried and condemned for them.

The Jews, then, on various grounds were the objects of popular hatred. Yet the risings against them—though probably they would not have occurred unless the sojourners had been so detested—were really often inspired by anxiety to cancel debts or to appropriate the wealth of others. One of the most terrible of the outbreaks against the Jews occurred on the coronation day of Richard I. Philip II, King of France, had recently driven them from his dominions, robbed them of all their money, and cancelled all the debts due to them. Richard saw that his subjects believed that he would pursue a similar policy. Fearing a disturbance,

he therefore forbade the presence of the Jews at his coronation. They had come, however, to Westminster from all parts of the country before this prohibition was published, and had brought with them valuable gifts in the hope of averting the threatened catastrophe. When the ceremony of the coronation was over and the King was sitting at the banquet in Westminster Palace, some of them could not resist the temptation of appearing at the gates of the palace in defiance of the King's order. An attack was made on them at once. Resistance was hopeless. They were utterly overpowered and a general massacre of the Jews followed, and their houses in the London Jewry were soon in flames. The King himself found it impossible to cope with so formidable a riot, which ran its course unchecked. Among the hated people then in London was Benedict, a rich Jew of York. Seriously wounded, he took sanctuary in the abbey church and was baptized. He was then brought before Richard. The King naturally inquired whether he really wished to be a Christian. Benedict replied that this was not the case, as he had been baptized against his will. Richard turned to the Archbishop and asked what he should do with him. 'If,' said the Archbishop, 'he will not be the man of God, let him be the man of the Devil.' After his interview with the King, Benedict was restored to the Jews, and soon died of his wounds. He was, we are told, 'a worse man than before, and died, not only a Jew, but also an apostate.'

Shocked by the outbreak at his coronation, Richard was anxious that the Crusade immediately impending should not be the means of provoking similar anti-Semitic outrages in the provinces. He was well aware that many Crusaders would be only too glad to launch attacks, destroy many of the Jews, burn their papers, and thus cancel their own obligations. The King accordingly dispatched messengers and letters through all the counties, charging the inhabitants to do no harm to the Jews. Benedict of Peterborough tells

us that the Jews of the town of Dunstable shared the King's alarm and anticipated his edict by being baptized and enrolling themselves as Christians. The royal orders to spare the Jews were in vain. The Israelites of York, the northern centre of their activity, were mercilessly fallen upon in the night by Crusaders and others; the house of Benedict, the wealthy Jew who had perished in London, was sacked and his widow and children killed. On the following day the surviving Jews took refuge in the castle, where they were closely besieged. Finding further resistance impossible and that they would soon fall into the hands of ruthless enemies, 'they chose rather to perish by killing one another than to be savagely butchered by the fury of their persecutors.' They made away with all their valuables. Then the men cut the throats of the women and children and afterwards slew one another. Wykes, the able monk and historian of Osney Abbey, does not hesitate to fix the responsibility for these crimes on the Crusaders. 'In the meantime,' he says, 'a countless host of the young nobility of England, marching under the standard of the Cross, made fierce attacks on the Jews of York, Lincoln, Stamford, and other cities and towns of England. They slew an enormous number and seized all their goods as their prize. They imagined that they were doing God service in exterminating the enemies of the Cross of Christ and using their treasures to meet their expenses in the Crusade.'

During the struggle between Henry III and the barons, the Jews were the victims of the popular party, of which Simon de Montford was the head. The reason is probably that the Jews supplied the King with money. In 1263, a multitude of Londoners destroyed two of the palaces of the Earl of Cornwall and wrecked the manorial buildings occupied by the Chancellor, Walter de Merton, the founder of Merton College, Oxford. But the most terrible feature of this rising was a massacre of the Jews in the city, the main motive of which was lust of plunder. 'All the Jews who

could be found were cruelly slaughtered. Neither age nor sex was spared. Children crying in the cradles or even hanging at the breasts were slain.' The richest Jew in England, Coq ben Abraham, was slain by John Fitzjohn with his own hands. Simon de Montford himself was not ashamed to appropriate a large portion of the spoil thus obtained. Wykes sensibly remarks, 'It is difficult to estimate the loss thus brought on the royal Exchequer, especially when it is remembered that the Jews enormously increased the revenue of the Crown, not only by tallages, but by pleas, escheats, and presents.'

Wykes's commentary on these atrocities shows that he may be reckoned among the more enlightened mediaeval churchmen to whom such things were abhorrent. 'And though,' he says, 'the Jews were not of our religion, it seemed base and impious to kill them when we ought to love them because they are men and have been created in the image of God and "because the remnant shall return, even the remnant of Jacob, unto the Almighty God."' 'None of them,' he adds, 'could escape except by paying an enormous sum of money or by making a spurious confession of Christianity in receiving baptism. When the danger was over, such converts almost invariably returned to their old disbelief.' Just as there were Christians who could feel for the sufferings of the Jews, so also there were Jews who could appreciate goodness and humanity in Christians. Such good feeling was shown at Bishop Grosstête's funeral, when many Jews present at that magnificent ceremony mourned and wept and declared that he had been 'a true servant of God.'

There was a further attack on the London Jews in 1264 by Simon de Montford himself, on the ground of a report that they were in possession of 'Greek fire' and meant to destroy the city. A massacre of all the Jews in London was ordered, with the exception of those who were willing to receive baptism and others of whom he wished to make inquiries.

Gilbert, Earl of Clare, treated the Jews of Canterbury with the same severity. Similar outrages occurred at Winchester and Worcester. Nor were the miseries of the Jews ended even by the victory of the King's party at Evesham. Indeed, it was after that battle that the 'disinherited barons' seized the 'island and town of Ely' and laid waste the whole of the county of Cambridge, 'slaying and utterly destroying the Jews and everywhere perpetrating many atrocities.' Moreover, Pierre of Lancroft states in his chronicle that the 'disinherited barons' and their followers broke open the chests belonging to the Jews at Lincoln. Then they seized their deeds and trod them under foot in the muddy lanes. They put men, women, and children to the sword.

It is a relief to turn from these and similar horrors to the attempts made both by Henry III and his son Edward I to convert the Jews. Henry III established a 'Domus Conversorum,' in which Jewish converts were supplied with competent maintenance and trained in the Christian faith. Edward I enlisted the services of the Dominicans or Friars Preachers to endeavour to hasten conversions. In 1275 the King forbade 'the unbridled licence of usury,' and endeavoured to induce the Jews to take up fresh occupations, and even allowed them to lease lands. He might as well have bidden the Ethiopian to change his skin or the leopard his spots as expect that the Jews would exchange a business of which they were masters for manual labour.

In the meantime the Dominicans preached in vain—conversions came in slowly, and the hope that Israelites would ever be christianized vanished into thin air. Edward was distressed and disappointed, and gradually became convinced that the Jews would always be an irritant to the people and a trouble to the sovereign. Moreover, his subjects were constantly clamouring for their expulsion, and his mother, Eleanor of Provence, used all her influence to induce him to take this course. Unpleasing incidents at length completely decided the King to take the irrevocable step. In 1278

many of the Jews were convicted of 'clipping the coin' and hanged for the crime. In 1287, a further offence, the exact nature of which we do not know, involved the imprisonment of all the Jews. They were released on the payment of the vast sum of twelve thousand pounds. At Midsummer 1290, their fate was sealed, and they were ordered to leave the country in the following November. The day of their departure arrived. Once again the hapless people were indeed wandering Jews, homeless—exiles 'seeking rest and finding none.' Men, women, and children, they numbered sixteen thousand five hundred souls. Misfortune still awaited them, for when they had left the Cinque ports, many were robbed and 'most inhumanly slain' by the sailors, who threw their bodies into the sea.

The story of the sojourn of the Jews in this country is sad beyond power of expression. To most of the mediaeval churchmen, rather than to them, the familiar words of Shakespeare might have been aptly addressed :

The quality of mercy is not strained;
It droppeth, as the gentle rain from heaven,
Upon the place beneath; it is twice blessed—
It blesseth him that gives, and him that takes.

Had this teaching been preached and followed, a terrible chapter in our history would have remained unwritten.

H. P. PALMER.

The Story of Donald Hankey (S. C. M. Press, 4s.) makes us understand the 'Student at Arms' who found himself in the Great War, and found also the supreme opportunity of his life to study men. Mr. Budd says 'he plunged into the midst of the motley crowd with the eager enthusiasm of the artist who has come suddenly upon a scene that calls to be painted, whatever inconvenience or hardship may be incurred.' His training for that work, and the influence he exerted in the trenches and at home, are clearly shown in this sympathetic and graphic story.

RELIGION IN SHAKESPEARE

FROM the shadows of the Middle Ages arose several great institutions—chivalry, feudalism, the Church—and these dominated the social, the economic, and the religious life of the people respectively. The Miracle plays were followed by the Moralities, which date from about the middle of the fifteenth century. These plays represent the conflict between the powers of good and evil for the soul of man. The object was to show that the solution of the moral problem 'depends for every man upon his relation to the powers contending for his soul.' This background is to some extent evident in the plays of Shakespeare. It is not enough to say that Shakespeare's plays are the highest examples of the popular forms of dramatic art. The older types often contained instances of stirring tragic emotion, and also cultivated many sensational and melodramatic elements. But, for romantic sentiment, skilful workmanship, brilliant poetry, for linguistic, artistic, and ethical revelation and effect, the works of Shakespeare remain the admiration and the despair of the dramatic world.

His characters were earthly persons, not legendary heroes. The objectionable passages in Shakespeare, which a modern censor would not pass, are not so obvious and painfully arresting as certain vigorous and unmincing lines in Swinburne. The Victorian poet did, and not without reason, offend the refined and chaste manners of that age. So much so that legal proceedings were threatened against him and his publisher. When these moral blemishes in Swinburne were pointed out to Lord Lytton he naïvely said, 'The beauty of diction, and mastership of craft in melodies, really so dazzled me that I did not see the naughtiness till pointed out.' The 'naughtiness' in Shakespeare is rare, nowhere obtrusive, and almost everywhere rendered innocuous by the majesty

of the scene and the brilliance of the poet's art. He can never be charged with an 'audacious counterfeiting of strong and noble passion by mad, intoxicated sensuality.' Indeed, Shakespeare soars so high in his delineation of human nature and his unparalleled dramatic expression that readers do not pause to ask whether he was moral or immoral, Christian or pagan.

Though tremendous religious problems are raised in the plays, yet it cannot be contended that Shakespeare wrote his dramas for edification in the first instance, much less for religious purposes. Shakespeare was not a missionary, he never intended the theatre to be a church and the stage a pulpit. His object was to entertain by his art, to present life so that it should appeal to the tastes of the community, and make popular and remunerative the dramatists' productions. Such moralizings as we find in the plays—and these are many and profound—are the natural and spontaneous expressions of their authors—fitted to their station, age, temperament, and environment. Shakespeare struck the imagination and captivated the passions of his audiences and contemporaries. He has retained the interest of the mind and stirred the depth of the conscience, because he held the mirror up to humanity, and allowed the world to see itself in all its rugged moods and natural sequences. In this way men realize

'Tis in ourselves that we are thus or thus.

It can hardly be stressed too much that Shakespeare's personal religion cannot with anything approaching certainty be extracted from his *dramatis personae*. They speak the language and utter the thoughts appropriate to their age and station. The utterances of King Henry VI (Part 2, Act II., Sc. i.) may very well express the pious sentiments of the well-intentioned, but sadly incompetent, king :

Now, God be praised! that to believing souls
Gives light in darkness, comfort in despair!

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Poor soul! God's goodness hath been great to thee:
Let never day nor night unhallowed pass,
But still remember what the Lord hath done.

Yet it is not to be concluded that this was Shakespeare's attitude towards Providence. This is but an illustration that the great dramatist suited his characters to *their* views and stations. In the plays, goodness is not introduced for goodness' sake, nor evil for evil's sake, but both are introduced as they fit into the natural order and process of human and historical self-revelation.

The great religious problem raised in the mind by a study of Shakespeare is the problem of a guiding divinity or a relentless fate. There are terrible forces in the universe; are these forces controlled or lawless? There is a God; but, according to the plays, is He on the side of truth and virtue, justice and love, or on the side of ambition and revenge, cruelty and murder? To answer this question is to solve the mystery of Shakespeare. The problem of human life is presented in a three-fold way. The comedies proceed largely on the surface; they sport in the gaieties of life, though frowning elements sometimes protrude. The histories move on the stage of enterprise and adventure; the characters devise, succeed, and fail, some achieve their aim, others fall from the heights into disastrous depths. It is in the tragedies that we really get beneath the surface and move among the mysteries of the subconscious. Here Shakespeare plumbs the abysses of human nature, and reveals some of the mystic forces and phases of the soul. The value which Shakespeare places upon the soul is tremendously significant. In his own impressive way, Shakespeare repeated the question: 'What shall a man be profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and forfeit his life (or soul)?' In this field of psychology Shakespeare takes us beyond our depth, yet we may at least learn to revise our values of life and circumstance. Probably the nearest approach to reality and soul-revelation is found in the soliloquies. They are the secret thoughts of men being

unconsciously uttered. What men have said to themselves is a truer expression of reality, and vastly more profound, than what they have said to others. The soliloquies of Hamlet are among the most penetrating utterances in human language, and reveal the prince as does nothing else in the mighty drama. Even the soliloquies of Iago, in spite of his known falsehood, give us the best clue to his real life and motive. The unexpected utterances that come welling up from the souls of Shakespeare's characters reveal something of the depth and darkness, the mystery and the nobility, of human nature.

The tragedies of Shakespeare constantly press upon us the question: Is God ruling, is He taking part, does He concern Himself in the affairs of men? Heroic Cordelia is killed, and pathetic old King Lear dies of a broken heart; virtuous Desdemona is wrongly suspected and dies an unnatural death; generous King Duncan is murdered in his sleep, but Macbeth, the ambitious, murderous general, accomplishes his wicked designs; and Iago, the ensign to Othello, succeeds in his villainous purpose. In the presence of such events we ask, Is there a moral order in the universe, is there no distinction in results between virtue and vice, is life a game of chance, and everything the product and the sport of fate? These are not new questions. They were asked ages before Shakespeare, and they will still be asked in the ages to come. It is really the problem of the Book of Job, it is the question to which Omar Khayyám gave a fatalistic answer. So many vessels lean awry, we ask, 'What! did the hand, then, of the Potter shake?' The problem of free will is raised again and again in the plays. This subject has perplexed the mind ever since man began to think. Shakespeare sets the reader questioning: Is a man free to choose if God fore-ordains and foreknows? If God knows that a man will pursue a certain course and reach a certain end, can that man pursue any other course or attain any other end? Perhaps there is only an apparent impasse here, and Shakespeare is

not concerned to mark the distinction between foreknowledge and fore-ordination. He does not solve the problem, but he represents men as free actors :

Men at some time are masters of their fates;

The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,

But in ourselves, that we are underlings.

—*Julius Caesar*, I. ii.

In all human action freedom is assumed, and in the plays the foreknowledge of God is always, at least, implied. We cannot deny the one or prove the other, and we proceed on the assumption that there is no necessary contradiction between them. Shakespeare asserts the facts in a multitude of inescapable psychological incidents and experiences, but leaves the mystery unsolved.

There appears, at least at first sight, so much that is dependent upon accident. In the plays the unexpected often breaks upon the scene, with strange determinative effects. In *King Lear*, the life of Cordelia would have been saved had Edgar appeared on the scene a moment sooner. In *Othello*, the innocent Desdemona is stifled by her husband, because by accident she dropped her handkerchief, which came into the hands of Cassio. In *Hamlet*, while crossing to England, the Prince of Denmark is taken prisoner on a chance pirate-ship, and thus escapes the death prepared for him. In *Romeo and Juliet*, the destiny of the lovers depended upon a few moments ; had Juliet awoke from her unconsciousness in the tomb in a fragment of time sooner, both her life and that of Romeo would have been saved. This is a feature of the tragedies, and cannot be accidental in the plays. Shakespeare makes the most momentous results depend upon the seemingly capricious and the most unanticipated events.

The conclusions, the results of the plays, are not often what we desire. In coming to the end of the tragedies we feel that justice has scarcely been satisfied. In this, Shakespeare differs from most modern romance writers. In the novel we expect a satisfactory ending, however tortuous the

process of the story. We look at the scene in the picture-house. The building is on fire, the heroine appears at the top of the burning, collapsing structure; there seems no possible escape from death. It is a thrilling, breathless moment; yet we are quite sure she will be rescued, and in this we are not often disappointed. It is altogether different with Shakespeare. If we journey with him we must meet the storm, the darkness, the disaster. The ordinary novel closes with the chime of bells; the tragedies end with the gun-shot and the sword-rattle. This is tragedy, and in tragedy the heart gets no satisfaction. In the presence of these plays we are left silent, awestruck, perplexed; we are face to face with reality, and reality is an unutterable mystery.

Shakespeare was not a didactic moralist, yet he expresses the highest moral values. He does not pretend to correct the vicious ways of people, but he shows how habits, good or evil, if persisted in must end. The peril of indecision is the moral of *Hamlet*; the deadly nature of jealousy comes out in *Othello*; the tremendous significance of choice is exhibited in the *Merchant of Venice*; the fearful Nemesis of temptation is revealed in *Macbeth*; the destructive issues of egoistic deceit are manifest in *Iago*; the supremacy of love is presented in *Romeo and Juliet*; the treachery of obsession is exposed in *Antony and Cleopatra*; the over-prudential checking of natural impulses is set forth in *Measure for Measure*. In all these, Shakespeare teaches the inexorable severity of the moral law. Conduct remorselessly carries men to destiny. In every tragedy light is extinguished, mirth is eclipsed, character decides doom, and the stage is left strewn with dead bodies, the symbols of suicidal souls.

Sin is never belittled, much less condoned by Shakespeare. It is noticeable that sins of ingratitude, selfishness, and worldliness are particularly condemned. In Shakespeare's ethics, deeds which are the product of strong impulses are more pardonable than premeditated actions of fraudulence and hypocritical professions of generosity. In this, Shakespeare

is on the side of the gospel and of our Lord, who poured out withering condemnation on the self-righteous Pharisees. The fundamental distinction is made between what is assumed in order to deceive, and what is an inherent constituent of human nature. Our Lord knew what was in man, and He judged by the inwardness of morality. Shakespeare, too, knew what was in man, and he judged in the same way. Hence the baseness of Iago and the hard-heartedness of Regan and Goneril are represented as utterly reprehensible. In *King Lear*, ingratitude is addressed as 'thou marble-hearted friend'; in *Othello*, even murder was the deed 'of one that loved not wisely, but too well.'

Shakespeare's presentation of conscience is very deep and subtle. No writings, not even the sacred Scriptures, ever indicated the remorse of conscience as the tragedies. That 'conscience doth make cowards of us all' (*Hamlet*, III. i.) is fully illustrated in all the great plays. There is no sentence in the withering speech of Queen Margaret, in condemnation of Gloucester, more poignant than: 'The worm of conscience still be-gnaw thy soul' (*Richard III*, I. iii.). The painful scene in the death-chamber of Cardinal Beaufort is a tragic commentary on conscience. Seeing the cardinal in anguish, the king addresses him :

Ah, what a sign it is of evil life

Where death's approach is seen so terrible !

—*Henry VI*, 2nd Pt., III. iii.

To read *Macbeth* from the point of view of conscience alone would be a liberal education in psychology. There may be physic for the body, but there is no antidote for 'the torture of the mind.' Read the dialogue between Macbeth and the doctor, concerning Lady Macbeth. 'She is troubled with thick-coming fancies that keep her from her rest.' 'Cure her of that,' says Macbeth. The doctor's reply is terribly significant :

Therein the patient must minister to himself.

—V. iii.

If one play could be selected as involving, more than any other, the ethical features of the tragedies, it would probably be *King Lear*. In general it illustrates the wickedness and consequence of treachery in the most dreadful forms. In this play, 'evil and good clash and grapple with an intensity of action and feeling' which is scarcely equalled elsewhere, even by Shakespeare himself. Here are two forms of blindness—the blindness of sentimentality in Lear, and the blindness of faithlessness in Gloucester. These blindnesses, having become chronic or established, by some inscrutable law—shall we call it fate?—work out a terrible doom. The lesson is, that man is only safe when his mind is perfectly just and calm. The presentation, in the last act, of the murder of Edmund by Edgar is wonderful in execution and psychic suggestiveness. Edmund has been traitorous to nearly all his associates. His last perfidious deed ended with his own destruction.

The gods are just, and of our pleasant vices
Make instruments to plague us.

—*King Lear*, V. iii.

Was Shakespeare a religious man? The answer will depend on what the critic means by religion. The breaking away from conventional forms, and the non-observance of ecclesiastical rites, is not a necessary evidence of irreligion. People who do not attend church services may be deeply religious. The historical Church is not synonymous with the quintessence of religion; if it were, then Leonardo da Vinci, Goethe, and Shakespeare had no religion. It is probably correct to say that Shakespeare recognized the place and power of religion in the development of our English Constitution, and this recognition enabled him to forecast the future. The sixteenth century was mainly occupied with the work of the Reformation, the seventeenth was characterized by the struggle for freedom, the eighteenth was largely devoted to the acquisition of colonial possessions. Shakespeare in *Henry VIII*, last scene, has foreshadowed the whole

process. He sees that the first condition is a sincere recognition of God; then greatness will not be determined by ancestry, but by walking in the path of honour, and the strict observance of duty will result in true freedom. From this first recognition there will result real expansion; the man strengthened by belief in God will emigrate to found new nations. 'The great poet lived to witness the prosperity of the first colony, Virginia; in *The Tempest* he has celebrated the wonders of the West Indian Islands—the new world which began to reveal itself to the eyes of men, with its unknown plants and undreamt-of animals.' The highest liberty has a religious basis, because a man in seeking freedom is responding to the appeal of his own conscience for emancipation. The God of Shakespeare moves within and through men, hence they must follow the clearest light revealed to them, and this freedom of self-determination decides destiny. There is an instinct for truth; loyalty to this intuition becomes a profoundly spiritual power, a principle of life. This is why men are most true to God when most true to themselves. Thus the advice of the father to his son in *Hamlet*:

This above all : to thine own self be true !

How could Shakespeare reveal so truly and profoundly the depth, possibility, and reality of human nature? That he did so is proof that he possessed some extraordinary insight, some stretch of mental comprehension, some spiritual vastness, of which perhaps he was not conscious, and of which the average man is devoid. 'Truth cannot be revealed to incapacity.' We cannot grasp anything unless there is some responsive element in us. We cannot even desire the best in art and science, unless we possess, in however primordial a degree, the faculty for art and science. We could not be moved by the music of Mozart and Bach if we did not have in ourselves at least some faint beginnings of symphony. We could never appreciate the works of Shakespeare, however high we may place his genius, unless there

was something, however little, of Shakespeare in us. And Shakespeare himself could never have revealed such undogmatic, profound, and everlasting conceptions of God and religion unless there were correspondingly lofty conceptions of God and religion somewhere entrenched in the depths of his own being.

Shakespeare has been called a sceptic. In the narrow sense of theological creeds, he was a sceptic, but, in the broad sense of divine revelation through nature and conscience, he was a profound believer. 'We may say, without offence, that there rises a kind of universal Psalm out of this Shakespeare, not unfit to make itself heard among the still more sacred Psalms. Not in disharmony with these, if we understand them, but in harmony.' Carlyle called Dante 'the melodious priest of the Middle-Age Catholicism,' and asked, 'May we not call Shakespeare the still more melodious priest of the true Catholicism, the universal Church of the future and of all times?' This does not mean that Shakespeare was conventionally a pious man; it rather means that he possessed immeasurable capacity for religion, which he did not fully realize. Shakespeare was a prophet, but he differed from the official prophets. They claimed to be conscious of the divine message, and sought to force their oracles by prescribed conventions and unbending laws. Shakespeare was unconscious of his heavenly call and divine message, but his vision was wider, higher, and deeper than that of the prophets, who limited their outlook by tribal and ecclesiastical boundaries. In the plays there is not much about religious faith, but this silence was not religious apathy. Shakespeare knelt before the unsearchable Creator in the infinite temple of the universe, and 'his whole heart was in his own grand sphere of worship.' To judge Shakespeare's religion from the objective side alone—that is, from the acts and consequences of the plays—would lead to a wrong conclusion. On the objective side everything leads to death. Life is a show and the gayest scenes pass into darkness and silence.

For never-resting time leads summer on
To hideous winter and confounds him there.

—*Sonnets*, V.

Yet Shakespeare never abandons life and history to a hopeless pessimism. After tempestuous voyaging come

. . . calm seas, auspicious gales.

—*Tempest*, V. i.

The profoundest meaning of human nature comes through agony. This is Shakespeare's philosophy and his religion, but it is not despair.

The success and transcendency of Shakespeare may to some extent be measured by placing his achievement by the side of that of others in the same field. Such a comparison shows him more and more as the unequalled artist in technique and characterization. No one ever looked so deeply into human nature, no one ever so powerfully revealed the nature and play of motives, no one ever so truly analysed the conscience and expressed its awful judgement, no one ever saw so clearly the inevitable doom of wrongdoing, and the tragic consequence of human passions allowed to achieve their natural goal. Here is theology, unconventional but profound; here is religion, unformulated but fundamental. Here is mystery and wonder—the mystery of man and the wonder of God. We cannot end better than with the words of *King Henry VI* (Part 2, Act II., Sc. iii.):

. . . God shall be my hope,
My stay, my guide, and lantern to my feet.

J. COURTENAY JAMES.

Notes and Discussions

THE KING AND THE COMMONWEALTH

UNLESS something quite abnormal happens, such as the end of the world, or something not quite so cataclysmic, such as another Flood, in another fifty years Australia, Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand will be Great Powers. If, by enlightened statesmanship, the fostering of the family spirit, the bonds that never break are forged in the furnace of freedom, and they are kept within the ambit of the Empire, what a power for peace that invincible, unconquerable, pacific Empire will be.

A good many years ago we were enjoined by a leading statesman to 'think imperially.' He might usefully have warned us at the same time to beware of the temptation to take thinking for acting. It is not enough to think imperially; unless we act imperially it is, like faith without works, a dead thing. But it is further necessary to make up our minds what imperial thinking and imperial acting are and are not.

First, then, what are they not? The war did much to revise the imperial dictionary. Doubtless the Alexanders, the Philips, the Napoleons, even the Big Willies and the Little Willies, imagined they were thinking imperially when they were really thinking parochially. The response to the call of the motherland, unique in history, of the far-flung British colonies in 1914 changed for all time the world's definition of imperialism. Not everybody yet knows the definition is changed; but it is, all the same.

No one doubts but these ancient and modern imperialists imagined they were sound patriots, zealous of their countries' prestige, progress, welfare, and honour. They believed they were divinely or diabolically ordained to be 'top dogs.' Their whole conception of imperialism was one of aggression, bullying, flag-wagging, sabre-rattling, and trumpet-blowing. 'What's thine's mine, and what's mine's my own' was one of their acquisitive proverbs, and another was: 'Every man for himself, and the Devil take the hindmost,' whilst, had they had an ear for poetry, probably their favourite quotation would have been:

The good old rule, the simple plan,
That they shall take who have the power,
And they shall keep who can.

It is hardly necessary to define or even explain the new imperial spirit. It is the antipodes of that. If the British Empire has no better foundation-stones than these, it is doomed to early dissolution, and—like the house of the parable, built on sand—'great will be the fall thereof.'

I think by this time, and in the light of past experience and of other

methods, we are all agreed that the Empire of the future must stand firm for peace and justice, for live and let live, for the Golden Rule and not the rule of gold. It must stand for all that is bright and right and friendly, for the smiles of motherhood, the sanctity of home, the happiness and health of children, the manhood of men, the reverence of good womanhood. It must stand for religion and science and arts and letters, for all those things of the mind and spirit that make men and empires splendid and potent.

If there were not a king growing native to our soil, the natural and immemorial flower of the sturdy plant of any nationality, the type and emblem of our empire unity, the centre and sun of our planetary system of free communities, we should have to invent one, and an improvisation is but a makeshift, unstable, ephemeral, temporary, here to-day and gone to-morrow.

It may be safely said that no more remarkable or significant declaration has ever been made within the walls of the Palace of Westminster than that made by General Smuts, statesman and soldier, once our determined enemy, before half a thousand of the flower of our race, the captains and guides of the congeries of democracies we call the British Empire, but should more correctly to-day call the British Commonwealth. What did he say? This: 'There are two potent factors we must rely upon for the future. The first is our *hereditary kingship*.'

How is it that, at a time in the history of the world's social and political and economic development when kings are of little account, when, in the patois of the street, they are 'three a penny,' how is it, I ask, that a man of republican traditions and instincts, who fought for a republican cause, who lived to manhood through his most impressionable years under a republican régime, should give expression to so decided a conviction in the hearing of the whole world?

Well, at a moment when dictators are becoming quite the fashion on the continent of Europe, it might be well here to inquire what constitutes the difference between our monarchy and other monarchies, what, in the circumstances and constituent parts of this empire, makes a king absolutely essential, and the idea of a republic the idea of disintegration and weakness?

Let us consider the case of the U.S.A., a country of more than a hundred million people, and of such vast area that these islands could be contained within its borders many times over. How is it that this great and prosperous and peace-loving country gets on well enough with a president elected by the suffrages of the people, and we could not in Britain?

The answer is that mere size, either of area or population, is not the crux of the problem of effective government and control. It is community of interest, race, language, political and social ideals, which most count, and this is assured in the States by their compactness. They are all together, all in one piece. On one and the same day the suffrages of all the States of the Union can be taken, and the will of the

people learned. They can say, as by a show of hands: 'We will have, or will not have, this man to reign over us'; and now it is a Wilson, now a Coolidge, and, again, a Hoover. They are content, on the whole, with the choice made, and, with the usual ups and downs of a political choice, the wheels continue to turn pretty smoothly and the State to function.

But let us apply the same test to the British Commonwealth. There are a hundred races and languages in India alone, and it is well to remember this in forming a judgement on the burning question of the immediate future of that wonderful country, which is practically a continent. There is Burma, and the West Indies, and the French and British in Canada, the Dutch and British in Africa. There are great lands like Australia and New Zealand separated by a sea voyage of fourteen thousand miles from Britain, and there is British Guiana, and Central and West Africa, and the Fellaheen and Arab of Egypt and the Soudan, the Jew and Arab of Palestine, the Greek of Cyprus, the Chinaman of Hong-Kong, the natives of Fiji, and all the scattered isles of the southern ocean. What president can all this mixed and scattered and polyglot company elect? Who is to count the hands for and against this man or that? But, most important question of all and hardest, who is to find the man who, for six months, will hold their respect and loyalty, not to mention their affection and reverence?

Russia is an example of 'swopping horses'; and, even though it will be readily admitted that the old team was a bad one and needed changing, it will not be as readily admitted that the change has been for Russia's happiness, honour, and prosperity. But may it not be safely affirmed that, had the late Tsar not only resembled in character, but also in the rights and prerogatives by which he held the imperial throne of Russia, his cousin George of England, and had the will and wish of the people of Russia had as free outlet and expression as in Britain, had Russia, in short, been a 'crowned republic' like the British Empire, the Tsardom would have survived, and Russia would have been better and stronger and happier for that survival?

For Russia, although self-contained like the U.S.A., is very far from having a homogeneous population. With Tartars, Kurds, Mongols, Persians, Turks, Lapps, Lithuanians, Samoyeds, and Finns, it has many races and many tongues. So, could the late Tsar have had the wisdom, ability, and foresight to remain the Little Father of the scattered clans of that vast tract of the earth's surface, the bond of common sentiment would have been a unifying force, which now it will be hard to find, even if the search be sincere, and the intention of the best.

And that is exactly what King George is to the world-scattered empire, that commonwealth of nations which has grown around the realm of England. The throne is not the centre of power, but the bond of union; not the autocratic arbiter of life and death, slavery and freedom, war and peace, but, rather, the fount of honour, the shrine of empire, to which all races and creeds can turn with affection

and reverence, just as all sorts and conditions of men composing a regiment salute their flag, and are ready to die for that symbol of honour, glory, patriotism, and unity.

I followed a party of colonial visitors into Westminster Abbey last summer. I saw them remove their hats and caps as they entered. I saw them stand before its monuments and memorials with awe. I saw them look up at its storied windows with the light of admiration and appreciation in their eyes, and I observed that they listened with strained attention to the story the guide was telling them of this ancient and noble pile. On the same day I saw a West Indian negro in 'Poet's Corner' looking at the bust of Shakespeare, and a Parsee gazing at the statue of Gladstone. Can you tell me why the Abbey is so fascinating? In what does it differ from a town hall or even from the Houses of Parliament? It differs because it is absolutely irreplaceable. You can build new town halls and even new parliament and government centres, but you cannot build a new Abbey of Westminster. The centuries have built that. Its consecration is not of ecclesiastics. History has laid holy hands upon it. Its stones are the piled years of the British people, and, in those same years, they have spread themselves to the four winds of heaven, and made themselves homes in the wilderness, and built mighty cities in the haunt of the lion and the jackal.

The case of our kingship is the same. It is for this empire an essential, an irreplaceable thing. It is the symbol of its history, the sun of its system, the heart of its body, the intangible, invisible cord, like the pull of gravitation, viewless but potent, which keeps all the young, free-moving democracies in their regular, law-abiding orbits, free from friction as they are free from interference or dictation.

This monarchy is the growth of the centuries as the Abbey is. It has long since sloughed off the shining armour of the tyrant and autocrat, and replaced it with the Robe of Justice and of Equal Rights. It has flung away the gauntlet of steel, the 'mailed fist' which so lately dragged its own people into the dust, and revealed the 'glad hand' of brotherliness and *bonhomie*. No president of the United States doffs his glove and stands on the steps of the White House to shake hands with miner and millionaire with a finer grace, a more brotherly warmth, than our king.

I believe 'our crowned republic's crowning common sense' will be very slow to scrap the throne when that throne is at the height, not of its power, for that is a thing of the past, but of its beneficence, its usefulness, its unique gift of attraction and unification, for our Perpetual President, the King, has the affectionate loyalty of men and women of every creed, colour, and language, and there is real wisdom in 'letting well alone.'

Freedom has been justified of her children, and our empire will evermore stand as the world-example of the stabilizing effect of free institutions. But all this means a responsibility none of us has a right to shirk. It is needful we live up to the call made upon us, that

we do not cramp the new spirit of freedom with petty objection, small aim, narrow outlook, internecine quarrel, selfish, grasping policy. We are all in the same boat. If we would voyage favourably and reach the desired haven of national and imperial security and well-being, and be of help to the wider world of men and women who are, despite all outward differences, bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh, we must be ready to take a hand in navigating the national and imperial craft.

We may set up international leagues and international courts, but unless there be the inherent will towards peace, the habit of thinking which leads that way, and that way only, a sentiment of peace in the hearts of men, these will prove but soulless pieces of machinery, which the first shock of controversy will tend to jolt out of gear.

A. B. COOPER.

DR. DAVID, LORD BISHOP OF LIVERPOOL, ON THE LAMBETH REPORT

THE Lambeth Conference of 1930 is now a thing of the past. There can be no denying the fact that there is unmistakable disappointment on the part of Free Churchmen at the attitude of the bishops to reunion with Free Churchmen. In view of this disappointment, I sought this interview with Dr. David, Bishop of Liverpool. The subject of the interview was the section of the report which deals with 'The Unity of the Church.' Dr. David received me graciously and spoke quite freely. He thinks there has been misunderstanding on the part of Free Church critics. On the other hand, he thinks that some things in the report might have been stated with greater definiteness, and other things now omitted might have been included. The first question I put was a general one as to whether he thought there was the same urge towards unity in 1930 as in 1920. Dr. David was not a bishop in 1920, but he pointed out that the really important clauses of the 1920 report had been reprinted and practically reaffirmed in 1930. The subject of the 1930 conference was 'Witness,' whereas that of 1920 was 'Fellowship.'

Because of the insistence on episcopacy as a necessary condition of reunion, both in the report itself and ultimately in reference to the South India movement, I asked the bishop if the dogma of apostolic succession was held by the bishops generally. He replied, 'The doctrine of apostolic succession as a mechanism of transmission is held by very few. To most of us it is a spiritual succession, not to be decided by literal succession.'

Dr. David has referred to this matter in the *Liverpool Review*. There he has said that 'it is a pity that Free Church comment has concentrated on the doctrine of apostolic succession . . . the committee concerned could not have held this doctrine in the crude form imputed

to us." Then, referring to the report, he says: "Such language seems to me inconsistent with any theory which makes devolution of authority and grace superstitiously dependent upon a sequence of physical acts."

In one of my questions I pointed out that, for Free Churchmen, this very indefiniteness in the matter of the episcopacy was a source of difficulty. If episcopacy was of such urgent importance, it was surely necessary to know its meaning before we could say whether or not we could accept—yet the report asked acceptance of the fact without committing us to any particular theory. The theory, I suggested, should be an attempt to express its meaning. Alternative theories meant alternative meaning. Which meaning were we to accept? Dr. David admitted the difficulty, and instanced Dr. Streeter and Dr. Gore as holding different views. I had mentioned two other distinguished doctors. When I suggested that this insistence on the necessity of episcopacy seemed to some of us to limit the Holy Spirit's operation, he did not agree. "To my mind, the emphasis on episcopacy is an emphasis on that which has been proved to work well, and if it can absorb the best fruits of the experience of Congregationalism or Presbyterianism it will be the best form of Church government in the future."

My next question was as to whether episcopacy had proved an effective instrument of unity in the Anglican Communion. The question was suggested by three considerations: the different positions taken up, say, by Dr. Barnes and Dr. Frere, the fact of priests who defy the bishops, and the paragraph in the report, on pp. 121-2, headed "Unity in the Anglican Communion." In this paragraph an appeal is made to various parties in the Church of England, which has episcopacy, to co-operate with each other.

Here, again, Dr. David recognized the facts, and said: "The position in the Anglican Church is one of special difficulty by reason of its comprehensiveness. Our difficulties are worth while, however, if we can secure, even at the cost of seeming disunity, that we do provide a spiritual home for men of different traditions and temperaments. We are bound to live dangerously, because we have learned the lesson of comprehensiveness." He rather turned the tables on me when he went on to say, "We did bitter wrong when we allowed you Wesleyans to go out of the Church. We ought to have kept you. We have said so, and, having learned our lesson, it imposes upon us the burden of comprehensiveness." Referring to the question of rebellious priests, he said that the bishops' hands were tied by all sorts of archaic restrictions. "That was not the fault of establishment, but of bad establishment."

My next question had reference to the paragraph in which interchangeability of ministries is discouraged, while united evangelical efforts are recommended. I suggested that this was an attitude not very likely to convince the man in the street, either of the sincerity or the love of the Churches.

Dr. David thought that there was a lot of work which could be done before the question of unity arose at all, but agreed that there might come a point when the persons whose interest had been aroused might have to separate and go in different directions. He went on to say: 'My main reason for not wishing inter-Communion is my fear that this most serious and solemn service may be used as a demonstration and argument. At one time I was inclined to the opposite view, but now I think that inter-Communion must be the end of the process of reunion.' I quoted Canon Raven's view that inter-Communion should help on the process of reunion—eliminating, of course, any element of the theatrical. I gathered that, with adequate safeguards, Dr. David's view would not differ greatly from Canon Raven's.

The matter of the *rapprochement* with the Eastern Orthodox Church was our next topic. The view that I put was that, from the standpoint of evangelizing England, union with the Orthodox Church would help very little, whereas union with the Free Churches would have meant real advance. In reply to this suggestion, Dr. David said two things.

First that the work of the Anglican Church was world-wide. He said: 'There opens up before me a new prospect of a world-wide Anglican Communion which must soon drop the name of Anglican—a federation of Churches, but without a federal constitution, united simply by the common loyalty of the bishops.'

On the question of the negotiations between the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Anglican Church, Dr. David made clear, what is not made clear in the report, that the initiative was taken by the leaders of the Orthodox Church and not by the bishops. 'The Orthodox Church approached the Anglicans with a warmth which was most impressive. It was a unique thing that these patriarchs should have come to London to ask for closer fellowship. What else could we do but respond?' He wondered whether Free Churchmen were surprised at the response of the Anglican Church to another Church in which there were admittedly superstitious practices. If that were the case, his answer would be that, 'if we believe in our Reformation principles, we should not be afraid of nearness to people who had not enjoyed them. The more dealings they have with the Anglican Communion the more they will understand our approach to the question of worship and prayer, and that must be all to the good.'

Following up this question, I asked the bishop whether, considering that there had been prolonged conversations between the bishops and representative Free Churchmen, and considering also that a large measure of agreement had admittedly been reached, note should not have been made of this in the summary of progress at the conclusion of the report. Dr. David did not know why a note had not been made similar to that made of the Malines conversations. He agreed that much greater progress had been made with Free Churchmen than with the Roman Church at Malines. His opinion is that this progress should have been noted.

My last question was whether Dr. David thought it worth while to continue talking about reunion when we were so fundamentally divided on the question of episcopacy. He replied that he probably would have taken the view that further conferences were useless at present but for the South India development. He did think that made a difference.

When I suggested that even concerning that movement there was disquiet in some minds because of the lack of definition in regard to episcopacy (what was episcopacy going to mean in the South India Church?), Dr. David said that we must wait, and, of course, I agreed that we must.

Dr. David is to be congratulated on the stand he is taking on Roman Catholicism in his city. His invitation to Dr. Coulton to deliver the Liverpool lecture, on questions affecting the Roman Church, showed courage. On the morning of this interview a letter appeared in the Press from Dr. David which showed the fear inspired by the priests among the poor in the matter of mixed marriages. Dr. Downey, of course, is angry that these things have been forced into the light, but the exposure is overdue.

J. R. PEACOCK.

THE TANGANYIKA MANDATE

THE publication of the British Imperial Government's White Paper on *Native Policy in East Africa*—see Memorandum C.M.D. 3598 (1922) recently published—has been the occasion of Press comment both in Great Britain, on the Continent, and in South Africa. Whilst the more recent exhibition of the German 'goose-step' in East Africa has served the purpose of those who fondly keep the fires of desire for the recovery of Tanganyika burning.

Hence the absorbing interest that lovers of Africa find in the 'Kenya White Paper,' the dominant note of which is that the '*Interests of the African native must be paramount.*'

The memorandum enunciates two main principles of which we wish to make particular mention, and these are:

- 1 That His Majesty's Government have no intention of advising the abandonment of the mandate [i.e. of Tanganyika] or its modification in any way.
2. That His Majesty's Government fully accept the principle that the relation of His Majesty's Government to the native population in East Africa is one of trusteeship which cannot be devolved and from which they cannot be relieved.

We welcome these statements with both hands, and trust that nothing either in international policies or in African politics will deflect the Imperial Government from the utterly wise declaration of its intentions.

We are quite well aware of the attitude of many newspapers in Germany that she is persistently aiming at the ultimate recovery of her colonies; but we fervently hope that Great Britain will never

resign her mandates in East and West Africa. We see no chance of South-West Africa being cut off again from the Union of South Africa; but we are apprehensive as to the mandate of Tanganyika.

As one who has been absorbingly interested in our East and Central African colonies I have come to definite conclusions concerning their life and relation to us in the South. For the good of the lands we have known intimately, we are firmly of the opinion that the time is rapidly coming when a federation of South and East (with East Central) African provinces should be considered as more than a mere academic question. It is going to be very real. It is, also, altogether a very necessary matter that the vast native populations in East Africa should continue under the guardianship of the British Government. This is based on my experience as I have travelled from Dar-es-Salaam to Ujiji, from Karagwe to Kampala in Uganda, and to Mombasa in Kenya.

It is well to refresh our memories to see the problem in its proper perspective. Tanganyika was one of the great battlefields of the war, and, for its subjugation, treasure in money and manhood was poured out without stint or complaint. The cost of the war in East Africa was at least £72,000,000. Thousands of our brave men died of wounds or disease, and to this day hundreds carry the brands of that conflict in their bodies, minds, and souls. Thousands of native levies sacrificed their lives in the war. Here and there I have stood in reverence before monuments raised to the memory of these Bantu servants of empire. In Nairobi there is a noble pile consisting of three bronze Askari figures, reminding residents and visitors alike of British appreciation of Bantu soldiers and servants of war.

Tanganyika became one of Great Britain's mandated territories. And the question of what that ultimately means in international nomenclature is not yet determined. There is a good deal of uneasiness in the minds of those who, like myself, are concerned for the maintenance of British administration in the best interests of the native peoples of the territory. Great Britain received the mandate in 1918 to administer Tanganyika from the allied and associated Powers and this was confirmed by the League of Nations in 1922.

It is interesting to recall the conditions of the mandate. They are: (1) No slavery. (2) No forced labour (except for essential services and public work and money-equivalent). (3) No abuses in arms-traffic and spirits. (4) Ordinary recruiting for labour. (5) Safeguarding native land-interests. (6) No transfer from a native to a non-native, except by consent of the higher administrative authorities. (7) Commercial amity with other nations. (8) Religious autonomy.

It will be remembered that Great Britain ceded to the Belgian Congo the great provinces of Ruanda and Urundi, thus cutting off from Tanganyika perhaps the most densely populated sections of the land. To-day, Tanganyika has a native population of over 4,000,000 (5,000 whites and 14,000 Indians), whilst the small territories so cut off have over 3,000,000 native people.

In 1925, ex-enemy nationals were permitted by the League of Nations to re-enter Tanganyika Territory—by imperial permission, of course, and under proper guarantee. They have not failed to embrace the privilege, and passenger boats up the east (or down the Suez) bring their quota of ex-enemy immigrants to this coveted possession. In travelling we find uneasiness because of this partial whittling down of what a British (even mandated) protectorate means.

Is the ex-enemy national optimistic? True, in 1925, and again in 1927, 'it was authoritatively asserted that the mandates could not be *revoked*.' We emphasize that word *revoke*. It is interesting. Etymologically, of course, the word is clear. It means 'cannot be recalled,' 'reversed,' 'renounced,' 'made void.' If we could be assured of that, all would be well. But are we? Can we be so certain? Even Lord Parmoor, in the House of Lords some time ago, stated that he 'did not really know where the ownership or sovereignty of these mandated territories lay.' The Secretary for the Dominions stated at the same time that 'it was not true that mandated territories were part of the British Empire.' Yet H.E. the Governor of Tanganyika (Sir D. Cameron) could make the statement, in the Legislative Council in December 1926, 'that Tanganyika is a part of the British Empire and will remain so.'

There is legitimate ground for deep anxiety as to the political future of this great native kingdom, which at present is being so well administered on behalf of the native people by some of the finest imperial servants Great Britain has ever sent on empire building and administration.

We share the alarm that the mandate may be revoked at no distant date. Hence we welcome the White Paper assurance, for such revocation would be disastrous, in our judgement, for at least two reasons:

1. *In the interests of our East African Empire.* It is of the utmost importance that the territory lying between Kenya and Uganda on the north and north-east, and the Rhodesias and Nyasaland on the south and south-west, should remain British territory. No wonder there is a movement afoot to create an East African Federated State or Federation of States to consolidate this part of the Empire. Tanganyika is absolutely essential to that end.

2. *In the interests of the native population itself.* We are not slow to criticize our own native administration when necessity arises, but, in our opinion, British imperial consideration of a subject people stands second to none, and here we have seen much of its beneficent application. Partnership in development, and not racial repression, is the only policy that can eventually claim regards in Africa's political future. Britain stands pre-eminent there, and for that reason the Tanganyika mandate should never be revoked.

We could mention a third reason, and this touches the sacred in our life. We think of the men who died in East Africa—some of whose graves I have seen and grieved over; we think of those who still suffer

through the war. Are their sacrifices to count for nothing in international determinations? We think of the men from South Africa whose blood is mingled with Tanganyika soil—their sacrifice has imposed an obligation. They died to win it. Surely the Empire will hold it. Great Britain can hardly go back on her sacrificial dead. Not even the League of Nations should interfere in such a matter.

I speak under restraint. The discriminating will understand one's reticence—and anxiety. The late Lord Asquith's great phrase comes most appropriately: 'Wait and see.' One can but trust and pray that, because of all it means, Tanganyika Territory may remain *for all time*, an integral part of our East African Empire. Here is a territory, 384,180 square miles in extent, where, as the Governor said in London on June 11, 1927, 'They had set up a native administration evolved from the inherent rights of the native himself, from his own customs and traditions, a form of administration which he understood. The aim was to make the European dependent on the native and the native a complement of the European in the development of the country.'

Here is, in fact, a native segregated area devoted primarily to native life and development—an object lesson with many suggestions that the Union of South Africa might well consider. Hence the genuine appreciation of the pronouncement 'that His Majesty's Government have no intention of advising the abandonment of the Tanganyika mandate.'

ALLEN LEA.

THE PORTRAIT OF A DOG

MRS. DE LA ROCHE has shown in this *Portrait* (Macmillan, 7s. 6d.) that she knows as much about dogs as *Whiteoaks* proved that she knew about horses. Her heroine is a little Scotch terrier, her last present to her husband, endeared to her by a host of happy memories. As a puppy she was an imp of mischief, but she grew up to be a chosen friend and companion, a little creature that had no fears, and that won over every visitor and neighbour. When her mistress first sat down to write, the dog followed and lay down at her feet. It established itself as her partner, and seemed to think that the work could not go on rightly without her. 'I must have the support of your solid little presence, the intimacy of your eyes, the sympathy of your quiet thudding tail on the floor when the pencil was laid down, the paper gathered up. You came to know that moment unerringly. I might fret about the room, look out of the window, or go to another room in search of something; you never budged. There you sat, doing your part, and, not till the final moment, rising to stretch, to give me a look complacent, beaming, affectionate, that sealed the morning's work.' The pathetic side of the story comes when Scottie grew blind, but trained her other senses to do such good service that it seemed impossible to believe that she could not see. When at last she was buried, a chapter seemed to have closed in the lives of those who loved her. She lives in this *Portrait*, which has a grace and beauty all its own.

Recent Literature

THEOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS

A Life of Jesus. By Basil Mathews. With two illustrations in colours by William Holman Hunt and thirty-three photographs by the author. (Oxford University Press. 7s. 6d.)

MR. MATHEWS pays generous tribute, in his Appendix, to the help of friends in Palestine and scholars in England who have assisted him in preparing this *Life of Jesus*. No one, however, can read it without feeling that he has himself lived through the Gospel history in its original setting and caught the spirit of every incident in our Lord's personal life and public ministry. The great story unfolds before our eyes, and the grace and simplicity with which it is told gives it some of the charm of the Gospels themselves. But the artistry of the writer does not conceal the scholarly way in which all the facts and theories have been examined and the finest scholarship laid under contribution. The notes are crisp and concise, so that they never detract from the impression produced by the narrative, and, although we do not share the writer's opinion that Mary of Bethany and Mary Magdalene are the same person, Mr. Mathews has not arrived at his conclusion without close consideration of the facts. He is also decisive in adopting St. John's statement that the Last Supper was kept on the night before the Passover. That, indeed, is the solution to which all the circumstances lead. One charm of the book is the intimate knowledge of every gospel scene which Mr. Mathews has gained by the journeys in Palestine which his wife has shared and which residents in the Holy Land have enriched by their personal experience. Another attraction is the author's photographs, which really light up the story at every point. Nor is the *Life* less impressive from the way in which our Lord's words are woven into the record. The description of the cleansing of the Temple is a powerful and dramatic scene. The treachery of Judas is ascribed to avarice, wounded pride, burning jealousy, lust of power, and disappointed ambition. There are many Lives of our Lord, but there is none more graphic, more tender, more revealing than this. It is delightful to read, and scholars will appreciate it not less than the ordinary reader.

Religion and Life. By W. B. Selbie, M.A., D.D. (Oxford University Press. 6s.)

Dr. Selbie delivered these lectures on the Noble Foundation at Harvard University in 1930. Schleiermacher was one of the first

to take into consideration the ideas underlying some of the great religions of the world, though his knowledge of them was superficial and traditional. Even up till recent times the work done has been mainly the collection of materials. The comparative method shows that religion cannot be accounted for by any one instinct to the exclusion of others 'It rather belongs to man's personality as a whole, and represents his total reaction to the universe.' Dr Selbie holds that religion has nothing to fear from psychology, but everything to gain. It interprets man to himself as a thinking being. A reasoned belief in God, not only helps to interpret the universe, but gives power, stability, and direction to life. The relation between religion and ethics has always been close. Religion inspires, sanctions, and directs man's moral strivings. Without religion, morality is apt to fall to a low legalism and to lack initiative and power. One of the most noteworthy things in the history of the Church is the vitality of the person of Jesus Christ. The truth of the Incarnation abides, and the end of Christianity is eternal life, of which the seed is within us. The lectures are rich in food for thought, and make a distinct contribution to faith as well.

The Historic Jesus. By James Mackinnon, D.D. (Longmans. 16s.)

Dr. Mackinnon has quickly followed his great work on *Luther and the Reformation* by this important volume. He seeks to depict Jesus as He actually manifested Himself in His life and work on earth. It is the Jesus primarily of the short span of His actual life. Dr. Mackinnon draws his material mainly from the Synoptists, the Pauline Epistles, and the fragment known as the Gospel of the Hebrews. He regards the Fourth Gospel as 'palpably coloured from beginning to end by the conditions of the time of its origin and by the theological views of the writer.' As Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Edinburgh, Dr. Mackinnon has had to grapple with the problems of our Lord's life, and his work will appeal to those who are facing these problems for themselves. He takes the position that there are strong historic reasons for questioning the Virgin Birth and the visit of the Magi. In the story of the raising of Lazarus he finds a certain artificiality, and is evidently doubtful about it. The minute account of the feet-washing in the Fourth Gospel 'bespeaks the eye-witness,' and chapter xiv. is complete in itself and 'pervaded by the farewell spirit. It breathes the mystic atmosphere of a higher world, the supra-mundane existence.' The rest of the discourse he thinks cannot have been delivered *in extenso* by Jesus as it stands. Dr. Mackinnon holds that by eliminating from the Gospel the miraculous in the traditional sense, we are really strengthening, not weakening, the Christian faith. The chapters headed 'Was Jesus Conscious of Pre-existence?' and 'Jesus and God' will provoke discussion, and will certainly fail to carry conviction to many minds. To represent Him 'as a human being becoming divine, in the sense of developing in the

highest degree a sonship of which, in His own teaching, all are capable, though only He has actually attained to the fullness of this filial consciousness, and only He is chosen to be the Son in the distinctive Messianic sense 'is a world below the teaching of the Creeds.

The Parables of Jesus : Their Art and Use. By A. T. Cadoux, D.D. (James Clarke & Co. 6s.). The parable is 'art harnessed for service and conflict.' The parables of Jesus were 'His characteristic utterances, because it was He who, in one and the same intent, called humanity to consider the lilies, and Himself undertook the conflict that led to the Cross.' The parable is rare, for it requires a considerable degree of art, but generally of art exercised under hard conditions. In the three typical parables of the Bible the speaker takes his life in his hands, and almost all the parables of Jesus of the occasion of which we are fairly sure, were spoken in attack or defence. There are no parables in the New Testament save His. The rarity of the art and His supremacy in it are valuable as evidence that the Church took its rise from a personality immeasurably greater than any who followed Him in its ranks. Dr Cadoux holds that our Lord intended His parables to be understood, and attributes the explanation given in the Gospels to the disciples. We do not follow him there, but he provokes thought, and brings out so many beauties that this volume will be welcomed by all students of the parables. In an effective parable the hearer passes judgement unhesitatingly on the situation depicted in the story. Those of Jesus represent moments in His creative reaction upon the life around Him. 'They take us into the brunt of his warfare.'

The Gospel Foundations, by John Stephen Hart (S.P.C.K., 5s.), is the Moorhouse Lecture for 1928 by the Bishop of Wangaratta, who brings out the literary ability and charm of St. Mark's Gospel in an impressive way, and dates it about the year A.D. 48. He thinks that the Gospel was not written in Rome, and that St. Paul must have read it in Antioch in 45. 'St. Mark in St. Paul' is a striking chapter, and the two chapters on 'History in St. John's Gospel' and 'The Johannine Gospel' are of special interest.—*The New Commandment*, by C. S. Phillips, M.A., D.D. (S.P.C.K., 6s.), offers a warning against painting the condition of the ancient world in over-gloomy colours, but shows that in its theory and practice of benevolence it was incomparably behind the world of to-day. 'The latter may be far from Christian: yet it has been profoundly Christianized.' The Church's social life and teaching in the Apostolic Age, before the time of Constantine, and under Constantine and his successors, is studied in a way that brings out impressively the forms in which the charity of the Church displayed itself. It is a great advantage to have such a survey of the benefits thus brought to individuals and to society at large.

Personal Discipleship and the Way of Prayer. By Canon John C. H. How. (Longmans & Co. 2s. 6d.) The Bishop of London has secured a fine book for Lenten reading. Canon How shows that the

first disciples had been prepared to receive the call of Jesus, and presses home the lesson that men and women to-day only answer the Lord's call when prepared for their vocation. The first part of the book dwells on discipleship as the study of Christ with the aim to catch His spirit and be made like Him. The first essential in this pursuit is 'determined and persistent prayer.' Prayer requires practice and studied attention if it is to be done well. Canon How would have us set Christ before us in His earthly life, in His Resurrection and Ascension, and as above us and about us in the practical service of the world. The ever-present Christ: He is in us, and one part of prayer is to realize this fact; to use this talent and trade with it to the profit of our own soul's life, to the profit of the world, and, above all, that our Master may see of the travail of His soul and be satisfied. The book will be a blessing to all who catch its spirit.

Jésus Dieu de la Pâque. Par Jean Pain. (Paris: Les Éditions Rieder. Fr. 15.) M. Pain feels that the hypothesis of a Jesus God of the Passover belongs to the very foundations of Christianity, which ceases, in this view, to appear as an extraordinary adventure, and takes its place among natural and normal phenomena. As modern exegetes regard it, the problem of the existence of Jesus is essentially a criticism of texts. The independent exegetes put no faith in the narratives of the New Testament, of which they contest the worth line by line. These views are discussed, and the conclusion is reached that, if Jesus had not been from the beginning a God who died and rose again for the salvation of souls, He would never have become one. Jesus as Messiah joins divine power to the suffering of death. This combination appeared monstrous to orthodox Judaism, yet it was a feature of the Jewish Passover itself. Much study of the primitive Church is needed, and opens out, with the heresies in particular, a vast field of study. M. Pain ventures to hope that the specialists will turn their attention to this subject. It is public opinion that constrains the savants to see clearly. Thinkers are ready to accept the scholar's explications, but demand one which does not defy common sense.

Abingdon Press Publications.—*The Problem of God.* By Edgar S. Brightman. (8s.) The Professor of Philosophy in Boston University has come to hold the conception of God as 'creative, supreme, and personal, yet genuinely limited within His own nature by "given" experiences eternally present, which His will does not create, but which His will can control, no matter how refractory they may be.' This view seems to him to be closer to the empirical facts of evolution and daily life, more in harmony with the combination of love and pain which experience reveals, and hence more satisfactory as a solution of the problem of evil than traditional theism. Belief in God is no evasion of the difficulties of life, but simply the confidence that, behind the daily mystery that surrounds us, the human race can rely on a powerful Friend. By the 'given' Professor Brightman means 'a limitation within the divine nature, a problem for the divine will

and reason.' His perfection 'is an infinite series of perfectings. Perfection means perfectibility.' It means that God is the controlling power of the universe, guiding it through all struggles and delays toward an ever-enlarging value. This is a book for thinkers, and one that regards God as more sympathetic with the limitations of man. It maintains His 'transcendence, and, by providing for the mysterious and irrational along with the moral and the rational in His nature, makes Him a more worthy object of numinous worship.'—*Ancient Fires on Modern Altars*, by Bishop A. W. Leonard (\$1.50), approaches the question of evangelism from a new angle. Dr. Leonard is persuaded that the artistry of worship may be secured without loss of apostolic passion and fervour. The Church is keenly criticized; and its laity plead that ministers should give less attention to controversy, and greater heed to the deeper things of the Spirit. The spiritual trend of to-day shows a mystical, spiritual longing for a deeper and fuller knowledge of God in Christ. People are hungry for the message of Christ. The bishop urges that increasing attention should be given to evangelism through the group method, and describes the Preaching Mission, which is intended to supplement the pastor's own evangelism and develop an evangelistic courage in the minds and hearts of ministers and laymen that will be abiding.—*Religion in Life Adjustments*, by Samuel N. Stevens (6s.), marks an attempt to make religion a dynamic and creative factor in life. Instead of being a support for weak wills and jaded lives, it is to be a bulwark of strength for those who carry on the struggle of life in the heat of every day. It gives the capacity to live courageously, and without anxiety, by placing at the centre of life a glowing ideal which will give 'a creative and complete expression of every faculty a man possesses.' Men still crave a rich, abundant life, and the Church must do all that it can to aid them in gaining it.

Prayer and its Psychology. By Alexander Hodge, Ph.D. (S.P.C.K. 6s.) *Sin and the New Psychology.* By Clifford E. Barbour, Ph.D. (Abingdon Press. \$2.) Dr. Hodge points out that Christianity is faced with one of the greatest crises of its history. Mankind is obsessed with the natural, the material, the non-religious. The scientific and utilitarian interpretation of life dominates the thought and conduct of the masses. Dr. Hodge shows that the mental processes involved in the prayer-state are characteristic of secular as well as religious thought. Prayer involves ideas of the real existence, superiority, personality, and responsiveness of the Deity, and is the central act of religion. It reflects the nature of the growth of the idea of God. The subject is vital, and, as Dr. Selbie says, the writer has made a real contribution to the better understanding of it. Dr. Barbour meets the fairly common view that there is no such thing as sin. The method of psycho-therapy he holds to be identical in principle with that which Christianity employs for the cure and eradication of sin. 'There is no real conflict between the new psychology and Christianity. Psycho-analysis has merely added the

weight of its evidence to the eternal truths originally revealed in the life and teaching of Jesus. Christianity does not limit its application to helping man to gain harmony with himself and his environment; it brings the human into relation also with the divine.'

Religion and the Mysterious. By F. H. Brabant. *Religion and the Reign of Science.* By F. L. Cross. (Longmans & Co. 4s. each.) Mr. Brabant feels that life without mystery would be intolerable. Religion never seems to have enough of mysteries. In the wider sense, the Unknown, as kindling joy, wonder and reverence, is found throughout the New Testament. The modern criticism of the supernatural is based on the notion that it is vulgar to admire a thing because it is unknown, and it is easy to be half-consciously influenced by such a fallacy when dealing with the miraculous. The fact is that the more we know, the more we should wonder. To seek to understand is of the essence of human dignity, to want to understand everything is to desire to be God and not man. This is a thinker's book and one that provokes thought in others. Mr. Cross, in his fine volume, considers the more popular objections made against the Christian religion, and shows how the Church has had to abandon positions which proved untenable. The relations to physics, biology, psychology, and biblical criticism are discussed in a way that will clear the minds of many students. The final chapter, on 'Religion and the Life of the Spirit,' takes a more positive course. Religion is here regarded as a way of approach to the universe. Christianity, before all else, is a religion, and, as Dr. Bradley says, 'the man who demands a reality more solid than that of the religious consciousness knows not what he seeks.'

Extracts from the Authorized Altar Book in Denmark. By the Rev. H. B. Hayes. (Stockwell.) This translation of some of the services used in the Danish Church has special interest in view of the desire expressed in the Lambeth Conference for closer relations with the Scandinavian Churches. The Marriage Service follows the lines of the English Prayer Book; the form for baptism speaks of 'this laver of regeneration'; that for the Lord's Supper prays that God would make these His 'gifts so truly to work in us that they may strengthen our faith, uplift our hope, and kindle within our hearts a mutual love.' It is a timely little publication.—*The Unity of the Trinity.* By E. Judson Page, A.R.C.Sc. (Epworth Press. 1s.) Mr. Page holds that the Nicene Fathers failed adequately to present the conception of the New Testament writers, in particular the theology of St. Paul and St. John, and the plain teaching of Jesus Christ. The unity of the Trinity in heaven is regarded as the pattern of the unity Christ designs to see accomplished among His followers on earth. It is an acute and well-sustained argument which appeals especially to theologians.—Three 'Broadcast Sermons,' from the Epworth Press (6d., 1s., 2s. 6d.), neatly got up and well printed, will be welcome companions for a quiet moment. They are by the Revs. Leslie Weatherhead, W. H. Cookson, and A. S. Hullah, M.C.

They are richly evangelical and get home to the heart. They will make acceptable little gifts, and will prolong and widen the influence they had when first broadcast.—*The Psalms*. Book V. By F. H. Wales, B.D. (H. Milford. 1s.) This translation, now brought to a close, has many suggestive renderings, such as that of Ps. cxli. 2. It is a real addition to one's understanding and love of the Psalter.—*At the Well of Bethlehem* is a Narrative Drama in three parts, by Mona Swan (L. B. Hill, 101 Great Russell Street, 2s. and 3s. 6d.). Ruth, David, and the Virgin Mary are the subjects of the three sections. The words are chiefly taken from the Authorized Version, and directions are given as to staging, costume, lighting, colour, and music. There is rich dramatic material in these Bible stories, and it is brought out in an arresting and impressive fashion.—*What is Wrong with the Churches*, by Sheldon Knapp (3d.), holds that the present tense—'sitteth'—which Jerome uses in Heb. i. 3, x. 12, has obscured the teaching of the New Testament on salvation from sin. He argues that 'Jerome's error still has enormous influence in our Protestant Churches.'—*Enlightenment and Salvation*. By R. D. M. Shaw, D.D. (Williams & Norgate. 7s. 6d.) Dr. Shaw is Professor of Old Testament Theology in Tokyo, and Oxford has conferred its divinity degree upon him for these studies. From Religions of Primitive Culture he passes to Early Indian Ideas, Buddhism, Jewish Thought, Christianity, Mohammedanism, and Confucianism. The conclusion is that religion is based on primary instincts of human nature. The sense of wonder, of fascination lies at the root of the religious development of mankind. That is the moving energy which makes men strive for fellowship with God. The great religions of the world act and react upon each other, and this close and careful estimate of them will be prized by all students of comparative religion.

The Invisible Christ. By Ricardo Rojas. Translator, Webster E. Browning. (Abingdon Press. \$2.50.) Dr. Rojas became Rector of the University of Buenos Ayres after many years as professor. His work on Argentine literature was awarded the national prize of \$30,000. This book consists of three dialogues between himself and a Roman Catholic bishop on the bodily image of Jesus as shown in many portraits; His spiritual image revealed in His teaching; and His spiritual mission as the Saviour of the race. The book is being translated into French and Italian, and gives evidence of the hunger for fuller knowledge of Christ which is making Latin America open 'wide its arms to the Invisible Christ who satisfies heart-hunger, who walks with man and talks with man and calls him friend.' The dialogues throw much light on the state of mind in clerical circles, and are full of interesting points.

HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY, TRAVEL

A History of Later Latin Literature. By F. A. Wright and T. A. Sinclair. (Routledge. 18s. net)

No standard work covering the immense volume of Latin literature from the fourth to the seventeenth century has yet reached completion. The German history commenced by Schanz and continued by Max Manitius has reached the twelfth century; the French *Histoire littéraire de la France*, including all writers born in France after the birth of Christ, whether writing in Latin or French, was begun by the Benedictines of St. Maur in the eighteenth century, and its thirty-sixth folio is still concerned with the fourteenth century. These facts, mentioned by the authors of the work under review, have not daunted them from undertaking a survey of Latin literature from Ambrose of Milan to Cowley; but have rather proved an incentive to an attempt which at the first blush might seem to be foredoomed to failure. The treatment might so easily become formal, encyclopaedic, and dull, or, on the other hand, inadequate and disproportionate, within the small compass of a single volume. And yet in the space of four hundred pages they have achieved a veritable *tour de force*. The book is not only the work of competent scholars, but is written in an easy, readable style, and is illustrated by quotations aptly chosen, either in the original or in admirable translations. Its pages sparkle with good things, and the judgements of personality, life-work, subject-matter, and Latinity are sound and trustworthy.

Beginning with the age of Augustine, the writers proceed to survey the history of the three succeeding centuries, a period of obscurity in which the names of Boethius, Gregory of Tours, Gregory the Great, and Bede are points of light. Then follows the revival under Charlemagne, with Alcuin, Einhard, Theodulf, and Paul the Deacon as the literary stars of his court. Next come two chapters dealing respectively with 'Medieval Prose' and 'Medieval Poetry'—a convenient arrangement, though it necessitates a double treatment, e.g. of a writer like Peter Damiani, who was distinguished in both forms. Finally, we have the Renaissance Latinists, including, among others, Petrarch, Poggio, à Kempis, Erasmus, Cowley, and Milton.

The value of the book consists largely in the light which is thrown on minor authors whose names are barely known to the average reader. Consequently as a work of reference it fills a gap, and will save hours of perhaps fruitless inquiry to those who have no access to original authorities. *The Select Bibliography* is useful in that it gives in most cases the volumes of Migue in which specific writers'

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works are to be found. Beyond one or two misprints, like 'Revelations' (p. 140) and 'Dounne' (p. 195) for 'Donne,' which we have noticed, a high standard of accuracy is maintained throughout.

Lord Balfour in His Relation to Science. By Lord Rayleigh. (Cambridge University Press. 2s. 6d.)

This memoir was prepared as an obituary notice for the Royal Society, and the wider circle of readers will find it both interesting and illuminating. Lady Blanche Balfour directed the education of her children and did much to stimulate their intellectual interests. Arthur's first schoolmaster at Hoddesdon formed a high regard for him, and, when he went to Eton, Mr. Chittenden's favourite relaxation was to visit him there. He was somewhat disappointed that he only gained a second class in moral science at Cambridge. That was probably due to the fact that he had paid too much attention to the current problems of philosophy, and not enough to its literature and history. He was not an enthusiastic politician. He regarded politics with a calm interest, but could not get excited over them. He had the highest admiration for Darwin because he really wanted to find out the truth—'an attitude of mind seldom found among men of science, and never among theologians.' He took a deep interest in the Medical Research Council, of which he was chairman, and his afternoon calls at the secretary's office were a delightful stimulus to all the workers. The Committee of Civil Research, which was formed on the model of his Committee of Imperial Defence, has done great service in such matters as irrigation research, Kenya native welfare, and locust control. One's estimate of the man and his work is enhanced by this attractive study.

The Life of J. Pierpont Morgan, 1837-1913. By John Kennedy Winkler. (Alfred A. Knopf. 15s.)

This is an American Life of the outstanding financier of his generation. It is not free from criticism on points of style, but it leaves the reader no dull moments and it will open his eyes to the ways of Wall Street and American finance. Morgan's father Junius was partner with George Peabody, the most trusted American banker in London. At Göttingen, young Morgan specialized in mathematics. His old professor said long afterwards, at a dinner given in his honour at New York, that, had Morgan stayed at Göttingen, he would have been his assistant and then his successor. When the haughty and self-assured youth of nineteen entered his father's office, he soon mastered the intricate system of foreign exchange, and Junius began to rely on his son's judgement. After a time in London, he became a junior clerk in a New York bank, and in 1860 opened an office of his own as agent for Peabody & Co. He married next year, but his wife died of consumption after a few months. Her memory was the most poignant of his life, and made him support every agency for

the relief of consumptive patients. He married Frances Tracey in 1865. He was soon immersed in railway schemes. He made arrangements which saved the Pennsylvania and Central Railways from bitter conflict, and gradually reorganized the Northern Pacific and other lines. His relations with Vanderbilt, Hill, and Harriman give special interest to the biography, but his great feat was the formation of the United Steel Trust, which paid Andrew Carnegie \$400,000,000 for his steel company and added other combinations. The part Morgan took in times of commercial panic, when he saved the situation more than once, makes exciting reading. His art collections were the delight of his life, and it is pleasant to read of his strong support of Dr. Rainsford, his rector of St. George's, in lower New York, whom he trusted and honoured. He loved St. George's, and on the Sunday before he left New York never to return 'he greeted every one and stood out, almost in the aisle, beating time with his book, singing with strong voice and moist eyes his favourite hymn, *'Blest be the tie that binds.'* He died in Rome on March 31, 1918. Theodore Roosevelt paid him a high tribute: 'We were fundamentally opposed, but I was struck by his very great power and his truthfulness. Any kind of meanness and smallness were alike wholly alien to his nature.'

George Whitefield—The Awakener. By Albert D. Belden, B.D. (Sampson Low, Marston & Co. 12s. 6d.)

This is 'A Modern Study of the Evangelical Revival' which shows how the lives and the work of Wesley and Whitefield were interwoven and wonderfully supplemented each other. It was Charles Wesley who secured Whitefield as a member of the Holy Club; it was John Wesley who opened the door of the New World to him; and he who led Wesley to make the great venture of field preaching. Mr. Belden tells the story of the great evangelist in a dramatic way with many arresting details as to his early days and the extraordinary effect of his preaching. He makes everything lead up to the urgent call for men of Whitefield's spirit. Stress is laid on 'his sublime audacity in the cause of the gospel.' His challenge to the youth of the Evangelical Churches is emphasized in the concluding section of the biography, which describes Whitefield's impact upon society, discusses the theological, ethical, psychological, and sociological aspects of the Evangelical Revival in the light of to-day. The book is well illustrated, beautifully printed, and well bound. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald asks in his Foreword if those earlier eras of dynamic faith associated with such names as Whitefield's can be repeated in our own day on a scale commensurate with this modern world, and with an application of creative value for the future. He feels that this is a peculiarly appropriate moment to go back for refreshment and enlightenment to such times as those of Whitefield. That is the object of Mr. Belden's book, and it is a powerful tonic for those who are facing the problems of our time.

Doctor Barnardo ; Physician, Pioneer, Prophet : Child Life Yesterday and To-day. By J. Wesley Bready, Ph.D. (Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.)

Dr. Bready has sought to link Dr. Barnardo's work with his fore-runners, in an unparalleled era of social reform, in which the child came finally to loom large as a social asset of incalculable worth. The story of his boyhood in Dublin, his conversion and mission work in its slums, is told with much vivid detail, and later, when he came to London to prepare for service under the China Inland Mission, he proved a dauntless worker in the East End. The appalling condition of the waifs and strays gradually made him feel that his real sphere was at home. The destitute urchin who crept in to sleep by the fire in the donkey-shed which had been converted into a Ragged School led the way to Dr. Barnardo's life-work. It is a thrilling story, and was followed by a series of shocks which startled Barnardo and amazed Lord Shaftesbury and his friends, who watched twenty-three boys, from seven to seventeen years old, who emerged from under a tarpaulin in Billingsgate one raw night, clad in vilely smelling rags. Dr. Bready shows how the work grew till girls as well as boys found home and friends, and a great national philanthropy was born. It had its storms, and Dr. Barnardo passed many hours in law courts and fought many a battle for his children. He was a great reader, who got an hour or two after midnight among his books, and knew how to use his knowledge well. He had imagination, originality, and courage, a marked individuality, an affectionate disposition, and a systematic mind. It must be added that he was 'autocratic, impetuous, peremptory, highly emotional, and impatient of restraint even from his own committee.' He lacked caution and expediency, and some incidents of his propaganda were not satisfactory, but he laid the Empire and the world under vast obligation by his courage, his audacity, and his boundless zeal in transforming the Kingdom of Childhood for a multitude of boys and girls who owed to him health and opportunity for living useful and happy lives.

Unitive Protestantism. By John T. McNeil. (Abingdon Press. 12s.)

The writer is Professor of the History of European Christianity in the University of Chicago, and feels that the scattered communions of contemporary Protestantism are stirred by a common desire to seek their own liberation into a wider fellowship by means of union. The principles now in the ascendant in the greater Protestant groups are integration, comprehension, and catholicity. The unitive principle in the Reformation movement is first considered. Protestantism might become an integrating social force if stress were laid on its common pursuit of great ends. The early Protestants attempted the recovery and promotion of catholicity in Christendom. The reasons for failure are brought out; the early efforts towards

Christian reunion under Luther, Calvin, and Cranmer are considered, and the unitive principle is traced in the Protestantism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and its revival to-day, when the union movement forms at once the test and the hope of Protestantism. 'Largely freed, both from the long oppressive subjection to the State and from the hindering limitations of obscurantism and literalism, the Protestant Churches are reaching what appears to be a position of supreme opportunity.' Dr. McNeil's book is a sign of the times, and will promote the growth of true catholicity among the Churches.

The Question of Greek Independence. By C. W. Crawley, M.A., Fellow of Trinity Hall, Cambridge. (Cambridge University Press. 15s.)

This is a study of British policy in the Near East, 1821-33. The destruction of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets in the Bay of Navarin in time of peace, more than a hundred years ago, was a landmark in the creation of modern Greece from small and precarious beginnings. Navarin was also a landmark in the decline of Turkey in the last century. At the time of the Greek revolt in 1821 the moral authority of the Quadruple Alliance had been shaken by Castlereagh, who was abused at home as the ally of despotism, the accomplice of oppression. Turkey had not been mentioned in the treaties of 1815, but after the Greek revolt Castlereagh was inclined to treat her as protected by that settlement. There was a general impression that the Turkish Empire must soon collapse. The power of Russia and the weakness of Turkey were both exaggerated. Greece had been growing steadily in wealth and population since the middle of the eighteenth century. Mr. Crawley describes the state of the country and the complicated negotiations which led up to the Treaty of London in 1827. 'The native Greeks cared little for their diplomatic status so long as the Turks were excluded from their midst; the interests of the Powers, more than the enthusiasm of the people, eventually made Greece into an independent kingdom.' The treaty caused immense joy in Greece, which seemed to be reborn. In May 1832 she was made an independent kingdom, with Prince Otto of Bavaria as sovereign, under the guarantee of the Three Powers, and with a frontier from the Gulf of Arta to the Gulf of Volo; and the Porte agreed to this frontier in July. The study of the complicated negotiations between the Powers is one of peculiar interest to diplomatists, and Mr. Crawley furnishes ample material for such an investigation.

August Strindberg: The Bedevilled Viking. By V. J. McGill. (Noel Douglas. 12s. 6d.) Strindberg certainly earned this title, but Stockholm flocked to his funeral in 1912, though he had attacked the family, marriage, and love with concentrated fury; satirized schools, colleges, universities, art, science, and business. 'No person or institution had escaped his hatred and his evil tongue.' He was Sweden's greatest poet, and had given his country a literature, lifted

its language to artistic perfection, composed the sagas of its kings, celebrated its culture and natural beauty. Such a man called for a study in human nature, and here he can be followed through all the stages of his public and private life. It is like facing a whirlwind. He came under the influence of Nietzsche, and Swedenborg taught him that repentance was the one way to blessedness. He had a long, frantic period of purgatory and conversion. Mr. McGill makes the man live, and one may hope never to look upon his like again.

A History of Vicarages in the Middle Ages. By R. A. R. Hartridge, M.A., Ph.D. (Cambridge University Press. 15s.) This belongs to the 'Cambridge Studies in Mediaeval Life and Thought' edited by Dr. Coulton. It deals mainly with English and Scottish vicarages, but spreads somewhat over Continental lands. The earliest mention of an English parochial vicar Mr. Hartridge has found is that of Pershore in 1147. Hugh de Welles, who was, perhaps, the most thorough of the English bishops in ordaining them, left in writing details of 300 vicarages in his diocese of Lincoln, and his successor, Grossteste, obtained from the Pope, in 1250, a mandate to strengthen him in his purpose to ordain vicarages in all appropriated churches where they were small or non-existent. The Second General Council of Lyons, in 1274, decided that the incumbent of a parish church must be suitable in knowledge and character and must reside permanently. Churches were sometimes given to the monasteries for the improvement of their beer, and to make provision for the guests beyond what the abbot was wont to distribute. About 1400 the Abbot of Glastonbury earmarked £80 a year, partly from the appropriation of a parish church, to give private pocket-money to each monk. The religious life of the Middle Ages grows clearer as we study this scholarly thesis, which gained the degree of Ph.D. for the Author from the University of London.

Pilgrim and Pioneer, by John M. Canse (Abingdon Press, 8s.), is the story of Jason Lee's missionary work among the Indians of Oregon. He went among them in 1833, and when their numbers were reduced he founded the first American State on the shores of the Pacific. Jason Lee was an athlete, who stood 6 feet 3 inches, and made himself respected and admired among the wild settlers. The Indians came to be instructed in the Book from Heaven for which they had prayed and longed. It is a noble story of fruitful service, and one that will be eagerly read during the centenary celebrations of the mission.—*Old France*, by John G. Coulter (Putnam's Sons, 15s.), gives 'an historic background of the France of to-day,' with 128 illustrations in the text. The author came with the American troops to France during the war, and now, after some years' residence near Paris, he has prepared this volume with a feeling that tourists ought not to be content without a knowledge of the history of the country. He begins with a chapter of geography, then he gives a view of the kings, and in his third chapter describes Roman Gaul and the Teutonic invasion. History throughout is linked to localities and told in a

chatty way that arrests attention. The record is brought down to the fifteenth century, of which France has many architectural treasures. The volume will certainly add much to the pleasure of tourists.

The Response of Rabbi Simon B. Zemah Duran. By Isidore Epstein, D.Litt. (Oxford University Press. 6s.) This is No. 18 of the Jews' College Publications. The Response presents a picture of the social and moral relations, the political and cultural conditions, the internal and external organization of the Jews in North Africa, especially in the Kingdom of Tlemcen, and shows the far-reaching effects of the influx of Spanish Jews who fled from the persecutions of 1391. For three centuries the Jews had enjoyed more security in Spain than elsewhere in Europe, but in 1391 a general pillage and massacre in Seville led to similar outrages in other places. Simon was a distinguished scholar of Majorca, and his life-work among the new North African Jewish communities is described at length in Dr. Epstein's valuable and most interesting work

The Problem of Right Conduct, by Peter Green, M.A. (Longmans & Co., 6s.), is a text-book of Christian ethics which has grown out of the Canon's lectures to candidates for Holy Orders. He has found no book that bases its entire view of conduct on the specifically Christian view of man and the universe. That has led him to write this manual. It defines the subject, and shows the relation of ethics to other sciences; it gives a brief survey of ethical systems and then considers man as an individual, a social being, and a spiritual being. Individual and social ethics are considered in the light of wide and close experience in a great industrial centre. Self-discipline, self-cultivation, sex relations, marriage, birth control, divorce, corporal and capital punishment, all are frankly discussed in a way that will really help those who have often to face life's problems in an acute form. It is high Christian morality presented in a style that appeals to men and women who wish to live worthy lives. We hope it will have wide use as a text-book and find its way into the hands of a host of young people. They will get clear and wise guidance from one who is in close touch with realities and never fails to speak his mind.

GENERAL

A Farewell to India. By Edward Thompson. (Benn. 7s. 6d.)

THIS story of Indian life is a real bit of autobiography. It gathers up the impressions made on the mind of a gifted teacher by the students whom he taught and the native leaders among whom he moved. It has a thread of incident which binds all together, but its interest really lies in its study of the native mind and the restless discontent which is full of danger. 'When what India needs is to keep her nose to facts, she's gone off into abstractions. We cut down the opium, and they get drunk on print. They'll be starting women's clubs next.' Alden is the tutor who never fears to say what is in his mind; his friend Findlay is a mystic and a man who loves everything in this great lovable world. No one but Alden could draw him back 'into the pleasant cynicism which, more than anything else, keeps the Englishman in India free from the kindred inanities of self-righteous seriousness and ungenerous bitterness.' Alden wears himself out in all manner of activities and has to return to England. It is a farewell to India, but it gives the West an interpreter of Indian life and thought who is doing important service in this time of transition. The panther raid and the hours that Alden spends up a chimney to escape a native fanatic are among the exciting scenes of the story.

The Pleasures of Poetry. A Critical Anthology. By Edith Sitwell. First Series: *Milton and the Augustan Age.* (Duckworth. 6s.)

A tiresome illness led Miss Sitwell to gather together some poems that she loved, and to preface them with a critical estimate of their special claims to admiration. In this volume she draws on Milton, Herrick, Marvell, Dryden, Pope, and Smart. A second series will be on the poets of *The Romantic Revival*; a third will bring the anthology down to *The Victorian Age*. Most readers can feel the charm of these selections, but their appreciation will be enhanced by the skill with which their beauties of alliteration and elision, and their use of vowels and consonants to deepen impression, are brought out. The song from *Comus* is magic, and none can tell whence it comes. Herrick is only a minor poet in the sense that he gives us short, small, exquisite things. In their way his songs are flawless. Not even Milton or Pope could manage sibilants better than he. Marvell's world is larger than Herrick's, and his poems 'have enriched our literature for ever.' In Dryden's 'Song for St. Cecilia's Day' 'the very splendour of the balance is like that of creation arising out of chaos.'

Pope's mastery of the caesura, or pause, is illustrated, and Christopher Smart's 'A Song to David' is praised as 'a really great and entirely underrated poem,' and it is no small attraction to this anthology that it is given at length. Miss Sitwell's volume is a school for poets and poet lovers, and they will learn much from it.

The Ramayan of Tulsidas. By J. M. Macfie, M.A., D.D.
(T. & T. Clark. 8s.)

This work of Tulsidas may be described as the Bible of northern India. Among the half-dozen volumes which a village may contain, this is sure to be one. It is written in the vernacular, which all can understand, and has a gospel for low caste as well as high. It claims their love and worship for Rama, the purest manifestation of God that India knows. One cannot read the first chapter without understanding the popularity of the book. It beats all the fairy-tales we ever read, with its marvels of Rama's incarnation and his terrific war with Ravan, the chief demon, for the recovery of his young wife. The moral teaching of the poem is of a high order and it is expressed in phrases such as these: 'If you are good, the world is good. If you are bad, the world is bad'; 'The touchstone tries gold and there is a test for precious stones. But it is opportunity which discovers a man's real nature.' Tulsidas was an orthodox Hindu of the Brahmin caste. He says nothing that can provoke any of his readers. 'He has captured, in large measure, the common mind of northern India, and made it listen to his plea that love for God is the chief end of man.' It is a wonderful poem, though imagination runs wild in it. It has room for all the gods in its scheme of the universe, but Rama's incarnation as the Supreme Spirit and his victory over the demons strike a note that is almost Christian. The poem, indeed, has many features which show how God was leading men's thoughts, in the East as well as in the West, towards higher things. Every one who wishes to understand Indian thought and religion will find this book a treasure.

The Structure of Thought: A Survey of Natural Philosophy.
By Ludwig Fischer. Translated by W. H. Johnston,
B.A. (Allen & Unwin. 16s.)

The writer's aim is to find a system of axioms which may permit us to develop the guiding principles of philosophy. The fundamental axiomatic concept is of a unity, complete in itself, which can be divided into 'determinateness combined with reciprocal dependence; and unity-and-multiplicity combined with order, or gradation.' The second part studies in detail the structure of the philosophies that have historical importance, and shows how they fit into the fundamental system of thought. This analysis brings out the importance of the different philosophies and makes clear their deeper inter-connexion. Great as are the superficial differences between the

different systems of philosophy, they are at bottom the same. The differences are mainly due to the fact that they look at things from different standpoints. There was really room for all the systems, and, when once thinkers are aware of the common thread that runs through all philosophy, all will be able to co-operate from a new angle. 'No system, provided that it is based on sound common sense, will perish: it will be completed, elaborated, or adopted, as a consistent part of the whole.' Philosophy will, perhaps, advance more slowly than any other science. 'It has learned to moderate its aims. But the line of its advance leads upwards, and, so long as a finite spirit apprehends the marvels of the universe and finds in them matter for reflection, so long it will find unanswered problems undiminished in number by the problems which philosophy has answered. Human intellect will continue to attempt the solution of these problems by non-rational methods, and will continue to establish rational connexions between the latest revelations and older discoveries.'

The New Education. By Herman H. Horne, Ph.D. (\$2.30.)
—*The Pastor and Religious Education.* By Harry C. Munro. (8s.) (Abingdon Press.)

The New Education is dedicated to Dr. George Alexander who was an 'educator with vision.' The Great War set the leading nations at work reforming their educational systems. Dr. Horne reviews the old systems and finds in the new a practicality, reality, and rejection of formality that is admirable, though it is in danger of experimentalism and of forgetting that all educative experiences are personal. 'The new education is in danger of gaining experience and losing personality.' The chapter on the formation of character is suggestive, and the closing pages, on 'The Thought of God in the Light of the New Education,' lay stress on the transforming touch of religion which should be felt in all education. Mr. Munro holds that the minister of to-day is forced into some intelligent and consistent attitude toward religious education. He must see that the best material is provided for the workers, and be thoroughly familiar with the curriculum. The object of Mr. Munro is to stimulate the minister 'to use the educational method in accomplishing all the changes necessary to usher in a new and better order in his own Church.'

The Children's Book of Wild Flowers and the Story of their Names. By Gareth H. Browning. Second Series. Illustrated by M. C. Pollard. (W. & R. Chambers. 10s. 6d.)

Wild flowers have an added attraction when they are surrounded as they are in this attractive volume with the romantic associations that have grown up around them. The Druids called the mistletoe 'All-heal,' as they fancied it could cure all ills. When they found it growing on an oak they prepared a sacrifice. The chief Druid

climbed into the tree and cut the plant with a golden sickle. Other priests caught it in a white cloth and two milk-white bullocks were sacrificed to the gods. The Greeks knew more about plants than any other nation, and their root-gatherers faced in the direction of the wind when they picked the hips of the rose lest their eyesight should suffer. The Romans had a great festival of flowers to Flora at the end of April, when they danced and decorated themselves and the buildings lavishly with choice blooms. The Anglo-Saxons believed that a preparation of burdock would save one from being poisoned, or restore a jaded appetite. The pages devoted to these wonders are followed by descriptions of wild flowers from the daffodil to the tansy—with its Greek derivation of immortality and its story of Gany-mede—and the spear-plume thistle. There will be no dull moments for readers of these pages, and the beautiful coloured illustrations will send them out in this spring with eyes opened wide to the beauties around them.

A Romany and Raq, by G Bramwell Evans (Epworth Press, 8s. 6d.), is as fresh and bright as *A Romany in the Fields*. Its charm lies in its intimate knowledge of birds and beasts and insects, and not least in its pictures of Raq, who manages to write his own biography. The gossamer, the squirrel, the art of making butter, and the lure of the open air—all these make us open our eyes, and will give new interest to country walks. The easy style is well in keeping with homely folk and rural scenes, and the illustrations add distinctly to the pleasure of a really delightful nature book.—Messrs. Chambers send us four beautifully illustrated stories. Two of them are historic. *Westward Ho! with Drake* (5s.), by Escott Lynd, takes a brave boy to the Spanish Main after he has been cross-examined by Queen Bess herself. It is a really spirited story.—*Cross and Sword* (8s. 6d.) has Joan of Arc as heroine and an English soldier who saves her from a savage wolf and bewails her fate at Rouen.—*Not an Ordinary Girl* (3s. 6d.) is forgetful and lacking in tact, but has a golden heart and is growing into a fine woman. *Eustacea* (3s. 6d.) goes to the châlet school in the Tyrol, and is a trial indeed to teachers and scholars, but she makes good at last, after a wild adventure that almost costs her her life. The stories are bound to be popular.—*Joan's Handful*. By Amy le Feuvre. (Pickering & Inglis. 2s. 6d.) This is a piece of Miss le Feuvre's happiest work. Joan is a fine, unselfish, and capable girl who wins a man that is worthy of her, and the change in her pleasure-loving sister when she finds a true lover is astonishing. It is a story that will help to form character.—*Books and Their History*, by R. N. D. Wilson (T. C. & E. C. Jack, 8s. 6d.), is meant for children, but it will interest and instruct parents as much as boys and girls. It covers every side of a book's life, from the scriptorium to the modern printing-house. Paper, type, illustrations—everything is explained in the clearest way and with twenty-six fine illustrations, six of which are in colour. It will be hailed with pleasure wherever it goes.—*Preparation for Holy Matrimony*. By Bernard M. Hancock.

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(Allen & Unwin. 2s.) A second edition of a sensible and practical guide for those who are about to marry. It has a fine religious tone throughout.—*The Press and the Public*. By George Blake. (Faber & Faber. 1s.) This is an experienced journalist's protest against sensational newspapers and the vulgarization of the Press which 'becomes more and more rapid as the years, nay, the months, go by.' Mr Blake pays due tribute to the sober-sided papers, and we hope that his rebuke to less reputable journals may not be unheeded.—*The East African Problem*, by J. H. Driberg (Williams & Norgate, 2s. 6d.), criticizes the system of imperial colonization and makes suggestions for the better government of East Africa in particular. So far as possible, interference with the fabric of tribal life is to be avoided, in order that methods of organic growth and rational adaptation may be secured. As a Government official and a trained ethnologist, Dr. Driberg has a right to careful attention.

The Second Twenty Years at Hull-House. September 1909 to September 1929. By Jane Addams. (Macmillan & Co. 17s.) This record of a growing world-consciousness is dedicated to those who for forty years have contributed money, service, and devotion to one of the outstanding social institutions of America. Miss Addams's Introduction sets us thinking about the present situation, which is in the hands of 'the mixed lot of us,' of all ages and of all degrees of social usefulness. 'Happily, the generations are never clean-cut, but are always inextricably mixed, from the new-born babe to the admitted octogenarian.' These intermingling groups must push the world along as best they may, and the hope of achievement 'lies in a complete mobilization of the human spirit, using all our unrealized and unevoked capacity.' A noble sense of world duty has been a definite factor in the last twenty years at Hull-House, as is illustrated in these pages. The survey begins with the shock given to Chicago when Dr. Sachs committed suicide as a protest against the entire corrupt civic organization with which he had been battling. Miss Addams traces the connexion between social service and the platform of the Progressive Party, giving some interesting details about her work with Roosevelt. The strange fiction of the devil baby at Hull-House, which drew crowds of visitors, opened the eyes of this noble worker to the power of maternal solicitude which can make life palatable, and at rare moments even beautiful. The account of the Woman's Movement is of special interest as showing how woman's influence in modern affairs is most manifest in the deliberations of international bodies. It has been said that a hundred different dialects and languages are spoken in Chicago, and most of them in the streets around Hull-House. Miss Addams had been a prominent advocate of international peace, and the Great War seemed at first incredible. The vain attempt made by American women to restore peace is described by one who took part in it, and who has had to face a post-war psychology which has conditioned social progress at every turn. 'A decade of Prohibition' shows how the dance-halls

and houses of prostitution have been affected, and the working classes benefited by it. The restriction of immigration under the Quota Act of 1921; the efforts to humanize justice; the play instinct and the arts and the process of education through the discussion of current social developments, are treated with the ripe wisdom due to long practical experience in a strategic centre of the world.

The Labyrinth, and other Poems. By James W. Mills. With Foreword by Patrick Braybrooke. Decorations by Raymond McGrath. (Williams & Norgate. 7s. 6d.) The Foreword looks on this volume as a combination of philosophic verse and musical poetry. It certainly has both thought and melody, and there is rich variety in theme and framework. The little tribute to Dan Leno is very graceful, and the waving 'Processional' tells man's story 'From the womb to the tomb.' The smallest pieces have their point and charm; the two Christmastide poems catch the spiritual note of the season. It is really choice work, and makes us long for more.—*Green Leaves*, by John H. Stonehouse (Sotheran, 1s.), is the first of a series of 'New Chapters in the Life of Charles Dickens' which brings out some interesting details about *Sketches by Boz*, and 'The Bill of Fare,' a poem of 358 lines in which Dickens describes a small party in the rooms of Mr. Breadnall, whose daughter Maria is the Dora of *David Copperfield* and the Flora of *Little Dorrit*. The pamphlet makes its own appeal to students of Dickens.—*Lustral Lays*, by Franklin M. Fernandez (Stockwell), is a little set of poems in memory of the writer's mother. They are rich in filial piety.

Cross Roads. By John Oxenham. (Longmans & Co. 1s.) This is 'The Story of Four Meetings' between Dysmas, the shepherd boy of Bethlehem, and Jesus—at the cradle, in the rough life of a robber, on the Cross, and in Paradise. It is a gem wrought with real skill and grace, but the closing scene is veiled, for 'of that meeting no man may tell.'

Bulletin of John Rylands Library (January).—The Notes of the amazing list of acquisitions are followed by 'Shakespeare's Recoil from Romanticism'; important new documents relating to the early part of the Hundred Years' War; *The Kirkstall Chronicle, 1355-1400*; some unpublished correspondence between Richard Baxter and John Eliot, the Apostle to the Indians; Dr. Maugana writes on Biblical Gleanings from Syriac MSS. Cotton Mather said that Eliot 'was one who lived in heaven while on earth,' 'Every day was a sort of Sabbath to him, but the Sabbath-day was a taste of heaven to him.'

Periodical Literature

BRITISH

Hibbert Journal (January).—Mr. Aldous Huxley writes on 'Grace, Predestination, and Salvation.' He thinks grace and justice can be reconciled in practice by those who love their fellows. Some few have a special talent for love; Christianity and humanitarianism have tried to teach others the art of loving, but it is a difficult art to acquire, and the success of its teachers has not been considerable. In a world where most people had been taught to love their fellows there would be no difficulty in reconciling the claims of grace with justice, but in this actual world the reconciliation is difficult indeed. Miss Mary Whiting gives a vivid picture of the mother of Francis Bacon, with her learning, her nervous, excitable temperament, and her interest in the 'Poor Preachers' of the time. Her letter to the Earl of Essex showed her zeal for good living, and the earl's answer did him credit. 'The Intellectual Vitality of the Middle Ages,' by Dr. Meyrick Carré, and Professor Bacon's article on the 'Elder John' of Ephesus are of special interest.

Expository Times (December).—'A Retrospect of Forty Years,' by Professor W. A. Brown of New York, goes back to the time when he entered Harnack's lecture-room. 'I had not listened to him for five minutes before I fell under the spell of his magnetic personality.' As he walked through the Thiergarten for the seven o'clock lecture, he used to wonder what new insight or inspiration the hour would bring. Harnack had an extraordinary sense for the concrete and individual aspects of human life, but never lost his sense of the whole in the parts. He used to read through the 'whole of patristic literature every year, but always with a single fresh point in mind.' Once it was to discover their views on the military practices of their day. He read the Fathers in translations, turning to the original only for difficult or controversial points. 'For the feel of the whole,' he said, 'there is nothing like one's own tongue; for the details one must go to the original.' His piety centred in loyalty to Jesus Christ. Dr. Brown recalls his saying, 'If you want to know Jesus you must read your Gospels. There is no other way. There is many a servant-girl in the city of Berlin who knows Jesus Christ better than many a university professor.'—(January).—The note on Sir James Jeans's *The Mysterious Universe* is important. It is no small gain to find a great scientist affirming that 'the whole story of [the world's] creation can be told with perfect accuracy and completeness in the six words "God said, Let there be Light."' 'The Contribution of France to

Old Testament Science,' by Dr. R. Siebens, is a valuable survey, and Professor Burkitt reaches the conclusion, in a most suggestive paper, that in Luke vii. the story of the 'woman that was a sinner' has received certain details which really belong to the supper at Bethany, and that both Mary, sister of Martha, and Mary Magdalene emerge from the inquiry 'with unblemished reputation.' The Rev. James Feather has an interesting note on 'The Second Coming,' which he identifies with the Day of Pentecost.—(February).—Dr. Lofthouse writes on 'Wealth,' the possession of gifts which make life worth living and which can be shared. Society can still be transformed; callousness can be banished. 'True wealth can only be gathered and preserved by those who have learnt the divine art of scattering. It may be that in these difficult times wealth may yet be gained and imparted beyond the dreams of avarice.' Principal Macgregor of Glasgow, in 'The Task of a Theological College,' lays stress on the equipping of the man. 'The theology of the chair ought to be such as can readily be transmuted into the theology of the pulpit.'

Journal of Theological Studies (October).—A memoir of Professor C. H. Turner, the first editor of the *Journal*, is to appear in the next issue. His account of Latin MSS. of Canons deals with the St. Maur collection (Paris, 1451). His story of his own research into the texts makes us feel how much English scholarship has lost by his death. The Rev. H. H. Rowley discusses 'The Historicity of the Fifth Chapter of Daniel'; Dr. Emery Barnes writes on 'Cyrus the Servant of Jehovah.' The Rev. A. J. Macdonald, in 'Eadmer and the Canterbury Privileges,' maintains his opinion that the charge of forgery brought by Professor Böhmer of Leipzig against Lanfranc is not proved. The documents the archbishop produced in 1072 were followed by 'a later and more extensive series, forged about 1122, possibly by Eadmer, at a time when the question had again become urgent, and when more documents were needed to support the Canterbury case.'

Church Quarterly (January).—The Bishop of Gloucester, in 'The Lambeth Conference and Reunion,' says that Nonconformists wish for a federation of Churches which Episcopalians think has no real value. 'To encourage intercommunion amongst those who are not really united together in true Christian brotherhood is not to bring about reunion, but to delay it, that it will mean a very definite unreality in our sacramental life.' 'The Myth of the Lost Tribes of Israel' calls attention to Professor Godbey's notable book on the subject. Dr. Relton writes on 'The Christian Conception of God.'

The Congregational Quarterly (January).—Mr. Brockway writes on 'The Church and World Problems.' 'Christians should be challenging the world to apply the principles of Jesus to its social and international relationships.' 'The essential thing is to realize

that we are a part of a Great Life, that we can consciously give ourselves to its fulfilment, that we can lose ourselves in it and find ourselves in the realization of its purposes.' We are glad to see the plain dealing with Mr. Lenwood's 'Jesus—Lord or Leader.'

Holborn Review (January).—'The Lambeth Encyclical and Reports' are carefully considered by Professor Humphries and H. J. Taylor; 'The Call of India' is a subject which is engaging much attention. Mr. Flowers writes on 'The Ethical Teaching of the Old Testament'; Mr. Barron on 'The Nature of the Physical World.' Other articles are 'The Age of Jeremiah,' 'Shakespeare and Ethics,' 'Body and Mind.' There is much food here for thoughtful readers.

Science Progress (January) has important articles on 'Symbiosis' and 'Advances in Photographic Science,' besides many notes on recent advances in all departments of science. Mr. Wayling describes 'The Romance of Science in Bygone London' in a striking way. He draws romance from existing public buildings, and tells how the fountains of Trafalgar Square are partly drawn from local artesian wells. The article is to be continued, and lovers of London should not overlook it.

AMERICAN

The Journal of Religion (January).—'Religion in John Dewey's Philosophy' argues that 'religion can be supreme devotion to the highest possibilities and to the process which carries such possibilities even when our beliefs about them are highly fallible.' Professor Titius of Berlin, in 'Natural Science and Christian Faith,' holds that knowledge enables us to unlock a depth and a greatness of the world which give new nourishment to religious devotion and reverence before God. Dr. McGiffert discusses 'The Significance of Jesus.' The Christian religion goes beyond the historic Jesus in some of its ideals, but He is 'the core of the Christian religion' and 'holds for the individual a significant place of corrective, constructive, dynamic, and constraining leadership.'

Methodist Review (January—February).—Three ministerial friends pay tribute to Dr. Elliott, the editor of the *Review*, who died on November 2. 'There seemed no limit to what he had read,' and he was 'a constant incentive to the reading of the best books, to accurate thinking, painstaking pulpit preparation, and wide interests.' Dr. Downey writes an appreciation of George P. Mains, the former Book Agent, who was 'always abreast of the times, a keen thinker, a brilliant conversationalist, a voluminous and thoughtful writer.' 'Lincoln and Three Methodists' shows how Matthew Simpson, J. L. Scripps, and James F. Jaques helped the President in the Civil War. Scripps prepared the first Life of Lincoln in thirty-two pages, Bishop

Simpson was his trusted counsellor, Jaques and a friend found their way to the Conservative camp, and drew from Jefferson Davis an ultimatum which made the North feel that it must be a fight to a finish.

Canadian Journal of Religious Thought (November—December).—The Editorial Notes on 'Using One's Leisure' and 'The Church and Youth' are important. Professor Mercer describes his 'Expedition to Abyssinia' in order to prepare a critical study of Ecclesiastes in Ethiopic. He identified and photographed a fourteenth-century MS. of Ecclesiastes which undoubtedly represents faithfully a much earlier text. It will form the basis of his own critical text of the book. Sir Robert Falconer, President of the University of Toronto, contributes 'My Memory of Harnack.' He has memories of not a few great teachers, but none approached Harnack for genius. Dr. Richard Roberts has a pleasant paper on 'The Golden Grove' and Jeremy Taylor.

FOREIGN

Calcutta Review (November—December).—Dr. Das, in 'British Imperialism in India,' holds that subordination of the interests of the people of India to those of the British people remains to-day as a cardinal policy of British representation, and that the Indian masses are reduced to a most pitiable condition by our continuous process of exploitation. It is an article which shows the movement of thought in India. Warm tribute is paid to Dr. Banerjee, Secretary to the Council of Post-Graduate Teaching in Calcutta University, who was drowned with his wife and son while on pilgrimage.

Moslem World (January).—Dr. Zwemer says the Moslem world is in revolution, but no one can foretell the result. Missions among Moslems 'need a common platform, a common forum of thought and a common organ for investigation and study.' Dr. Margoliouth shows how the *Moslem World* is invaluable in this respect. 'Folk-Medicine in Modern Egypt,' 'An Indian Fakir,' 'Nubia, the Land of Shadows' are some of the features of this number.

Analecta Bollandiana (Tomus XLVIII., Fasc. iii. iv.).—The first article is on the Lausiac History and the Greek Lives of St. Pachomius. In the history, Pallade tells how an angel appeared to the founder of coenobitism, bearing a tablet of bronze on which were the rules that he was to give his monks. The first rule ran 'Tu laisseras chacun manger et boire selon ses forces.' Other articles are 'The Passion of S. Basile d'Epiphanie' and 'The Ancient Life of S. Front.' Paul Grosjean describes the Commission set up by the Free State of Ireland on Irish manuscripts.

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